Mostov v. Unkefer

9 Citing cases

  1. Kiddle v. Schnitzer

    167 Or. 316 (Or. 1941)   Cited 15 times
    In Kiddle v. Schnitzer et al, 167 Or. 316, 327, 114 P.2d 109, 117 P.2d 983 (1941) we stated that it is within the trial court's discretion "whether to enlarge upon any particular subject covered by general instructions."

    " Mostov v. Unkefer, 24 Ohio A. 420, 157 N.E. 714, is typical of the cases of relaxation of the majority rule, above mentioned, declaring the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law because of failure to stop his car within his range of vision. Therein the defendant was a dealer in paper stock and scrap iron.

  2. Grimes v. Richfield Oil Company of California

    106 Cal.App. 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930)   Cited 15 times
    In Grimes v. Richfield Oil Co., 106 Cal.App. 416 [ 289 P. 245, 251], the court definitely answers the contention of the appellant herein, that the plaintiff should have anticipated the negligence of the defendant.

    " The facts in the case of Mostov v. Unkefer, 24 Ohio App. 420 [ 157 N.E. 714], are similar to the instant case. The accident out of which the action arose occurred in Michigan, but the trial was had in Ohio.

  3. Motor Freight Co. v. Johnson

    168 N.E. 143 (Ohio Ct. App. 1929)   Cited 3 times

    We may start with the premise that the law of Michigan as announced by its Supreme Court is applicable to the question now under consideration. In the case of Mostov v. Unkefer, 24 Ohio App. 420, 157 N.E. 714, where the question was whether the courts of Ohio would apply the law of Michigan, which imputes to a guest the negligence of the driver of an automobile, it was held that the rights of the parties in an action for injuries arising out of an automobile collision which occurred in another state are governed by the law of the place where the tort is committed, if such law is pleaded and proved. The writer was the trial judge in the court of common pleas by whom the Mostov case was tried.

  4. Morris v. Sells-Floto Circus

    65 F.2d 782 (4th Cir. 1933)   Cited 10 times

    In a number of states it has been held that the question whether or not the driver of an automobile, under like conditions, is guilty of contributory negligence, is a question of fact for the jury under the circumstances of each case. As was said by the Court in Murphy v. Hawthorne, 117 Or. 319, 244 P. 79, 80, 44 A.L.R. 1397: "While there is authority to the contrary, we believe the better reasoned cases support the holding that whether plaintiff failed to exercise due care to avoid the collision was a question of fact for the jury." Among the cases relied upon on behalf of the plaintiff to support this rule of law are the following: Wurl v. Watson, 67 Cal.App. 625, 228 P. 43; Haynes v. Doxie, 52 Cal.App. 133, 198 P. 39; Ross v. Hoffman (Mo.App.) 269 S.W. 679; Hatch v. Daniels, 96 Vt. 89, 117 A. 105; Tutsch v. Omaha Structural Steel Works, 110 Neb. 585, 194 N.W. 731; Bancroft v. East Montpelier, 94 Vt. 163, 109 A. 39; Mostov v. Unkefer, 24 Ohio App. 420, 157 N.E. 714; Morehouse v. City of Everett, 141 Wn. 399, 252 P. 157, 58 A.L.R. 1482; Powell v. Schofield, 223 Mo. App. 1041, 15 S.W.2d 876; Devoto v. United Auto Transportation Co., 128 Wn. 604, 223 P. 1050; Bridgen v. Pirozzi, 97 N.J. Law, 535, 117 A. 602; Kaufman v. Hegeman Transfer, etc., 100 Conn. 114, 123 A. 16; Hallett v. Crowell, 232 Mass. 344, 122 N.E. 264; Owens v. Iowa County, 186 Iowa 408, 169 N.W. 388; Robinson v. Pa. Rwy. Co., 117 Ohio St. 43, 158 N.E. 83; Ashdown v. Tresise, 26 Ohio App. 575, 160 N.E. 502; Koplovitz v. Jensen, 197 Ind. 475, 151 N.E. 390; Williams v. Express Lines, 198 N.C. 193, 151 S.E. 197; Hanno v. Motor Freight Lines, 17 La. App. 62, 134 So. 317; Standard Oil Company of New York v. Johnson (C.C.A.) 299 F. 93; Kopper v. Burnhardt, 91 N.J. Law, 697, 103 A. 186, 106 A. 893; Kendall v. Des Moines, 183 Iowa 866, 167 N.W. 684; Johnson v. Hoffler Boney Transfer Co., 204 N.C. 420, 168 S.E. 495; Filer v. Filer, 301 Pa. 461, 152 A. 567. An examination of the numerous decis

  5. Merback v. Blanchard

    105 P.2d 272 (Wyo. 1940)   Cited 15 times

    Gonzales v. Nichols, 294 P. 758; Seben v. Malanka, 182 A. 890; Hatch v. Daniels, 117 A. 105; Boileau v. Williams, 185 A. 429; Bielke v. Knack, 242 N.W. 176. The driver of a car on a highway at night has the right to presume that there will not be a car, unlighted, parked on the travelled portion of the highway. Lunquist v. Thierman, 248 N.W. 504; Mostive v. Unkefer, 157 N.E. 714; Carlson v. Decker, 247 N.W. 296. When a vehicle is parked on a highway without lights required by statute, and another vehicle collides with it from the rear, the question whether the absence of lights was the proximate cause of the accident is for the jury.

