Opinion
E070855
12-20-2018
M.R., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
Steven L. Harmon, Public Defender, Laura Arnold, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Alan D. Tate, Deputy District Attorney, for Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.Nos. RIF1802003 & RIJ1700046) OPINION ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. Sean P. Lafferty, Judge. Petition is granted. Steven L. Harmon, Public Defender, Laura Arnold, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Alan D. Tate, Deputy District Attorney, for Real Party in Interest.
In this matter, we have reviewed the petition and its exhibits, real party in interest's (real party) opposition, and petitioner's reply. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that the equities favor petitioner. We conclude that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)
I
DISCUSSION
The passage of Proposition 57 in 2016 shifted the presumption of non-suitability for juvenile jurisdiction over an offender who was a minor at the time of the offense, to a presumption of suitability. It "terminated the prosecutor's ability to file a criminal complaint against a juvenile in the criminal court without first obtaining authority from a juvenile court judge to treat the juvenile as an adult. 'Proposition 57 effectively guarantees a juvenile accused felon a right to a fitness hearing before he or she may be sent to the criminal division for prosecution as an adult.' [Citation.]" (J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 711 (J.N.).) Following Proposition 57, "[t]o justify the transfer of a minor from juvenile court to the criminal court system, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the minor is not a suitable candidate for treatment under the juvenile court system. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.770(a); Evid. Code, § 606.)" (J.N., at p. 715.) As to whether to retain a minor in the juvenile system or transfer him or her to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the juvenile court must consider: (A) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor; (B) whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction; (C) the minor's previous delinquent history; (D) success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor; and (E) the circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged to have been committed. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 707, subd. (a)(2)(A)-(E); J.N., at p. 711.) The suitability or fitness determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 680 (Jones); J.N., at p. 714.) The " 'court's findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.' [Citation.]" (J.N., at p. 714.) " 'Substantial evidence' is evidence which is ' "reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value." ' [Citation.]" (People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 614.)
Further citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
Petitioner was 17 at the time of the offense. In childhood, he was neglected and abused by his mother, until he and his sister (sister) were taken in by their maternal grandmother (grandmother) and her husband (grandfather) when petitioner was about 11 years of age. He has no history of delinquency or misconduct, nor of mental disorders. He did chafe under the grandparents' control and complained that the grandfather would not let him do everything he wanted. He expressed a few times to friends that he wanted to kill his family and/or steal the truck and leave but otherwise talked about doing other routine things and had plans to enlist in the Navy after high school. His friends thought he was joking.
On January 13, 2017, petitioner awoke at 3:00 a.m., angry. He got up, took a hunting knife, and went downstairs where his grandfather routinely slept alone. They fought. Petitioner stabbed him several times, including in the heart and lungs. At one point, the knife was knocked out of petitioner's hand and he went into the kitchen, got a different knife, and re-engaged. His grandmother was awakened by the yells and came out of the bedroom. Petitioner ran upstairs and began stabbing her in the torso. She yelled for petitioner's sister to call 911, and petitioner attacked his sister, stabbing her (but less forcefully or effectively). Grandmother got grandfather into the bedroom, where they and petitioner's sister locked themselves in until police arrived. Petitioner had left and was apprehended about 10:30 a.m. near his school. Grandfather died from his wounds, grandmother was severely injured but recovered, and petitioner's sister was injured, but less seriously, and also recovered.
Petitioner is presently charged with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), use of a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, §§ 12022, subd. (b)(1) & 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)), committed while lying in wait (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(15)); and with two counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664 & 187, subd. (a)), use of a deadly weapon, and inflicting great bodily harm (Pen. Code, §§ 12022.7, subd. (a), & 1192.7, subd. (c)(23).) On real party's motion, the juvenile court conducted a transfer hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, between April 16-23, and determined petitioner be transferred to adult court.
