William E. Kemp, J.J. Cosgrove and Benj. M. Powers for Kansas City; Clarence S. Palmer for Loewenthal Securities Company and Richard J. Loewenthal. (1) The condemnation judgment was entirely valid and the only one authorized by the Kansas City Charter. City Charter, Art. 6, Secs. 132, 133, 136, 156, 174, 175; Mullins v. Mount Saint Mary's Cemetery Assn., 239 Mo. 681; Mullins v. Mount Saint Mary's Cemetery Assn., 259 Mo. 142; Mullins v. Mount Saint Mary's Cemetery Assn., 268 Mo. 691; Mount Saint Mary's Cemetery Assn. v. Mullins, 248 U.S. 501; Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo. 459; Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20; Farrar v. St. Louis, 80 Mo. 379; Ranney v. Cape Girardeau, 255 Mo. 514; Kansas City v. Denver, 135 S.W. 571. (2) This was a final judgment and cannot be collaterally attacked.

. 1 Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) Section 31; 4 Dillon's Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) Section 1430; 5 McQuillin's Municipal Corporations (2d Ed.) Section 2166; 63 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 1375(b); 48 Am.Jur. Special or Local Assessments, Section 29. Whether a particular public improvement does result in special benefit, within the meaning of the applicable principle, to certain land, is, like the question as to the amount of such special benefit and the proper basis and method of the apportionment thereof, committed to the judgment and sound discretion of the legislative tribunal of the state or municipality having charge of such improvement, and the decision of such tribunal will not be disturbed by the courts in the absence of a clear showing that such decision was wholly arbitrary, capricious, or actuated by fraud or bad faith, Feldhake v. City of Santa Fe, supra; Oliver v. Board of Trustees of Town of Alamogordo, supra; La Mesa Community Ditch v. Appelzoeller, supra; Mt. St. Mary's Cemetery Association v. Mullins, 248 U.S. 501, 39 S.Ct. 173, 174, 63 L.Ed. 383; Marks v. Detroit, 246 Mich. 517, 224 N.W. 619; Larsen v. City and County of San Francisco, 182 Cal. 1, 186 P. 757; Federal Construction Co. v. Ensign, 59 Cal.App. 200, 210 P. 536; Killingsworth v. City of Portland, 93 Or. 525, 184 P. 248; Coates v. Nugent, 76 Kan. 556, 92 P. 597; City of Vancouver v. Corporation of Catholic Bishop of Nisqually, 90 Wn. 319, 156 P. 383; Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. City of Seattle, 46 Wn. 674, 91 P. 244, 12 L.R.A., N.S., 121; Swayne v. City of Hattiesburg, 147 Miss. 244, 111 So. 818, 56 A.L.R. 926. In the language of the United States Supreme Court in St. Mary's Cemetery Association v. Mullins, supra [ 248 U.S. 501, 39 S.Ct. 174], "It is well settled that unless such assessment is arbitrary and unreasonable the extent of the benefit, essential to justify the assessment, was a matter within the control of the local authorities.

Some lots would be sold for the tax, and thus diverted to secular uses. . . . The cemetery, instead of being one consecrated place of burial, or all devoted to business or residence purposes, would be broken up into small fragments used for different and incompatible purposes, rendering the cemetery unfit for the repose of the dead or the activities of the living." The case went to the United States Supreme Court, and it was there said ( Mt. St. Mary's Cemetery Assn. v. Mullins, 248 U.S. 501 [63 L.Ed. 383, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 173, 174, see, also, Rose's U.S. Notes Supp.]): "The plaintiff in error contends that it was deprived of its property without due process of law, inasmuch as about one-half of the tract of 34 acres belonging to the Cemetery Association had, before the assessment, been conveyed for burial lots; that the assessment against the entire tract had the effect to impose the lien upon much of its property arbitrarily, as the burial lots had been conveyed to others. But the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the fee in the title to the burial lots which had been sold or leased was still in the association, with an easement of the right of burial in the lot purchasers.

(a) No notice or hearing is required of legislative acts providing for public work, assessment of special taxes therefor, the establishment of the taxing district within which the special assessment shall be levied, or the apportionment of the tax according to a uniform rule applicable alike to all property in the district. Withnell v. Ruecking Const. Co., 249 U.S. 63; Mt. St. Mary's Cemetery Assn. v. Mullins, 248 U.S. 501; Hancock v. City of Muskogee, 250 U.S. 454; Valley Farms Co. v. County of Westchester, 261 U.S. 155; Miller Lux v. Drain Dist., 256 U.S. 130; St. Louis Casting Co. v. Prendergast Const. Co., 288 Mo. 197, affirmed 260 U.S. 469; Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 551, affirmed in Shumate v. Heman, 181 U.S. 402; Meier v. St. Louis, 180 Mo. 409. (b) The same rule applies to provisions of ordinances of the legislative department of the city (at the time of the passage of the ordinances involved in this case, the Municipal Assembly). Mt. St. Mary's Cemetery Assn. v. Mullins, 248 U.S. 506; Hancock v. City of Muskogee, 250 U.S. 454; St. Louis Casting Co. v. Prendergast Const. Co., 288 Mo. 197, affirmed 260 U.S. 469; Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 551. (4) It is competent for the people of St. Louis to limit by their charter the legislative power of the Municipal Assembly.

