Opinion
NO. 12-16-00331-CR
11-22-2017
CHESTER JEROME MOSLEY, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE 145TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT NACOGDOCHES COUNTY , TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Chester Jerome Mosley appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance. In a single issue, Appellant challenges the admission of statements he made to a police officer during a traffic stop, as well as the officer's dash cam video. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In February 2015, Officer Chad Patrick of the Nacogdoches Police Department observed a vehicle fail to signal one hundred feet prior to turning. Officer Patrick conducted a traffic stop and found Appellant in the driver's seat and a female passenger in the car. Patrick observed a green, leafy substance on Appellant's shirt and pants. He believed the substance to be marijuana. Officer Patrick asked Appellant to exit the car and asked him about the substance on his shirt and his activities from the day. Patrick searched the vehicle and found marijuana and a substance he believed to be phencyclidine (PCP). Officer Patrick asked Appellant if the substance was PCP. After Appellant admitted the substance was PCP, Patrick placed him in handcuffs and read him his Miranda warnings.
Appellant was later indicted for possession of a controlled substance, PCP. At trial, Appellant objected to the admission of his statements during the traffic stop and to admission of Patrick's dash cam video. He alleged that the statements were made in violation of Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The trial court overruled the objections. The jury found Appellant "guilty" and sentenced him to imprisonment for forty years. This appeal followed.
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
In his sole issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred by admitting his statements and the dash cam videotape into evidence. Specifically, he contends the statements should have been suppressed because they were made during a custodial interrogation in violation of the Fifth Amendment and Article 38.22. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Under the Fifth Amendment, statements made by a suspect during a custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless certain warnings were given to the suspect before he makes those statements. Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); see U.S. CONST. amend. V. Article 38.22 also requires the suppression of statements made during a custodial interrogation unless certain statutorily prescribed warnings are given. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (West Supp. 2016). Miranda and Article 38.22 apply only to custodial interrogation. Herrera v. State , 241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Texas courts construe "custody" under Article 38.22 consistent with the meaning of "custody" for purposes of Miranda. Id.
The purpose of the warnings required by Miranda and Article 38.22 is to safeguard a person's privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. Gardner v. State , 306 S.W.3d 274, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). "If an individual is subjected to questioning while in custody without first being warned of his rights and without voluntarily waiving those rights, then any evidence obtained as part of that questioning may not be used against him at trial." Hernandez v. State , 107 S.W.3d 41, 47 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. ref'd). When seeking the suppression of unwarned statements, the defendant must prove that the statements were the product of custodial interrogation. Herrera , 241 S.W.3d at 526.
As a general rule, persons temporarily detained pursuant to an ordinary traffic stop are not "in custody" for purposes of Miranda. Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984); Hernandez , 107 S.W.3d at 47. A traffic stop that includes questioning and field sobriety tests does not, without more, rise to the level of a custodial interrogation. Berkemer , 468 U.S. at 440-42, 104 S. Ct. at 3150-52; State v. Stevenson , 958 S.W.2d 824, 828-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). While a routine traffic stop generally does not place a person in custody for Miranda purposes, it may escalate from a noncustodial detention to a custodial detention when the detainee's freedom of movement is restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. State v. Ortiz , 382 S.W.3d 367, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Both an investigative detention and an arrest involve a restraint on a person's freedom of movement. State v. Sheppard , 271 S.W.3d 281, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). An arrest, however, is a greater restraint upon a person's freedom of movement than is a temporary detention. Id. There is no bright-line test for distinguishing between an investigative detention and arrest; instead, courts consider a number of factors, including: (1) the amount of force displayed; (2) the duration of the detention; (3) the efficiency of the investigative process and whether it is conducted at the original location or the person is transported to another location; (4) the officer's expressed intent—that is, whether he told the person that he was under arrest or was being detained only for a temporary investigation; and (5) any other relevant factors. Id. at 291. When the degree of incapacitation appears more than necessary to simply safeguard the officers and assure the suspect's presence during a period of investigation, it suggests the detention is an arrest. Id. Furthermore, handcuffing is but one of a range of relevant factors in a custody determination. Ortiz , 382 S.W.3d at 374.