In several respects, petitioner's case is similar to that in J.N., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th 706. There, the minor, J.N., was also 17 at the time of the offense. (Id. at p. 710.) J.N. suffered physical abuse in his early life by his father and, to some degree, his mother. He also had prior run-ins with law enforcement and some gang involvement, with a term in juvenile hall. Regarding the offense in question, he and two codefendants were "tagging" or making graffiti in a rival gang's claimed territory. (Id. at pp. 711, 717-718.) While so engaged, an adult rival gang member surprised them and approached codefendant S.C., who pulled a gun to scare him. The rival grabbed the gun in S.C.'s hand and they struggled over it, resulting in shots fired, killing the rival. (Id. at pp. 711-712.) In early 2016, the prosecutor filed a felony complaint directly in criminal court, charging J.N. (and the codefendants) with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), and other charges relating to criminal street gang activities and the special circumstance of murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). (J.N., at p. 712.) (In that regard, the J.N. case is different; J.N. was not the trigger-puller who killed. He was charged with vicariously discharging a firearm, causing death to a non-accomplice. Here, petitioner is charged with having personally committed murder and attempted murder.) Following Proposition 57, the superior court certified J.N. to the juvenile court to determine whether he should be treated in the juvenile court system, or as an adult. Reviewing the five Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 factors, the juvenile court found factors (A), (C), and (D) to be in favor of retaining J.N. in the juvenile system, but, as here, factors (B) and (E) favored transferring him to criminal court jurisdiction, and the juvenile court found in favor of transfer. (J.N., at pp. 713-714.) On writ review, Division Three of this District found that the juvenile court's determination as to factors (B) and (E) was not supported by substantial evidence, mostly because the probation officer's report was itself not supported by substantial evidence; and the prosecution did not otherwise provide substantial evidence to achieve its burden of proof to show unsuitability for juvenile jurisdiction, including no substantial evidence to show that J.N. could not be rehabilitated within the three years remaining under juvenile jurisdiction. (J.N., at pp. 721-724.) We will review the juvenile court's findings here accordingly. --------
On July 10, 2018, petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of mandate. On August 13, 2018, we issued a stay of further proceedings pending briefing and determination of the petition.
Here, the juvenile court's review of the section 707 factors found factor (A), the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor, a "draw." Petitioner argues, and we agree, that a "draw" means the People did not make their preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof of unsuitability. The court found factors (C) and (D) favored petitioner's retention in the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), there being no past history of delinquency and no reason for any prior attempts to rehabilitate. On the other hand, factors (B), possibility of rehabilitation while under DJJ jurisdiction, and (E), the gravity and circumstances of the offense, favored transfer to criminal court. We will examine the latter two factors.
A. Possibility of Rehabilitation
Regarding factor (B), whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction, however, the court's determination is problematic. It reviewed four pieces of evidence in finding that this factor favored transfer: (1) evidence adduced by the prosecution; (2) the probation officer's report; and, expert evidence by psychologists (3) Dr. Rogers (real party; report only) and (4) Dr. Minagawa (defense; report and live testimony).
(1) Prosecution's Evidence
Addressing item (1), the prosecution's testifying witnesses addressed only the facts of the attacks, not petitioner's suitability for juvenile jurisdiction. The only point the prosecution presented on factor (B) was to argue, "Now the second factor, for DJJ to have the ability to rehabilitate him before the jurisdiction ends, which would be at, my understanding, 23 years old—four years—I believe that's four years and three months or so from here, from this date. And DJJ in their wisdom has already set—I pointed out in my moving papers—for just first-degree murder, your Honor, their baseline is that a juvenile needs seven years to rehabilitate from that type of crime. Seven years. [¶] . . . [¶] So, even by DJJ's own recommendation, he's not suitable because he will not be rehabilitated in the time it will take before he's back out in society[,]" apparently referring to the California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 4951. This proceeds on a false premise. Section 4951 states, "A parole consideration date interval of seven years shall be established for those cases committed to the Youth Authority for offenses in this category." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 4951.) That refers to parole consideration intervals, not minimum rehabilitation requirements. (People v. Vela (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1105 ["The DJJ, rather than the court, sets a parole consideration date. DJJ commitments can range from one year or less for nonserious offenses, and up to seven years for the most serious offenses, including murder. (See Cal. Code Regs, tit. 15, §§ 4951-4957.)"]; In re R.O. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1498, fn. 6 [discussing parole consideration intervals].) Absent authority that ties parole consideration to minimum rehabilitation requirements, a mere argument that section 4951 establishes a minimum rehabilitation period does not constitute substantial evidence. Real party has pointed to no such authority, though it continues to rely on this unsupported argument in its informal response. (Cf. J.N., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 722 ["There was no evidence that demonstrated existing programs were unlikely to result in J.N.'s rehabilitation, why they were unlikely to work in this case, or that they would take more than three years to accomplish the task of rehabilitating J.N."]; notably, although the murder charge in J.N. may have involved vicarious shooting of a firearm resulting in death rather than a direct stabbing, it was still a Category I offense involving a violation of Pen. Code, § 187, invoking a seven-year parole consideration under Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 4951, yet the prosecution had the burden of proving that rehabilitation was unlikely in J.N.'s remaining three years in DJJ.) This argument under section 4951 fails to meet real party's burden of proof.
