Opinion
3:20-cv-00290-KGB
03-15-2024
DERRICK MOSS PLAINTIFF v. U.S. XPRESS, INC., and JIMMY R. PYLATE DEFENDANTS
ORDER
KRISTINE G. BAKER, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is the petition for attorneys' fees by defendants U.S. Xpress, Inc. and Jimmy R. Pylate (Dkt. No. 47). Plaintiff Derrick Moss responded in opposition, and defendants replied (Dkt. Nos. 48; 51). For the following reasons, the Court grants defendants' petition for attorneys' fees.
I. Background
This petition for attorneys' fees stems from a motion for contempt filed on July 12, 2022, and a supplemental motion for contempt filed on February 6, 2023 (Dkt. Nos. 37; 39). The motion for contempt involved the alleged failure by counsel for Mr. Moss to return to defendants certain documents along with a certification of compliance signed by plaintiff's counsel within 40 days of the conclusion of the litigation as required by the Protective Order (Dkt. No. 37, at 2). Defendants assert that they made efforts to secure compliance with the Protective Order without Court intervention, then filed the motion for contempt on July 12, 2022, when those efforts were unsuccessful (Dkt. No. 47, ¶ 1). Mr. Moss's counsel returned the documents to defendants on July 13, 2022, one day after the original motion for contempt was filed (Dkt. No. 46, at 2). However, defendants persisted in their request to have Mr. Moss's counsel provide the certification contemplated by the Protective Order, which in defendants' view required signature of counsel with personal knowledge to attest to whether the documents had indeed been returned, and filed a supplemental motion for contempt and then a reply in support of that motion (Dkt. Nos. 39; 45, at 2-3).
In an Order entered on March 30, 2023, the Court denied defendants' motion for contempt (Dkt. No. 46, at 3). However, “[r]ecognizing that from the record before the Court defendants attempted through correspondence to resolve this dispute but were required to file a motion for contempt before Mr. Moss returned documents in compliance with the Protective Order, the Court award[ed] reasonable attorneys' fees to defendants for filing the motion for contempt” (Id.).
II. Legal Standard
“The Eighth Circuit has authorized civil contempt compensatory sanctions in the amount of the movant's attorneys' fees and other costs incurred in prosecuting a contempt motion.” BMO Harris Bank N.A. v. Alton Bean Trucking, Inc., No. 6:16-cv-6118, 2019 WL 1997477, at *2 (W.D. Ark. May 6, 2019) (citing Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 630, 630-31 (8th Cir. 1984)).
“The starting point in determining attorney fees is the lodestar, which is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rates.” Fish v. St. Cloud State Univ., 295 F.3d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). A reasonable hourly rate is “calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). “When determining reasonable hourly rates, district courts may rely on their own experience and knowledge of prevailing market rates.” Bryant v. Jeffrey Sand Co., 919 F.3d 520, 529 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hanig v. Lee, 415 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2005)). The party seeking an award of fees should “submit adequate documentation supporting the number of hours claimed,” and the court “may deduct hours from this initial number if counsel's documentation is inadequate.” Gay v. Saline Cty., Case No. 4:03-cv-00564-HLJ, 2006 WL 3392443, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 20, 2006) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433).
“Attorney's fees are within the broad discretion of the district court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” Hanig, 415 at 825 (citing Harmon v. City of Kansas City, 197 F.3d 321, 329 (8th Cir. 1999)).
III. Discussion
In their petition for attorneys' fees, defendants seek fees for: (1) time spent communicating with plaintiff's counsel in their attempt to secure compliance with the document-return and certification requirements of the Protective Order; (2) time spent preparing their motion for contempt, their supplemental motion for contempt, and their reply in support of the motion; and (3) time spent reviewing plaintiff's responses to these filings (Dkt. No. 47, at 2). This amounts to a petition for $1,740.00 in attorneys' fees for 8.7 hours of work billed at a rate of $200.00 an hour (Dkt. No. 47-1, at 2).
In his response to the petition for attorneys' fees, Mr. Moss does not dispute the reasonableness of defendants' counsel's hourly rate (Dkt. No. 48). Instead, Mr. Moss argues that, because his attorney returned the documents after the initial motion for contempt was filed on July 12, 2022, defendants should only be able to recover fees for the cost of preparing the initial motion for contempt and not for other expenses such as informal communications between counsel or the supplemental motion and briefing filed after Mr. Moss returned the documents (Dkt. No. 48, at 12).
The Court disagrees. The time spent by defendants' counsel attempting to secure compliance with the Protective Order, including but not limited to time spent fully prosecuting the motion with additional briefing even after the documents were returned, is sufficiently related to the motion to provide the basis for a fee award. The work listed in defendants' fee petition is all related to the same goal as the motion for contempt: attempting to secure full compliance with the Protective Order. The Court finds that both the scope of the requested attorneys' fees and the hourly rate at which they were billed is reasonable. The Court grants defendants' petition for attorneys' fees.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants defendants' motion for attorneys' fees and approves attorneys' fees in the amount of $1,740.00 (Dkt. No. 47). This fee award is to be paid by the Law Offices of Thomas J. Henry, PLLC.
It is so ordered.