Moss v. Moss

7 Citing cases

  1. Reynolds v. Reynolds

    217 Ga. 234 (Ga. 1961)   Cited 58 times
    In Reynolds, a case holding that prenuptial agreements settling alimony are void against public policy, this Court described these agreements as being in contemplation of divorce because they are "`made with the intention of promoting a dissolution of the marriage relation existing between'" the parties.

    In grounds 108, 109, 110, and 111, the defendant assigns error on the charge of the court that the prenuptial agreement was unenforceable being in violation of the public policy of this State, that it was admitted in evidence for the sole purpose of "shedding some light upon the income and separate estate of the defendant wife," and that the jury should consider the prenuptial agreement solely for such purpose. It has been insisted by counsel for the plaintiff that while the prenuptial agreement was void as a bar to alimony by the wife, it was admissible in evidence to show the consideration she received under the agreement for the purpose of showing her separate estate, and counsel cite Powell v. Powell, 196 Ga. 694 ( 27 S.E.2d 393); Moss v. Moss, 200 Ga. 8 ( 36 S.E.2d 431); and Brown v. Brown, 210 Ga. 233 ( 78 S.E.2d 516), in support of this contention. In the Powell case and the Moss case the wife was seeking alimony, and the husband sought to set up a separation agreement as a bar to the alimony.

  2. Fitts v. Fitts

    199 S.E.2d 256 (Ga. 1973)   Cited 1 times

    As to attorney's fees, see Collins v. Collins, 29 Ga. 517; Rogers v. Rogers, 103 Ga. 763 ( 30 S.E. 659); Spooner v. Spooner, 149 Ga. 467 ( 100 S.E. 571); Statham v. Statham, 182 Ga. 805 ( 187 S.E. 17); Morris v. West, 183 Ga. 214 ( 187 S.E. 861); Hall v. Hall, 185 Ga. 502, 506 (4) ( 195 S.E. 731)." Moss v. Moss, 200 Ga. 8, 12 ( 36 S.E.2d 431). The appellant also complains that the following provision of the judgment is illegal, "Ordered that James E. Fitts who is holding funds subject to this court's order, shall pay over said sum of $560.06 to plaintiff and said sum of $6,000 attorney's fees forthwith."

  3. Kiser v. Kiser

    105 S.E.2d 220 (Ga. 1958)   Cited 3 times

    DUCKWORTH, Chief Justice. 1. The subsequent cohabitation of a husband and wife, while annulling and setting aside all provisions made for permanent alimony for the wife, does not affect the rights of children under any deed of separation or voluntary provisions for alimony. Code § 30-217; Henderson v. Henderson, 170 Ga. 457 ( 153 S.E. 182); Powell v. Powell, 196 Ga. 694 ( 27 S.E.2d 393); Moss v. Moss, 200 Ga. 8 ( 36 S.E.2d 431); Brown v. Brown, 210 Ga. 233 ( 78 S.E.2d 516), and cases cited therein. 2.

  4. Brown v. Brown

    78 S.E.2d 516 (Ga. 1953)   Cited 10 times

    In this respect there is no difference between permanent and temporary alimony and incidental allowance of attorney's fees." See also Smith v. Smith, 187 Ga. 743 ( 2 S.E.2d 417); Moss v. Moss, 200 Ga. 8 ( 36 S.E.2d 431); Levine v. Levine, 204 Ga. 313, 317 (2) ( 49 S.E.2d 814, 4 A.L.R. 2d 1205). From what has been said it follows that the trial court erred in holding that the previous verdict and decree for permanent alimony to the wife are of full force and effect, and are res judicata as to the wife's right to recover temporary and permanent alimony and attorney's fees; but did not err in so holding as to the prayer for alimony for the support of the minor child, for under Code § 30-217 and the ruling made in Clary v. Thornton, 177 Ga. 833 (1) ( 171 S.E. 704), the rights of children to a decree for alimony are not affected by subsequent voluntary cohabitation of the husband and wife.

