Decided September 11, 1997 Appeal from 2d Dept: 237 A.D.2d 586 MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL

As noted by the court in its decision, successive summary judgment motions in the same action are discouraged. However, as further noted by the court, "a subsequent summary judgment motion may be properly entertained [by the trial court] when it is substantively valid and [when] the granting of the motion will further the ends of justice while eliminating an unnecessary burden on the resources of the courts" ( Rose v. Horton Med. Ctr. , 29 AD3d 977, 978 [2006] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see alsoGraham v. City of New York , 136 AD3d 747 [2016] ; Fuller v. Nesbitt , 116 AD3d 999 [2014] ; Valley Natl. Bank v. INI Holding, LLC , 95 AD3d 1108 [2012] ; Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Timm , 237 AD2d 586 [1997] ; 885 Park Ave. Brooklyn, LLC v. Goddard , 55 Misc 3d 74 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017] ). The decision whether to consider a successive summary judgment motion rests within the sound discretion of the motion court.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs. Although multiple summary judgment motions in the same action should be discouraged in the absence of a showing of newly discovered evidence or other sufficient cause, a subsequent summary judgment motion may be properly entertained when it is substantively valid and when the granting of the motion will further the ends of justice while eliminating an unnecessary burden on the resources of the courts ( see Landmark Capital Invs., Inc. v. Li–Shan Wang, 94 A.D.3d 418, 941 N.Y.S.2d 144, 144 [1st Dept 2012]; Town of Angelica v. Smith, 89 A.D.3d 1547, 1549, 933 N.Y.S.2d 480;Miles A. Kletter, D.M.D. & Andrew S. Levine, D.D.S., P.C. v. Fleming, 32 A.D.3d 566, 567, 820 N.Y.S.2d 348;Rose v. Horton Med. Ctr., 29 A.D.3d 977, 978, 816 N.Y.S.2d 174;Varsity Tr. v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 300 A.D.2d 38, 39, 752 N.Y.S.2d 603;Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Timm, 237 A.D.2d 586, 587, 655 N.Y.S.2d 611;Detko v. McDonald's Rests. of N.Y., 198 A.D.2d 208, 209, 603 N.Y.S.2d 496). Contrary to the defendants' contention, under the circumstances present here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in entertaining the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law against the defendants by submitting proof of the underlying credit agreement, the individual defendant's personal guaranty of the corporate defendant's obligations under the credit agreement, and the corporate defendant's failure to pay the outstanding principal balance of $77,777.78, in accordance with the terms of the credit agreement ( see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Laniado, 72 A.D.3d 645, 645, 897 N.Y.S.2d 514).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs. There is no merit to the plaintiff's contention that the order dated April 20, 2005, should be vacated because the defendants' motion for summary judgment was an improper, second motion for summary judgment ( see Wit's End Giftique v Ianniello, 211 AD2d 684, 686 [2000]; Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v Timm, 237 AD2d 586, 587). Moreover, although the plaintiff and the Supreme Court treated the order dated April 20, 2005, as having been entered upon the plaintiff's default in appearing at oral argument, a reading of that order reveals that the Supreme Court considered the plaintiff's papers.

Therefore, the Supreme Court properly entertained the Hospital's subsequent motion which addressed that issue, and which, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, eliminated the question of fact, thus warranting dismissal of the complaint. Under such circumstances, it was a better use of judicial resources to entertain this second summary judgment motion, instead of conducting a full trial ( see Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Timm, 237 AD2d 586). The Supreme Court also properly rejected the redacted and unsigned "affidavit" of the plaintiff's expert.

FCIC first received notice of the accident approximately 4 1/2 years after the alleged injury occurred, and approximately two years after the claimant commenced a personal injury action against the insured, in which the insured was declared in default. The notice of accident, sent by the insured's broker, was late as a matter of law ( see Deso v. London Lancashire Ins. Co. of America, 3 N.Y.2d 127, 130; Matter of DeLeon v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 243 A.D.2d 475, 476; Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Timm, 237 A.D.2d 586, 587; Town Bd. of Town of Poughkeepsie v. Continental Ins. Co., 213 A.D.2d 475, 477; Platsky v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 181 A.D.2d 764, 765). Contrary to the claimant's assertions, the notice the claimant provided to the insured's insurance broker was not notice to the insurer ( see Security Mut. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Acker-Fitzsimons Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 436, 442 n 3; Serravillo v. Sterling Ins. Co., 261 A.D.2d 384, 385; Incorporated Vil. of Pleasantville v. Calvert Ins. Co., 204 A.D.2d 689). The claimant did not exercise his right pursuant to Insurance Law § 3420(a)(3) to provide independent notification to FCIC.

Exceptions are permitted to the rule against successive summary judgment motions not only when evidence has been newly discovered since the prior motion (a circumstance concededly not obtaining here), but also when "other sufficient cause" for the subsequent motion exists (see Freeze Right Refrigeration Air Conditioning Servs., Inc. v. City of New York, 101 A.D.2d 175, 180). Here, sufficient cause to except to the rule exists inasmuch as the record, clarified in the wake of A.C. Transportation (supra), demonstrates that the matter can be further disposed of without burdening the resources of the court and movants with a plenary trial (see Detko v. McDonald's Rests., 198 A.D.2d 208, 209;see also Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Timm, 237 A.D.2d 586, 587, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 806). If a dispositive point can be reached, it should be (see e.g. Lewis v. Hertz Corp., 212 A.D.2d 476, 477, lv dismissed 80 N.Y.2d 893, and lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 810). Under the subject agreements, plaintiff is barred from billing for costs that are not "ordinary and reasonable."