1. On December 2, 1978, pending this appeal, Sprouse escaped from the Chatham County Jail and has not been recaptured. Based on the escape the state has made a motion to dismiss Sprouse's appeal, citing Griffin v. State, 239 Ga. 795 ( 239 S.E.2d 16) (1977) and relying on Mosley v. State, 189 Ga. 71 ( 5 S.E.2d 47) (1939), the latter case decided under the prior death penalty statute. The present death penalty statute provides that when the "death penalty is imposed, and upon the judgment becoming final in the trial court, the sentence shall be reviewed on the record by the Supreme Court of Georgia."

Although Passaro was not a capital case, there is nothing in the broad language of the opinion that limits its holding to non-capital defendants. Dismissal of pending appeals of defendants escaped from death row is not a novel concept. E.g., Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 17 S.Ct. 525, 41 L.Ed. 949 (1897); Mosley v. State, 189 Ga. 71, 5 S.E.2d 47 (1939); State v. Jugger, 217 La. 687, 47 So.2d 46 (1950); see, Jones v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 427, 323 S.E.2d 554 (1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012, 105 S.Ct. 2713, 86 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985) (denying motion to dismiss only because the defendant surrendered within period set by court). However, because of the severity and finality of the sentence of death, we are statutorily mandated to review all death sentences pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(h).

In order to bring about a repeal by implication, the legislative intent must be ascertained from the words of the act. Britton v. Bowden, 188 Ga. 806 (1) ( 5 S.E.2d 47). The caption to the act of 1947 states that the act is to "provide means whereby restoration to sanity and capacity may be established by judgment of the Court of Ordinary," and provides for the procedure in such cases.

In order to bring about a repeal by implication, the legislative intent must be clear, manifest, and irreconcilable with intent not to repeal. Griggs v. Macon, 154 Ga. 519 ( 114 S.E. 899); Cornwell v. Atlanta Trust Co., 177 Ga. 303 ( 170 S.E. 194); McGinty v. Gormley, 181 Ga. 644 ( 183 S.E. 804); Britton v. Bowden, 188 Ga. 806, 811 ( 5 S.E.2d 47). What is there in the act of 1937 that is in conflict with the provision in the Code, § 61-301, which among other things declares that the owner's attorney in fact may go before a proper judicial officer and make oath to the facts? What is there in that act which discloses a legislative intent irreconcilable with the intention not to repeal? The Code section declares in effect that an attorney in fact may make the affidavit.

Counsel for the plaintiff suggest that there may have been a repeal of pre-existing sections in so far as they were made applicable to life insurance; but we do not deem it necessary to inquire into this, since the statutes are substantially the same as related to the questions presented, and for that reason, even if the later acts should be considered as a comprehensive treatment of the same subject-matter, and thus as repealing the former law, the result still could not be different in the instant case. As to repeal by implication on such theory, see City of Atlanta v. Goodman, 183 Ga. 834 ( 189 S.E. 829); Britton v. Bowden, 188 Ga. 806 ( 5 S.E.2d 47). It follows that no fault can be found with the decision of the Court of Appeals merely because one of the cases cited therein, Northwestern Life Insurance Co. v. Montgomery, 116 Ga. 799 (2) (supra), was decided several years before the act of 1912. It may be remarked, however, that because of an incontestable clause there involved, the insurer in that case was relegated to the defense of actual fraud, whereas in the instant case proof of actual fraud was unnecessary, and the Court of Appeals did not hold that it was shown.

Code, § 54-101; Kaigler v. Floyd, 187 Ga. 441 ( 200 S.E. 784). See Britton v. Bowden, 188 Ga. 806 (3) ( 5 S.E.2d 47). (b) The office to which the plaintiff was appointed was abolished by section 2 of the 1937 act referred to in the petition. Ga. L. 1937, p. 230.

Kaigler v. Floyd, 187 Ga. 441, 444-445 ( 200 S.E. 784). The principle was recognized also in Britton v. Bowden, 188 Ga. 806 (3) ( 5 S.E.2d 47). ( b) Since passage of the act of 1931 (Ga. L. 1931, pp. 7, 45, sec. 116), the decision in Shackelford v. West, 138 Ga. 159 ( 74 S.E. 1079), and similar decisions in other cases, as in Stephenson v. Powell, 169 Ga. 406 ( 150 S.E. 641), and citations collected in Pittman v. Ingram, 184 Ga. 255, 257 ( 190 S.E. 794), ruling, on the basis of statutory laws as distinguished from the constitution, that the officer holds over after expiration of his prescribed term until a successor has been selected and qualified, are not applicable, as in the instant case where the officer was appointed by the Governor subject to confirmation by the Senate.

The fact that both Brackett and Etheridge registered as candidates for the office in the June election did not affect the case. Britton v. Bowden, 188 Ga. 806 (6) ( 5 S.E.2d 47). The decision in Pittman v. Ingram, 184 Ga. 255 ( 190 S.E. 791), is not a precedent that affects the instant case.

minated. The question here involved is not whether an official regularly elected by the people at the time and place prescribed by law could be deprived of his office by virtue of the mere failure of the General Assembly to canvass and declare the result as directed by the constitution, for manifestly the will of the people could not be thus defeated; but the question is whether the relator was in fact elected at the proper time and place within the purview of the constitution; and the fact that the act of 1937 did not provide for canvassing returns and declaration of result by the General Assembly, as it would be the duty of that body to do with respect to office of attorney-general as a Statehouse office with a term running concurrently with that of the Governor, demonstrates that the June election was not intended by the legislature as one in which to fill a vacancy in the office of attorney-general. The questions presented here were not involved in Britton v. Bowden, 188 Ga. 806 ( 5 S.E.2d 47). The decisions in Moore v. Smith, 140 Ga. 854 ( 79 S.E. 1116), Aycock v. State ex rel. Boykin, 184 Ga. 709 ( 193 S.E. 580), and the opinions of the Justices in Mitchell v. Pittman, 184 Ga. 877 ( 194 S.E. 369), dealt with different constitutional provisions, and have no bearing upon the question now presented. See reference to these cases in Stephens v. Reid, 189 Ga. 372.

Repeals of statutes by implication are not favored, and nothing short of irreconcilable conflict between two statutes will work such repeal. Walker v. City of Rome, 16 Ga. App. 817 ( 86 S.E. 658); Moore v. State, 150 Ga. 679 ( 104 S.E. 907); Britton v. Bowden, 188 Ga. 806 ( 5 S.E.2d 47). Such conflict results where it appears that the last legislative act was intended to cover the whole subject matter of the particular legal field, and it appears that certain parts of the former law were intentionally omitted in the revision ( Hardy v. State, 25 Ga. App. 287, 103 S.E. 267; Thompson v. Georgia Power Co., 73 Ga. App. 587, 37 S.E.2d 622), but such is not the case here. On the other hand, the general rule is that, where a prior statute is re-enacted without reference to an intermediate amendatory statute, and there is no conflict between the intermediate and last enactments, but it does not appear that the last act is an exhaustive treatment of the subject matter, the intermediate statute is not repealed by implication.