  5. Brannen v. Brannen

    65 S.E.2d 161 (Ga. 1951)   Cited 5 times

    1. The discretion of the trial judge in allowing or disallowing temporary alimony pending an action for divorce will not be controlled unless that discretion is shown to have been flagrantly abused. Code, § 30-205; Smith v. Smith, 125 Ga. 384 ( 53 S.E. 958); Aiken v. Aiken, 131 Ga. 578 ( 62 S.E. 820); Helton v. Helton, 146 Ga. 48 ( 90 S.E. 381); Gaskin v. Gaskin, 150 Ga. 756 ( 105 S.E. 369); Brown v. Brown, 159 Ga. 323 ( 125 S.E. 713); Cook v. Cook, 197 Ga. 703 ( 30 S.E.2d 479); Moss v. Moss, 200 Ga. 8, 12 ( 36 S.E.2d 431); Childs v. Childs, 203 Ga. 9 ( 45 S.E.2d 418); Lybrand v. Lybrand, 204 Ga. 312 ( 49 S.E.2d 515). "In a proper case, and in the exercise of a sound discretion, the court may award the use of the home and the household goods therein to the wife as temporary alimony." Lloyd v. Lloyd, 183 Ga. 751 ( 189 S.E. 903). Where, as in this case, it appears from the evidence that the plaintiff, at the invitation of the defendant, came to this country from Australia to marry the defendant; that two children were born as the issue of the marriage, who, at the time of the trial, were 3 years and 5 months, and 4 months of age, respectively; that she had no relatives in Georgia, and none in this country except a first cousin in the State of New York whom she does not remember ever having seen, no other place to live, no independent income or other means of livelihood, it cannot be said that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award to the plaintiff the use of the home

  6. Levine v. Levine

    49 S.E.2d 814 (Ga. 1948)   Cited 10 times
    In Levine v. Levine, 204 Ga. 313 (1), supra, it was held that an order of the trial judge in an action by a wife against her husband for divorce and alimony, ordering her to reconvey to the husband property she had received in a prior settlement between them, at a hearing held prior to the trial of the case and ordering the case stayed until she complied therewith, was held sufficient to support an appeal (bill of exceptions), it being a final judgment, although the case be left pending.

    Even in cases where agreements settling alimony have been entered and there has been a subsequent cohabitation, which under the Code section above cited would render null and set aside the deed or decree making provision for permanent alimony, it has been held that restitution of the property received under such an agreement is not a condition precedent to a wife's suit for divorce and alimony where there has been a later separation. Powell v. Powell, 196 Ga. 694 ( 27 S.E.2d 393); Moss v. Moss, 200 Ga. 8 ( 36 S.E.2d 431). It is, therefore, obvious that the rule requiring restitution as a prerequisite to rescission, and the rule providing that when an election of remedy has been made another inconsistent remedy will be denied, and the numerous decisions applying these rules cited in the brief of counsel for the defendant in error, are inapplicable here. 3. But in the interest of clarifying the question of procedure, we prefer to base our reversal of the judgment both upon the ruling in the preceding division of the opinion and the further ground that the trial judge in the circumstances shown was wholly without authority to render the judgment complained of. There is no provision of law for the trial judge to thus interrupt the orderly trial of such a case, and in the absence of a jury hear evidence touching a matter concerning which there is no prayer for relief, and based upon such evidence, irrespective of what it might show, enter a judgment prohibiting the petitioner from proceed

  7. Simonds v. Simonds

    225 S.C. 211 (S.C. 1954)   Cited 13 times

    326; 6 S.C. Eq. (1 M'Cord) 197. As to Lower Court erringin allowing an excessive amount of temporary alimony torespondent: 17 Am. Jur. 434; 10 Rich. Eq. 416; 27 Am.Jur. 23. As to appellant not being able to deduct temporaryalimony payments from his taxable income: 7 T.C. 723; 7 T.C. 625; 14 T.C. 1131; 161 F.2d 732. Messrs. Sinkler, Gibbs Simons, and Stoney Crosland, of Charleston, for Respondent, cite: As to allowanceof temporary alimony being within discretion of Court: 166 S.C. 43, 164 S.E. 238; 138 S.C. 1, 136 S.E. 25; 130 S.C. 511, 125 S.E. 737; 187 S.C. 436, 198 S.E. 29. As to Lower Court properly holding that respondent hadshown a prima facie right to alimony: 211 S.C. 25, 43 S.E.2d 210; 216 S.C. 451, 58 S.E.2d 731; 185 S.C. 518, 194 S.E. 640. As to Lower Court not abusingdiscretion in allowing temporary alimony in instant case: 128 S.C. 553, 123 S.E. 206; 115 S.C. 217, 105 S.E. 285; 107 S.C. 99, 91 S.E. 971; 95 S.C. 130, 78 S.E. 712; 86 W. Va. 46, 102 S.E. 799; 13 S.E.2d 778; 36 S.E.2d 431. April 12, 1954.