(2) Probation Officer's Report
As to item (2), the probation officer's report also focuses on the seven-year period; she stated petitioner's offense "would be classified under Category I and would be reviewed by the Parole Board within seven years from the date of acceptance to DJJ. However, DJJ would only have jurisdiction of the minor until his 23rd birthday." Also, that the "parole baseline would be seven years; however, jurisdiction of the minor would be only up until his 23rd birthday." The probation officer stated that "a multitude of services including education and behavior mental health counseling" would be available, but did not discuss specific programs, their durations, or the potential success in rehabilitation before DJJ lost jurisdiction. She simply stated, "Even though such services may be available at DJJ, it is felt that due to the severity of the offense, the risk he presents, and the minor's unknown needs, a lengthier period of secure confinement would be warranted. This would potentially require a lengthier projected time of treatment which could extend beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile court." (Italics added.) That is her own unsupported opinion and seems to rest in part on the mistaken precept of the "seven-year minimum rehabilitation" idea. It is not substantial evidence and is inadequate to support a transfer decision. (J.N., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 722 ["The probation officer's opinion in [her] report was not substantial evidence because the opinion lacked support by substantial evidence. [Citation.]"])
(3) Dr. Rogers's Report
As to item (3), Dr. Rogers's expert witness report, we note that the prosecution did not offer it into evidence before the juvenile court; the petitioner did. The report is generally favorable to petitioner, particularly on factor (B). Among other points, her analysis stated, "Because she was denied the opportunity to interview the minor, the Probation Officer also did not know if he showed any inclination toward services, but his openness was evident in both the Police Interview, where the officers made him aware that there would be services available, and also in his test profiles that he is open to help. He also accepted services of a counselor at Juvenile Hall. Given his lack of a Conduct Disorder, or previous antisocial propensities or behaviors, and lack of substance abuse problems, and good intelligence, he appears to be a good candidate for psychological intervention. Because of his openness, therapeutic services will not have to deal with defensiveness, denial or distortion from this minor, and thus he does appear amenable. Often it takes years to get through excuses before therapeutic intervention can actually work, but in this case he appears to be open." The juvenile court discounted this, stating, "Dr. Rogers did, in interviewing [M.R.], come to the conclusion that he was amenable to rehabilitation, but she did so a year after she interviewed him. And she specifically did not say that that would occur within the time frame, even though that was the category under which her opinion fell. Her perspective on it was that he does appear amenable to rehabilitation. And I don't disagree with that. It's a matter of how long and when that does occur. And that absolutely puts me in a position to believe that, at least, as to the second criteria [factor (B)], the People have met their burden." The problem is that the People did not present any evidence of the time required to rehabilitate, except to mistakenly argue that the seven-year parole interval is a minimum rehabilitation period. Dr. Rogers's report does not state rehabilitation cannot be completed within the time remaining to DJJ, nor does she detail the type of programs and services available in DJJ or their efficacy. Therefore, her report is not substantial evidence for the court's determination that the People met their burden.
(4) Dr. Minagawa's Testimony and Report
On the other hand, item (4), Dr. Minagawa's opinion, did address DJJ's ability to rehabilitate petitioner in the time remaining. Dr. Minagawa performed baseline tests on petitioner and reviewed his records, the probation officer's report, Dr. Rogers's report, and petitioner's juvenile hall contact and behavior records. He noted no prior arrests, no alcohol or drug-related citations, and no interventions with the police. Further, he found no history of psychiatric treatment or diagnoses; an MCMI-IV revealed no clinical issues of major depression, major anxiety, or related disorders. Dr. Minagawa assessed petitioner with only an "[a]djustment disorder with anxious mood and parent/child relational problems."
Dr. Minagawa also visited DJJ facilities and researched the facilities and available programs with the superintendent of DJJ and the chief psychologist. He discussed those programs in testimony and his expert report. He testified that the DJJ facility has a ratio of one and a half psychologists for every 12 minors in the behavioral mental health unit. DJJ uses an evidence-based treatment process proven effective in treating depression, anxiety, and other mental health problems; cognitive behavioral therapy is a foundation for treatment, and minors must participate in mental health treatment. DJJ also provides programs in taking responsibility, victim impact, how to restore to justice, independent life skills, vocational training to transition back to the community and others.
Specific to petitioner's case, Dr. Minagawa found no barriers to treatment. Regarding the amount of time left before petitioner turns 23 (at that time, the nominal age where DJJ would lose jurisdiction), Dr. Minagawa opined that five years is more than sufficient time to address mental health and substance abuse issues and provide counseling. In petitioner's case, the focus will be on his rage and anger he had at the time, which he was not able to control. He stated, "So if [M.R.] is allowed to stay in DJJ, I anticipate that the mental health counseling that he'll receive will focus on that rage that he experienced." Importantly, Dr. Minagawa also discussed the positive progress petitioner had already made in the year he was in DJJ before the transfer hearing, including his remorse, progress in programs, and completion of his high school diploma.
