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Mott v. Iossa

12 Citing cases

  1. West Park Ave., Inc. v. Township of Ocean

    48 N.J. 122 (N.J. 1966)   Cited 35 times
    Holding that while exactions for contributions to local board of education were illegal, N.J.S.A. 40:55-1.20, the predecessor statute to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-44, gave local governments the authority to require developers to reserve portions of their properties for parks and recreational purposes

    This is the usual rule. 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5 th ed. 1941), § 419e, p. 180; 27 Am. Jur.2 d, Equity, § 158. p. 694; § 160, p. 696; Restatement, Restitution § 148, comment b, p. 590 (1937); Mott v. Iossa, 119 N.J. Eq. 185, 192 ( Ch. 1935); cf. Bahr v. Breeze Corporations, Inc.,126 N.J. Eq. 124, 128 ( Ch. 1939), affirmed o.b. 127 N.J. Eq. 257 ( E. A. 1940); Merchants Indemnity Corp. v. Eggleston, 37 N.J. 114, 132 (1962). Moreover defendants did not make out the defense of laches, even if it were relevant. This is so for two reasons.

  2. Stellmah v. Hunterdon Coop. G.L.F. Serv., Inc.

    219 A.2d 616 (N.J. 1966)   Cited 27 times
    Upholding judgment of adoption entered after death of adopting parent, thereby making the child eligible for worker's compensation benefits

    We agree with the Appellate Division that Frank, Jr. cannot recover death benefits under a theory of in loco parentis, as that rule is no more than a description of "actual dependency." Amadeo v. Amadeo, 64 N.J. Super. 417, 425 ( App. Div. 1960); D. v. D., 56 N.J. Super. 357, 361 ( App. Div. 1959); Mottv. Iossa, 119 N.J. Eq. 185, 187 ( Ch 1935); Brinkerhoff andWife v. Merselis' Executors, 24 N.J.L. 680 ( Sup. Ct. 1855). II.

  3. Weisberg v. Koprowski

    17 N.J. 362 (N.J. 1955)   Cited 20 times
    In Weisberg, supra, this Court acknowledged the criticism of the rule presuming a gift based “on considerations of the closeness of the relationship or the extent of natural affection, [ ]or by reason of any legal obligation to furnish support.

    Restatement, supra, pp. 1355 et seq.; 3 Scott, Trusts (1939), p. 2256 et seq. Thus, a gift or advancement is presumed where a husband takes title in the name of his wife, Lipp v. Fielder, 72 N.J. Eq. 439 ( E. A. 1907); Gorrellv. Gorrell, 97 N.J. Eq. 367 ( E. A. 1925), or a father in the name of his son, Brower v. Brower, 98 N.J. Eq. 218 ( Ch. 1925), affirmed 99 N.J. Eq. 414 ( E. A. 1926), or a stepfather in favor of a stepchild, Mott v. Iossa,119 N.J. Eq. 185 ( Ch. 1935). But the usual inference of a resulting trust and not of a gift is said to arise where the wife is payor and takes title in the name of her husband, or, as in the instant case, where the child purchases the property and takes title in the name of his parent.

  4. Hooton v. Neeld

    97 A.2d 153 (N.J. 1953)   Cited 8 times
    In Hooton v. Neeld, 12 N.J. 396, 97 A.2d 153, the court declined to overrule the MacClurkan case, supra, but applied its ruling to similar facts and held that an inheritance tax was not assessable on a transfer of intangibles under an irrevocable trust executed and delivered by the transferor while a resident of Virginia, where the sole right retained by the transferor was the right to receive the income from the property transferred even though the transferor subsequently moved to New Jersey and died a resident thereof.

    See 1 Restatement of the Law, Trusts (1935), sec. 91, p. 261; sec. 109, p. 286. An infant's acceptance of a trust may be confirmed or disclaimed upon his coming of age. Cf.Ownes v. Ownes, 23 N.J. Eq. 60, 63 ( Ch. 1872); Mott v.Iossa, 119 N.J. Eq. 185, 191 ( Ch. 1935); Scott on Trusts (1939), sec. 91, p. 497. Compare 54 Am. Jur., Trusts, sec. 115, p. 101.

  5. Hague v. Warren

    137 N.J. Eq. 117 (N.J. 1945)

    Carlisle v. Cooper, 18 N.J. Eq. 241. In the case of Mott v. Iossa, 119 N.J. Eq. 185;181 Atl. Rep. 689, Vice-Chancellor Bigelow had before him for consideration the right of a complainant to equitable aid in the enforcement of a legal right. Complainant alleged that he was an infant when certain property was conveyed to the defendants; that he received no consideration therefor; and prayed that the deed be canceled. It appeared that complainant waited fifteen years after coming of age before bringing suit.

