Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:02-CV-1366-G
March 28, 2003
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is the motion of the plaintiff Robert W. Mott ("Mott") for leave to amend his complaint. For the reasons discussed below, Mott's motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
This case involves allegations of fraudulent inducement and breach of contract by Mott against PFPC, Inc. ("PFPC"), his former employer. Mott is a resident and domiciliary of Dallas, Texas. See Plaintiff's Original Petition ("Petition") ¶ 11, attached to Notice of Removal. PFPC is a Massachusetts corporation with its principal place of business in Delaware. See Petition ¶ 2; Notice of Removal at 2.
On May 23, 2002, Mott filed his original petition with the District Court of Dallas County, 191st Judicial District. Notice of Removal at 1. PFPC removed the case on June 28, 2002, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, 1441, and 1446. Id. at 2. On August 22, 2002, this court issued a scheduling order as authorized by FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) and the local rules. See Order Establishing Schedule and Certain Pretrial Requirements, August 22, 2002 ("Scheduling Order"). The court's scheduling order set a November 21, 2002 deadline for "all motions requesting the joinder of additional parties or amendments of pleadings." Id. ¶ 3(a). On February 28, 2003, nine months after the filing of his complaint and three months after the scheduling order deadline, Mott filed the instant motion for leave to amend. See Plaintiff's First Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, and Brief in Support ("Plaintiff's Motion"); Docket Sheet.
II. ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) governs the amendment of pleadings after a scheduling order deadline has expired. SW Enterprises, L.L. C. v. South trust Bank of Alabama, 315 F.3d 533, 535-36 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Foster, No. 3-00-CV-1080-BD, 2002 WL 31433295 at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2002); Howell v. Standard Motor Products, Inc., No. 4:99-CV-0987-E, 2001 WL 196969 at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2001). Under Rule 16(b), a scheduling order "shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause and by leave of the district judge." The good cause standard requires a showing that, despite his diligence, the movant could not reasonably have met the scheduling order deadline. SW Enterprises, 315 F.3d at 535; Foster, 2002 WL 31433295 at *1; Howell, 2001 WL 196969 at *1. In determining whether the movant has met this burden, the court considers: (1) the explanation for the failure to timely move for leave to amend; (2) the importance of the amendment; (3) the potential prejudice in allowing the amendment; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure any such prejudice. SW Enterprises, 315 F.3d at 536 (citing Reliance Insurance Company v. Louisiana Land Exploration Company, 110 F.3d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 1997)). Absent a demonstration of good cause, the more liberal standard of Rule 15(a) will not apply to the court's decision to grant or deny leave to amend. SW Enterprises, 315 F.3d at 536; see also Foster, 2002 WL 31433295 at *1; Howell, 2001 WL 196969 at *1.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend should be "freely given when justice so requires." The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that Rule 15(a) evinces a liberal amendment policy. See, e.g., Lowrey v. Texas A M University System, 117 F.3d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 1997); Nance v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 817 F.2d 1176, 1180 (5th Cir. 1987); Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 348 (5th Cir. 1986). A motion to amend under Rule 15(a), therefore, should not be denied unless there is a substantial reason to do so. Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District, 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)).
In the present case, three of the four factors under the Rule 16(b) analysis weigh strongly against granting Mott leave to amend his complaint. The first factor weighs against Mott because he has offered no adequate basis for his failure to amend prior to the court-ordered deadline. According to Mott, the motion was untimely because "during discovery and . . . development of [the instant] case, counsel recognized a cause of action that had not been previously considered." See Mott's Reply to Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint at 1. The proposed amendment, however, appears to rely on language contained in a document known to Mott from the time of his original pleading. See Amended Complaint ¶ 19, attached to Plaintiff's Motion. Mott therefore could have asserted his new theory at that time or, at the very least, within the six months remaining before the scheduling order deadline. Consequently, Mott's only explanation for the delay — his counsel's failure to recognize a cause of action — "is tantamount to no explanation at all." See SW Enterprises, 315 F.3d at 536.
The third factor weighs against Mott because his proposed amendment adds a new theory in support of his breach of contract claim, which would presumably require PFPC to conduct additional research and discovery. Given the current discovery deadline of May 31, 2003, see Scheduling Order ¶ 6, allowing the amendment would therefore cause undue prejudice to PFPC. While the court could extend the discovery period in order to cure this prejudice, such an extension would cause undue delay and possibly require the court to reset the current trial date. In light of Mott's failure to present any adequate explanation for his untimely motion, such disruption to the court's docket is unwarranted. See Reliance Insurance, 110 F.3d at 258 ("District judges have the power to control their dockets by refusing to give ineffective litigants a second chance to develop their case"); Guillory v. Domtar Industries Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1332 (5th Cir. 1996) ("It is well established that the district court is entitled the [sic] manage its court room and docket"); Freeman v. Continental Gin Company, 381 F.2d 459, 469 (5th Cir. 1967) ("A busy district court need not allow itself to be imposed upon by the presentation of theories seriatim"). The fourth factor, therefore, also weighs against granting Mott leave to amend. Accordingly, Mott has failed to show good cause to modify the scheduling order pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 16(b) and his motion for leave to amend must therefore be denied.
Mott's amended complaint seeks to add the following language:
"[T]he provision in the January 25, 2002, memorandum denying Mott payment if he is fired for cause is invalid. The requirement that Mott be employed by PFPC when the sums become payable constitutes a forfeiture or a penalty that is invalid under Texas contract law."See Amended Complaint ¶ 19 (emphasis added).
Because Mott has failed to meet the good cause standard of Rule 16(b), the court need not address whether Mott's motion satisfies the requirements of Rule 15(a). See SW Enterprises, 315 F.3d at 536.