He opined that petitioner should not be transferred to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. These opinions, resting on personal knowledge of DJJ programs and facilities, are substantial evidence. (J.N., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 722.)
Nonetheless, the juvenile court did not accept Dr. Minagawa's opinion, stating, "And with respect to Dr. Minagawa—I should be clear. I think this is the third time I have heard him testify, and he's a very persuasive witness. I absolutely recognize his expertise in this area and the work he does in this area as well. [¶] But make no mistake, he has a viewpoint or a vantage point that I think does reflect his position; which is with respect to youth and youth who are engaged in criminality that the best place for them, from his viewpoint, is going to be the Division of Juvenile Justice, if it is in fact necessary that they go there at all. [¶] I always appreciate hearing his perspectives, but I have to take a different approach to it than just accepting it at face value. [The prosecutor] made some good points on the cross-examination of him that—where it struck. There were certain things about what is going on with [M.R.] that Dr. Minagawa just couldn't answer. And again, a lot of it comes down to the why. And without knowing the why, being able to confidently predict rehabilitation or that he would be completed and done with respect to the four-year assessment, to suggest that I think is incorrect. And I was not persuaded by that." The court thus rejected Dr. Minagawa's opinions based on a perception that the doctor's "viewpoint or [ ] vantage point" defaults to keeping a juvenile offender in juvenile court. Certainly, the People argue this. The court stated that points in the prosecutor's cross-examination supported making its decision but did not identify what they were. Yet, the court is required to "recite the basis for its decision in an order entered upon the minutes." (§ 707, subd. (a)(2).) It did not, either in the hearing transcript or in the form order.
It also appears the juvenile court gave credence to the idea that the seven-year parole interval sets the minimum rehabilitation period at DJJ. The court stated, "When I look at the specifics of what is available in the juvenile court jurisdiction, my—I have a hard time getting away with the fact that—away from the fact that when the juvenile system says, his type of crime—just based on the charge alone, not necessarily what the actual conduct is, but the charge alone presents him at a seven-year matrix of getting through it." To the extent that the seven-year parole consideration period is necessarily tied to a minimum rehabilitation period, that idea is incorrect.
Moreover, the court stated it could not retain petitioner in DJJ without knowing the "why" of his offense, apparently referring to petitioner's inability to explain his rage at the time of the attacks. But, there was no evidence that current understanding of the "why" of the offense would affect the term for juvenile rehabilitation; in fact, Dr. Minagawa expressly opined that the focus for petitioner's rehabilitation in DJJ would lie in addressing his rage, the thrust of the acts he committed. The court's finding as to "why" is not supported by substantial evidence. The court also apparently shifted the burden to petitioner to show he is suitable for DJJ, given the lack of substantial evidence supporting real party's argument that he is not. Real party's response here does not persuasively show otherwise.
B. Gravity and Circumstances of the Charged Offense
"In determining this factor, the court may consider and 'give weight to any relevant factor, including but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the person's degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the person's mental and emotional development.' (§ 707, subd. (a)(2)(E)(ii).)" (J.N., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.)
Here, the juvenile court debated whether petitioner acted in rage, as both psychologists testified, or merely awoke angry, consistent with his statements to law enforcement, and simply acted in a stealthy manner during the attacks. The court noted that at some point, petitioner decided to use a knife in the attacks, which the court characterized as "an intensely personal intimate act." He stabbed the grandfather several times, twice fatally, and continues the attack despite exchanges of " 'I love you' " between them both, including replacing the knife he lost. Going upstairs, petitioner told his grandmother that grandfather was calling for her, and then stabbed her in the back, before attacking his sister. The court then stated that such an act is "not a rage." That seems to controvert the evidence of both psychologists. Moreover, then, the court returned to the question of "why." "Again, I come back to the why. I can't get to the why. And [M.R.] in his conversations with the doctors are not either. But I don't hear at any point from at least Dr. Minagawa—I'll put this responsibility on him—how it is he comes to the conclusion that this can be handled and dealt with within a four-year time span."