In determining whether a person is in custody, courts determine whether, given the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, a reasonable person would have perceived the detention to be a restraint on his movement comparable to the restraint of formal arrest. Id. at 372. In evaluating whether a reasonable person would believe his freedom has been restrained to the degree of formal arrest, we consider the objective factors surrounding the detention. Id. Unless the officer manifests his belief to the detainee that he is a suspect, the subjective beliefs of the detaining officer are not relevant to the determination of whether a reasonable person in the detainee's position would believe he is in custody. Id. A suspect is "in custody" for Miranda purposes if a reasonable person would believe that his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest under the circumstances of the interrogation. Herrera , 241 S.W.3d at 525. At least four general situations may constitute custody: (1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, (2) when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he cannot leave, (3) when law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted, and (4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave. Dowthitt v. State , 931 S.W.2d 244, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Regarding the first through third situations, the "restriction upon freedom of movement must amount to the degree associated with an arrest as opposed to an investigative detention." Id. Regarding the fourth situation, the officer's knowledge of probable cause must be manifested to the suspect. Id.
A trial court's ultimate custody determination presents a mixed question of law and fact. Herrera , 241 S.W.3d at 526. Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court's custody determination when the questions of historical fact turn on credibility and demeanor. Id. at 526-27. Conversely, when the questions of historical fact do not turn on credibility and demeanor we review the trial court's custody determination de novo. Id. at 527. "The ultimate legal determination of whether an individual was in custody requires an appellate court to take the facts, as assessed for weight and credibility by the trial court, and then to make a legal determination as to whether those facts amount to custody under the law." State v. Saenz , 411 S.W.3d 488, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We review the trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Oprean v. State , 201 S.W.3d 724, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Analysis
Appellant argues that he made statements to Officer Patrick pursuant to a custodial interrogation. He contends that custody was established because a reasonable person in his position would have believed that he was under arrest or was not free to leave. Therefore, he contends his statements made to Officer Patrick should not have been admitted into evidence at trial.
Officer Patrick observed Appellant's vehicle fail to signal one hundred feet prior to making a turn. When he stopped and approached the vehicle, he observed a man and a woman inside the vehicle. Both Appellant and the woman acted nervously and had a green leafy substance, which appeared to be marijuana, on their clothes. These circumstances were sufficient to vest Patrick with reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant and further investigate the possibility of his involvement in the criminal activity of possession of marijuana. See Powell v . State , 5 S.W.3d 369, 377 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd) (holding that an officer may continue the detention after an initial stop if he develops reasonable suspicion that the detainee was engaged in criminal activity).
As part of his investigation, Patrick searched the vehicle and found a substance that he believed to be PCP. He testified that Appellant was not in custody during the search. Patrick asked Appellant if the substance would test positive as PCP, and Appellant answered that it would. Appellant also admitted to using cigarettes to "dip" the PCP earlier that day. Officer Patrick testified that Appellant was not in custody during this questioning. Only after the questioning did Patrick handcuff Appellant and arrest him for possession of a controlled substance. There is no evidence in the record indicating that, at the time Appellant made the challenged statements, (1) he was physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way, (2) Patrick told Appellant he could not leave, (3) Patrick created a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted, or (4) Patrick had probable cause to arrest and manifested that probable cause to Appellant, but did not tell Appellant that he was free to leave. See Dowthitt , 931 S.W.2d at 255.
We, therefore, conclude that the record does not demonstrate that at any time before Appellant's arrest a reasonable person would believe that his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest under the circumstances. See Herrera , 241 S.W.3d at 525. Appellant's statements were made before his arrest and were not the product of a custodial interrogation, but were merely the result of an investigative detention. See Arthur v . State , 216 S.W.3d 50, 58 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). "[T]he mere fact that the suspect becomes the focus of a criminal investigation does not convert a roadside stop into an arrest." Stevenson , 958 S.W.2d at 829. Therefore, Appellant's statements are admissible even absent Miranda warnings and the warnings articulated in Article 38.22. See id . Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the statements, and the dash cam video, into evidence. See Oprean , 201 S.W.3d at 726. We overrule Appellant's sole issue.
DISPOSITION
Having overruled Appellant's sole issue, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
GREG NEELEY
Justice Opinion delivered November 22, 2017.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
(DO NOT PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
JUDGMENT
Appeal from the 145th District Court of Nacogdoches County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. F1622666)
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.
Greg Neeley, Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.