Motor Co. v. State

4 Citing cases

  1. Legum v. Carlin

    168 Md. 191 (Md. 1935)   Cited 14 times
    In Legum v. Carlin, 168 Md. 191, 177 A. 287 (Ct.App. 1935), the issue was whether an automobile sales room was a public garage as intended within the terms of a covenant against use of land for such use.

    The appellees put their reliance chiefly on the opinions of this Court in Stubbs v. Scott, 127 Md. 86, 95 A. 1060, and Baltimore City v. Scott, 131 Md. 228, 101 A. 674, and section 228, article 56 of the Code, construed in Montgomery County Motor Co. v. State, 147 Md. 232, 127 A. 637. In the first of these cases, Stubbs v. Scott, 127 Md. 86, 95 A. 1060, Scott had applied for a permit "to erect and conduct a salesroom and service station for the sale of automobiles, and for the other purposes incident to the business of such establishments."

  2. Tippett v. Daly

    10 A.3d 1123 (D.C. 2010)   Cited 45 times
    Concluding that statutory provision is ambiguous and applying statutory mandate that ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of "strengthening the legal rights of tenants and tenant organizations"

    " See Janes v. State, 350 Md. 284, 711 A.2d 1319, 1328 n. 9 (1998) ("As we held more than 70 years ago . . . the Legislature may `declare in the body of the act the construction to be placed thereon, and the courts are bound by such construction, and all other parts of the act must yield.'" (citing Montgomery County Motor Co. v. State, 147 Md. 232, 127 A. 637, 638 (1925))). The mandate to resolve any ambiguity in favor of the tenant requires us to interpret "provide" to mean "send," and not, as the court does, to require that the tenant "deliver" or ensure receipt by the owner.

  3. Janes v. State

    350 Md. 284 (Md. 1998)   Cited 36 times
    In Janes v. State, 350 Md. 284, 302, 711 A.2d 1319, 1328 (1998), we found that collateral estoppel does not operate in respect to the relationship between criminal prosecutions for drunken driving and driver's license suspension hearings.

    1( l)(1) cannot be regarded as actually modifying the common law, but rather as establishing a principle of statutory construction contemporaneously with the enactment of the statute. As we held more than 70 years ago in Motor Co. v. State, 147 Md. 232, 236, 127 A. 637, 638 (1925), quoting from Farmers' Bank v. Hale, 59 N.Y. 53, the Legislature may "declare in the body of the act the construction to be placed thereon, and the courts are bound by such construction, and all other parts of the act must yield." See also Legum v. Carlin, 168 Md. 191, 177 A. 287 (1935).

  4. Noll v. Comptroller of the Treasury

    252 A.2d 474 (Md. 1969)

    This exemption, contained in the last phrase of ยง 160 (b), was added by Ch. 294 of the Laws of 1920. Ch. 535 of the Laws of 1931 brought open air garages within the ambit of the licensing requirement and Ch. 467 of the Laws of 1941 removed them. The licensing statute has been before us previously in Montgomery County Motor Co. v. Maryland, 147 Md. 232, 127 A. 637 (1925) where we held that an automobile salesroom was not a garage and was therefore not subject to the licensing requirement. It is interesting to note that since 1941, Baltimore City has imposed a license fee on open air garages which are defined as "open air place[s] of storage for hire."