(2) The rule of law, and the decisions of this court sustaining the same, constitute no violation of the "due process of law" provisions of the Constitution of the United States. Such procedure in taxation cases is due process of law. L. N. Ry. Co. v. Barber Pav. Co., 197 U.S. 433; Houck v. Little River Drain. Dist., 239 U.S. 264; Wagner v. Baltimore, 239 U.S. 217; Mt. St. Mary's Cem. Assn. v. Mullins, 248 U.S. 501. (3) The apportionment of benefits according to value of the tracts of land in the taxing district is valid. No hearing before the officer making the assessment of value is necessary when the fairness of the valuation can be raised in a suit on the tax bills.

These cases were so exceptional in their facts, that thereunder the effect of the tax was to confiscate property without due process of law. Notwithstanding the contention of the appellant that this case is a parallel one with them, it is sufficient to say that there is no allegation made nor proof offered to bring the case within the exceptional decisions mentioned. On the contrary, it comes clearly within the general rule which has been recently restated by the supreme court of the United States in St.Mary's Cemetery Assn. v. Mullins, 248 U.S. 501, [63 L.Ed. 383, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 173], where it was said: "This court has more than once declared that it does not interfere with the taxation and assessment laws of the states as violative of the fourteenth amendment unless the state's action has beenpalpably arbitrary or grossly unequal in its application to thepersons concerned." (Italics ours.)

Compare to establish any inference of arbitrary oppression. Compare Branson v. Bush, 251 U.S. 182, 190, 191; Mt. St. Mary's Cemetery Assn. v. Mullins, 248 U.S. 501; Embree v. Kansas City Road District, 240 U.S. 242. For that reason the testimony was correctly held to be "immaterial," and the error, if any, "harmless." A street must be properly paved, for the safety and convenience of travelers, as well as for the good of abutting owners.

It is true that the courts of a State have the supreme power to interpret and declare the written and unwritten laws of the State; that this Court's power to review decisions of state courts is limited to their decisions on federal questions; and that the mere fact that a state court has rendered an erroneous decision on a question of state law, or has overruled principles or doctrines established by previous decisions on which a party relied, does not give rise to a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment or otherwise confer appellate jurisdiction on this Court.Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171, 176; Mount St. Mary's Cemetery Ass'n v. Mullins, 248 U.S. 501, 503; Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 255 U.S. 445, 448; Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm., 274 U.S. 651, 655.Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103, 112; Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 461; Willoughby v. Chicago, 235 U.S. 45, 50; O'Neil v. Northern Colorado Irrigation Co., 242 U.S. 20, 26-7; Dunbar v. City of New York, 251 U.S. 516, 519; Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 261 U.S. 114, 118; Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 450; American Railway Express Co. v. Kentucky, 273 U.S. 269, 273.

In such a case it has been frequently decided that the judicial procedure constitutes due process of law and supplies every requirement for due notice and hearing. McMillan v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 41; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104-5; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 345, 355-6; King v. Portland, 184 U.S. 61, 70; Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 255; Embree v. Kansas City Road District, 240 U.S. 242, 251; Mt. St. Mary's Cemetery v. Mullins, 248 U.S. 501, 506. It is unnecessary for us to consider, therefore, the sufficiency of notice and opportunity for a hearing before the council under the statutes of Ohio for assessments, or the question whether plaintiff was estopped by his acquiescence and conduct from raising such an issue.

The facts found by the trial court are sufficient to establish that such omission was arbitrary. Lawrence v. Grand Rapids, supra; Mt. St. Mary's Cemetery v. Mullins, 248 U.S. 501. The conclusions of law upon which the trial court based its judgment were erroneous because the omission of the park property from the sewer district warranted a finding of fact that the members of the Municipal Assembly were actuated by motives which constitute legal fraud; and because the motives of the Municipal Assembly were immaterial. Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703; Brown v. Cape Girardeau, 90 Mo. 377; Kansas City v. Hyde, 196 Mo. 498; Kerfoot v. Chicago, 195 Ill. 229; Potter v. McDowell, 31 Mo. 62.