Opinion
NO. 00-3096.
March 12, 2001.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendants' motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, to amend the Court's judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the motion.
I. Background
On May 25, 1967, Shell Oil Company and Joseph F. Wegmann, Jr. entered into a lease agreement of immovable property located at 4400 Clearview Parkway in Metairie, Louisiana, under which Wegmann leased the property to Shell. Plaintiff, Motiva, is the assignee of Shell's interest in the lease, while defendants, Joseph F. Wegmann III and Susan W. Collins, are the successors in-interest to the original lessor. The lease provided an option to buy the property for the price of $175,000, at any point during the contract. In 1967, when the contract was entered, the property was appraised at a value of $105,600. In 1969, the parties amended the lease to include an additional adjacent parcel of land and the entire property was appraised at $148,300. Under the amended lease, the rental payments increased but the terms of the original leases were otherwise ratified and confirmed. The property was improved with a functioning gasoline station.
Plaintiff exercised the purchase option by sending letters to defendants dated May 1, 2000 and October 11, 2000, asserting that plaintiff wished to exercise Shell's option under the lease to purchase the property for $175,000. On August 20, 2000, the property was appraised at the price of $595,000. Defendants refused to honor the option.
Plaintiff filed suit demanding specific performance under the lease and its option to buy. Defendants claimed that the defense of lesion beyond moiety applied to the option and therefore, they were not required to sell the property for the $175,000 option price. On January 18, 2001, the Court entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. Defendants now move for a "new trial" or, in the alternative, to amend the judgment. Defendants re-argue that lesion beyond moiety applies and that they should be dispensed from their obligations under the lease agreement. They also contend that the Court ignored their improvements when ruling on summary judgment. Additionally, defendants now focus on the fact that the lease was amended in 1969 to add an additional parcel of land. Defendants contend that this parcel of land should not be included in the purchase option.
II. Discussion
A. Reconsideration Standard
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not formally recognize a motion to reconsider in haec verba. See Pryor v. United States Postal Service, 769 F.2d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit has held that a motion for reconsideration to reinstate a case may be classified under either Rule 59 or Rule 60, depending upon the time of filing. See id.; see also Lavespere v. Niagra Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Defendants' motion requests "a new trial" under Rule 59(a). The Court disposed of this matter by summary judgment, not by trial; therefore, it will construe defendants' motion as a motion to reconsider under Rule 59 (e) or 60. Because defendants' motion was filed with the Court within ten days of the judgment, the Court treats its request to reconsider the Court's order as a Rule 59(e) motion to "alter of amend the judgment". See Pryor, 769 F.2d at 285.
A district court has considerable discretion to grant or to deny a motion under Rule 59(e). See Edward H. Bohlin Co., Inc. v. Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993); Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 173. A court's reconsideration of a prior order is an extraordinary remedy which should be used only sparingly. See Fields v. Pool Offshore, 1998 WL 43217, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 1998), aff'd, 182 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 1999); Bardwell v. George G Sharp, Inc., 1995 WL 517120, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 30, 1995). The court must "strike the proper balance between the need for finality and the need to render a just decision on the basis of all the facts." Bohlin, 6 F.3d at 355. Courts in this district hold that a moving party must satisfy at least one of the following criteria to prevail on a Rule 59(e) motion: (1) the motion is necessary to correct a manifest error of fact or law; (2) the movant presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) the motion is necessary in order to prevent manifest injustice; and (4) the motion is justified by an intervening change in the controlling law. See Fidelity Deposit Co. v. Omni Bank, 1999 WL 970526, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 1999); Jupiter v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 1999 WL 796218, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 1999); Burma Navigation Corp. v. Seahorse, 1998 WL 781587, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 3, 1998); Fields, 1998 WL 43217, at *2.
B. Analysis
Defendants urge the Court to reconsider its ruling because they contend that the Court relied on erroneous facts and misapplied the law. Defendants believe the Court should amend its judgment because the Court failed to consider improvements that defendants made to the property in its evaluation of whether the option price was lesionary. Defendants also argue that the additional parcel of land that was added to the lease in 1969 should not be included under the option provision and the Court's judgment.
Defendants argue that the Court misapplied the law because it allegedly relied upon the headings and comments of Louisiana Revised Statute Article 2590 in deciding that an option must be valued at the time of the contract, not at the time the option is exercised. Contrary to defendants' assertions, the Court relied upon the language of the statute, which reads:
The immovable [property] must be evaluated according to the state in which it was at the time of the sale. If the sale was preceded by an option contract, or by a contract to sell, the property must be evaluated in the state in which it was at the time of that contract.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2590 (1993). Pursuant to the language of the statute, the Court determined that it must value the property at the time the option was granted in applying lesion beyond moiety. Therefore, defendants' argument lacks merit.
Defendants also contend that the Court did not account for the $93,000 of improvements to the land by defendants in evaluating the contract for lesion beyond moiety. This argument also lacks merit because under the terms of the contract, defendants were adequately compensated for such improvements by rental payments. This fact is evidenced by terms in the contract which increase rental payments depending upon the value and amount of improvements defendants made to the property. Furthermore, defendants have failed to meet their burden under Rule 59(e) because they have provided no new evidence or law that supports this argument, nor have they demonstrated manifest injustice.
Defendants also argue that the parcel of land that was added to the lease in 1969 should not be included under the purchase option. The Court notes that defendants had ample opportunity to present this argument to the Court the first time around but failed to do so. Plaintiff's summary judgment motion applied to the premises in its entirety. In support of its motion, plaintiff submitted the 1969 appraisal of the property, which included the additional parcel. The 1969 amendment to the contract adds an additional parcel of land to the lease, increases rental payments, and confirms, continues, and ratifies. all other aspects of the original contract. The contract provides an option to purchase the "premises", not specific lots. Therefore the option applies to all lots included in the definition of "premises". The lease as amended includes the additional parcel in the definition of "premises," and the parties confirmed and ratified all other aspects of the lease. Therefore, the Court finds that the purchase option applies to the entire premises, including the additional lot, under the amended contract. Furthermore, based on the 1969 appraisal, the option price was not lesionary at the time the contract was amended to extend the option rights to the additional parcel. Defendants' arguments are without merit.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies defendants' motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, to amend the judgment.