  6. Sprague v. Herbel

    6 P.2d 930 (Colo. 1931)   Cited 17 times
    In Sprague v. Herbel, 90 Colo. 134, 141, 6 P.2d 930, we said: "A jury having been expressly waived and the county court having determined that the sole and proximate cause of plaintiff's injury was defendant's negligence, even though our conclusions might be different, we must not act as appellate jurors."

    " This identical question was urged in the case of Arps v. Denver, 82 Colo. 189, 257 Pac. 1094, in which case all the authorities from other jurisdictions here presented, except those decisions subsequently announced and which are similarly conflicting, were before the court, and there we determined to follow the rule as announced in Murphy v. Hawthorne, supra. Some of the later decisions supporting this rule are Tresise v. Ashdown (1928), 118 Ohio St. 307, 160 N.E. 898, 58 A.L.R. 1476; Morehouse v. Everett, 141 Wash. 399, 252 Pac. 157, 58 A.L.R. 1482 and note; Johnson v. Auto Interurban Co., 139 Wash. 132, 245 Pac. 920; Powell v. Schofield (1929), 223 Mo. App. 1041, 15 S.W.2d 876; Parenteau v. Parenteau (R.I.) (1931), 153 Atl. 872; Moyer v. Vaughan's Seed Store (1926), 242 Ill. App. 308; Mostov v. Unkefer (Ohio) (1927), 157 N.E. 714; Williams v. Frederickson Motor Express Lines (1930), 198 N.C. 193, 151 S.E. 197; Hickerson v. Jossey (1929), 131 Ore. 612, 282 Pac. 768, 283 Pac. 1119; Ross v. Gearin (1930), 145 Okla. 66, 291 Pac. 534; Stanger v. Hunter (1930), 49 Ida. 723, 291 Pac. 1060; McMoran v. Associated Oil Co. (1927), 144 Wash. 276, 257 Pac. 846; Indianapolis Glove Co. v. Fenton (1929), 89 Ind. App. 173, 166 N.E. 12; Sawdey v. Rasmussen Co. (Cal.), 290 Pac. 684; Owens v. Iowa County, 186 Ia. 408, 169 N.W. 388; Waynick v. Walrond (Va.), (1930), 154 S.E. 522, 70 A.L.R. 1014; Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Shipp (1927), 174 Ark. 130, 297 S.W. 856. The A.L.R. report of the Waynick case contains a very comprehensive list of cases supporting the rule that failure to drive within the range of vision is negligence as a matter of law and notwithstanding which the court held such questions were for the jury.

  7. Spreng v. Flaherty

    177 N.E. 528 (Ohio Ct. App. 1931)   Cited 2 times

    Certainly a court cannot take judicial notice that an automobile traveling from 20 to 25 miles an hour on a certain pavement can be stopped in less than 100 to 150 feet, when the uncontradicted evidence shows it could not be done. And, of course, on a motion by the defendant for a directed verdict the evidence must be construed most favorably for the plaintiff. In Mostov v. Unkefer, 24 Ohio App. 420, 424, 157 N.E. 714, decided by this court, it appears that the driver of the car could see by his own lights an object 200 feet ahead, and saw the truck with which he collided when he was 75 or 100 feet from it, and could have stopped his car in from 30 to 50 feet, and yet he recovered a judgment in the court of common pleas, which was affirmed by this court, and the Supreme Court overruled a motion to certify the record. The rule is stated in Doran v. Bethards, 26 Ohio App. 426, 160 N.E. 110, that the question of contributory negligence of the driver of an automobile approaching an unlighted parked truck in the night season is ordinarily one for the jury, and this court is of opinion that the rule thus stated is applicable to the case at bar.

  8. Page v. Neiland

    178 N.E. 710 (Ohio Ct. App. 1929)   Cited 4 times

    The evidence, as has already been said, does not disclose how far the dimmed lights from the headlights thereon shone on the pavement in front of his automobile, but, assuming that this distance was less than that required by Sections 6310-1, 12614-2 and 12614-3, General Code, as defendants in error seem to assume was the fact because the lights were dimmed, such fact, although negligence per se, would not determine what was the proximate cause of the collision. Admittedly not only is it negligence to permit a truck to stand upon the highway in the nighttime with no light thereon, but as was said by this court in the case of Mostov v. Unkefer, 24 Ohio App. 420, 157 N.E. 714, to do so is gross negligence. Unless he knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care would have known, thereof, Page was not bound to assume that a truck would be left on the traveled portion of the highway without a warning light thereon, but, on the contrary, had a right to assume and proceed on the basis of that assumption that no such emergency would arise.

  9. Danner v. Avery

    168 N.E. 52 (Ohio Ct. App. 1929)

    This charge also is subject to the objection that it states the driver of the defendant's truck had the right to assume various things stated in the charge, without adding, "unless he has or in the exercise of ordinary care should have knowledge to the contrary," or words to that effect. Mostov v. Unkefer, 24 Ohio App. 420, 157 N.E. 714. Defendant's request No. 3, like the one just discussed, is subject to the objection that it instructs the jury, without qualification, that Ruth Danner was charged with notice that the law gave those approaching from the south on Maple street, and on her right, the right of way.