Unquestionably, the nature and result of the attacks, and petitioner's personal involvement in them, are grave and serious. But, the juvenile court seems to equivocate on the "why" question here, as in the analysis of factor (B), above, leaving the issue open to some degree. The court also revisited the issue of ability to rehabilitate, but explicitly put the responsibility on Dr. Minagawa, petitioner's expert witness, to explain how petitioner could be rehabilitated in a four-year period given the lack of an answer to "why." In that light, the court appears to put the burden of proof on petitioner to make such a showing. As we noted above, there was no substantial evidence presented that current understanding of the "why" of the offense would affect the term for juvenile rehabilitation, or the ultimate weight to be given factor (E), the gravity and circumstances of the offense. As the court observed, "[t]he loss of any human being is—at the hands of murder is horrific." Yet, section 707 "does not exclude juveniles charged with murder from consideration for treatment in juvenile court." (J.N., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 724.) Given that we will direct the juvenile court to reconsider real party's motion to transfer, the court should include factor (E) in that reconsideration.
C. Conclusion
In sum, on the five-factor analysis alone, we find that real party has not sustained its burden by a preponderance of the evidence that petitioner is unsuitable for juvenile court, as discussed herein. Most specifically, real party has not shown by substantial evidence that petitioner cannot be rehabilitated within the time remaining of juvenile jurisdiction in the DJJ. Instead, the juvenile court appears to have required petitioner to show that he can be and is suitable for treatment in the juvenile jurisdiction. That was appropriate prior to Proposition 57, under the former presumption of unsuitability for juvenile treatment, but is not under the current presumption of suitability. We therefore find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting real party's motion and transferring petitioner to a court of criminal jurisdiction while placing the burden of proof on petitioner for the intended fitness hearing. Accordingly, the petition should be granted for the purpose of directing the trial court to reconsider the motion to transfer petitioner to a court of criminal jurisdiction.
There is another matter to include in the trial court's reconsideration, however. As petitioner points out, after the April 23 order and petitioner's transfer, Assembly Bill No. 1812 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended the time for DJJ's jurisdiction over a minor felony offender. Welfare and Institutions Code sections 1769, subdivision (d)(2), 607, subdivision (b), and 1771, subdivision (c)(2) (all effective June 27, 2018), now give DJJ jurisdiction until a minor felony offender turns 25 for commitments occurring on or after July 1, 2018. Real party admits this change, but "denies, however, that this change to the maximum commitment period can necessarily and constitutionally be applied to a minor who committed his [ ] offenses prior to the enactment of the legislation, and accordingly further denies that advance knowledge of this legislative change would have affected the superior court's ruling." Real party offers no authority for its "denial," however, and offers no further explanation. For his part, petitioner argues on reply that real party's opposition is "presumably" based on "ex post facto concerns." He argues to the contrary, that ex post facto issues are inapplicable because the amendments are not penal in nature. Notwithstanding, petitioner also "[r]ecogniz[es] that this question is not squarely presented in this writ proceeding . . . ." It is, however, a valid point and one which would possibly yield up to two more years of rehabilitative effort by the DJJ on petitioner's behalf, if the amendments apply to him. Petitioner was originally committed to the DJJ prior to July 1, 2018, and was then transferred to the superior court in a court of criminal jurisdiction, also prior to July 1, 2018. Transfer back to juvenile court now, obviously post-July 1, 2018, with a potential commitment to DJJ, raises the question whether the change to jurisdiction until age 25 applies to petitioner. That—and the related question, would the additional time affect the analysis under factor (B)—should be included in the trial court's reconsideration.
II
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing the Superior Court of Riverside County to vacate its order of April 23, 2018, in Riverside Superior Court case No. RIJ1700046, transferring petitioner to a court of criminal jurisdiction, and to enter a new and different order returning petitioner to juvenile jurisdiction for the purpose of the trial court to reconsider afresh real party's motion to declare minor not fit and proper subject for juvenile court. Reconsideration will include:
(1) Reviewing or receiving substantial evidence on section 707, subdivisions (a)(2)(A)-(E), specifically to include hearing substantial evidence on the issue of whether petitioner may be rehabilitated within the time remaining under DJJ jurisdiction;
(2) Considering whether petitioner's time remaining under DJJ jurisdiction extends until age 25, pursuant to the amendments effected by Assembly Bill No. 1812 discussed herein, and, if an additional two years under DJJ jurisdiction results, whether that has a further impact on petitioner's rehabilitation within the time remaining;
(3) Requiring further briefing by the parties and conducting a further evidentiary hearing in reconsideration, as necessary; and,
(4) Rendering a decision supported by substantial evidence as to petitioner's suitability or unsuitability for juvenile jurisdiction, and retention in DJJ or transfer to a court of criminal jurisdiction accordingly.
Petitioner is directed to prepare and have the peremptory writ of mandate issued, copies served, and the original filed with the clerk of this court, together with proof of service on all parties. The stay previously imposed by this court is LIFTED.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. McKINSTER
J.