  6. Strong v. Strong

    134 N.J. Eq. 513 (N.J. 1944)   Cited 19 times
    In Strong v. Strong, 134 N.J. Eq. 513, Vice-Chancellor Jayne considered a case where a wife acquired title to property for consideration paid by her husband and the question, whether beneficial title was in him, arose after they became estranged.

    upon satisfactory and explicit proof of a contemporaneous intention inconsistent with the grant manifestly exhibited by the deed. Of the numerous authorities, only a few of the more familiar need be cited: Peer v. Peer, 11 N.J. Eq. 432; Midmer v. Midmer's Executors, 26 N.J. Eq. 299; affirmed, 27 N.J. Eq. 548;Linker v. Linker, 32 N.J. Eq. 174; Lister v. Lister,35 N.J. Eq. 49; affirmed, 37 N.J. Eq. 331; Read v. Huff, 40 N.J. Eq. 229;Duvale v. Duvale, 56 N.J. Eq. 375; 39 Atl. Rep. 687;Selover v. Selover, 62 N.J. Eq. 761; 48 Atl. Rep. 522; Herbert v. Alvord, 75 N.J. Eq. 428; 72 Atl. Rep. 946; Beck v. Beck,78 N.J. Eq. 544; 80 Atl. Rep. 550; Thomas v. Thomas, 79 N.J. Eq. 461;81 Atl. Rep. 748; McGee v. McGee, 81 N.J. Eq. 190;86 Atl. Rep. 406; Hood v. Hood, 83 N.J. Eq. 695; 93 Atl. Rep. 797;Andreas v. Andreas, 84 N.J. Eq. 375; 94 Atl. Rep. 415;affirmed, 85 N.J. Eq. 210; 96 Atl. Rep. 39; Prisco v. Prisco,90 N.J. Eq. 289; 110 Atl. Rep. 111; Gorrell v. Gorrell, 97 N.J. Eq. 367;127 Atl. Rep. 346; Mott v. Iossa, 119 N.J. Eq. 185;181 Atl. Rep. 689; Ritter v. Ritter, 125 N.J. Eq. 212;4 Atl. Rep. 2d 846; Hill v. Lamoreaux, 132 N.J. Eq. 580;30 Atl. Rep. 2d 833; 4 Pom. Eq. Jur. ( 5th ed.) § 1039. The defendant Mr. Strong expressly instructed the bank to grant the title to the premises absolutely to his wife.

  7. Smith v. Smith

    23 A.2d 903 (N.J. 1942)

    The cases enunciating principles applying to the situation under consideration are numerous in this state. Among them are: City National Bank v. Hamilton, 34 N.J. Eq. 158; Lykles v. Lykles, 109 N.J. Eq. 490; 158 Atl. Rep. 105; Levi v. Levi,111 N.J. Eq. 127; 161 Atl. Rep. 835; Gordon v. Griffith, 113 N.J. Eq. 554;168 Atl. Rep. 57; Szpak v. Szpak, 114 N.J. Eq. 143;168 Atl. Rep. 386; Mott v. Iossa, 119 N.J. Eq. 185;181 Atl. Rep. 689. I shall advise a decree for the complainant.

  8. Shayegan v. Baldwin

    9 N.J. Tax 452 (Tax 1987)   Cited 1 times

    Restatement, supra, pp. 1355 et seq.; 3 Scott Trusts (1939), p. 2256 et seq. Thus, a gift or advancement is presumed where a husband takes title in the name of his wife, Lipp v. Fielder, 72 N.J. Eq. 439 [66 A.2d 189] (E. A. 1907); Gorrell v. Gorrell, 97 N.J. Eq. 367 [127 A. 346] (E. A. 1925), or a father in the name of his son, Brower v. Brower, 98 N.J. Eq. 218 [130 A. 222] (Ch. 1925), affirmed 99 N.J. Eq. 414 [131 A. 918] (E. A. 1926), or a stepfather in favor of a stepchild, Mott v. Iossa, 119 N.J. Eq. 185 [ 181 A. 689] (Ch. 1935). But the usual inference of a resulting trust and not of a gift is said to arise where the wife is payor and takes title in the name of her husband, or, as in the instant case, where the child purchases the property and takes title in the name of his parent.

  9. A.S. v. B.S

    139 N.J. Super. 366 (Ch. Div. 1976)   Cited 21 times
    Defining role as "one who means to put himself in the situation of the lawful father with reference to the father's office and duty of making provision for the child"

    After the severance of that marriage the relationship between the child and his or her natural mother is no different from what it was before that marriage. Green v. Dept. of Institutions Agencies, 109 N.J. Super. 462 (App.Div. 1970); Tartaglio v. Dept. of Institutions Agencies, 102 N.J. Super. 592 (App.Div. 1968) cert. den 394 U.S. 1000, 89 S.Ct. 1594, 22 L.Ed.2d 778 (1969); Falzo v. Falzo, 84 N.J. Super. 343 (App.Div. 1964); Amadeo v. Amadeo, 64 N.J. Super. 417 (App.Div. 1960) D. v. D. 56 N.J. Super. 357 (App.Div. 1959), Schneider v. Schneider, 25 N.J. Misc. 180, 52 A.2d 564 (Ch. 1947), Mott v. Iossa, 119 N.J. Eq. 185 (Ch. 1935). In the case at bar the child, then a month old, was received by these parties who were neither his natural nor adoptive parents.

  10. Notaro v. Notaro

    38 N.J. Super. 311 (Ch. Div. 1955)   Cited 5 times

    The length of time within which an infant may, after reaching majority, disaffirm a contract may extend for the periods prescribed in the statute of limitations, subject, of course, to an earlier loss of such right by conduct of the emancipated minor amounting to a ratification or constituting estoppel. In Mott v. Iossa, 119 N.J. Eq. 185 ( Ch. 1935), the court said: "In determining which rule to adopt, we should bear in mind that the privilege of a former infant to avoid his deed is a legal right, enforceable in a court of law. Ross v. Adams, 28 N.J.L. 160, 161; Adams v. Ross, 30 N.J.L. 505; Peacock v. Binder, 57 N.J.L. 374.