"Because the applicable provisions of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are ‘co-extensive,’ [the court] discuss[es] both claims together, focusing on the ADA." M.R. v. Dreyfus, 697 F.3d 706, 733 (9th Cir. 2012). Similarly, California Government Code § 11135(b) affords the same level of protections as the ADA.
"The ‘most integrated setting’ is the one that ‘enables individuals with disabilities to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest extent possible.’ " M.R. v. Dreyfus , 697 F.3d 706, 734 (9th Cir. 2012.) Simply labeling a setting as "community-based" does not obviate the legal requirement to engage in a fact-based, individualized inquiry.
In addition, by concluding that the PCS Recipients are likely to succeed on their ADA claim, the majority opinion appears to equate any risk of institutionalization with the substantially higher actual legal standard, which is a “ serious risk of institutionalization.” M.R. v. Dreyfus, 697 F.3d 706, 734 (9th Cir.2012) (emphasis added). It is not enough for the PCS Recipients to show that they face some risk of institutionalization; they must show that the risk of institutionalization that they face is actual and severe.
Payan v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 11 F.4th at 738 (9th Cir. 2021).M.R. v. Dreyfus, 697 F.3d 706, 733 (9th Cir. 2012); accord Thomas v. Kent, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2017); Wyatt B. by McAllister v. Brown, No. 6:19-cv-00556-AA, 2021 WL 4434011, at *11 (D. Or. Sept. 27, 2021). The U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") has promulgated regulations implementing the ADA.
Thus, a preliminary injunction may be granted "if there is a likelihood of irreparable injury to the plaintiff; there are serious questions going to the merits; the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of the plaintiff; and the injunction is in the public interest." M.R. v. Dreyfus, 697 F.3d 706, 725 (9th Cir. 2012). Additionally, the Prison Litigation Reform Act provides:
Other courts have latched onto this reasoning. See Davis v. Shah, 821 F.3d 231 (2d Cir. 2016); Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2013); Waskul v. Washtenaw Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health, 979 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2020); Radaszewski ex rel. Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 2004); Steimel v. Wernert, 823 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 2016); M.R. v. Dreyfus, 663 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2011), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, 697 F.3d 706 (9th Cir. 2012). Further, a theory framed on the "risk of unjustified institutionalization" is particularly inapt in the face of Mississippi's legal regime for commitment to hospitals for the mentally disabled.
A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it is "illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record." M.R. v. Dreyfus, 697 F.3d 706, 725 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)). Applying these standards, we reverse.
However, a plaintiff "need not further show that the action sought to be enjoined is the exclusive cause of the injury." M.R. v. Dreyfus , 697 F.3d 706, 728 (9th Cir. 2012). While the irreparable harm must be causally connected to the activity to be enjoined, we have not held that the cause of an irreparable injury must be defined as narrowly as federal defendants and intervenor-defendants suggest.
Unsurprisingly, against this backdrop, courts of appeals applying the disability discrimination claim recognized in Olmstead have consistently held that the risk of institutionalization can support a valid claim under the integration mandate. See Pashby, 709 F.3d at 322 (4th Cir.2013) (holding that plaintiffs may raise successful ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims “because they face a risk of institutionalization”); M.R. v. Dreyfus, 697 F.3d 706, 720 (9th Cir.2012) (recognizing violation where plaintiffs established that “reduced access to personal care services will place them at serious risk of institutionalization”); Radaszewski ex rel. Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 608 (7th Cir.2004) (recognizing violation where state's actions “portend [ ] ... unjustified institutional isolation” (internal quotation marks omitted));Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1181–82 (10th Cir.2003) (holding that Olmstead does not require a disabled person to submit to institutionalization when “imperiled with segregation” due to a state policy). As the Tenth Circuit has observed, “nothing in the plain language of the [integration mandate]” nor “in the Olmstead decision supports a conclusion that institutionalization is a prerequisite to enforcement.”
A factual finding constitutes clear error if it is “ ‘illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.’ ” M.R. v. Dreyfus, 697 F.3d 706, 725 (9th Cir.2012) (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc)). We hold that the district court in this case abused its discretion when it denied a preliminary injunction.