Mosher v. St. Louis c. Railroad Co.

27 Citing cases

  1. Bitterman v. Louisville Nashville R.R

    207 U.S. 205 (1907)   Cited 127 times
    In Bitterman v. Louisville Nashville Railroad Co., 207 U.S. 205, 221, 28 S.Ct. 91, 96-97, 52 L.Ed. 171 (1907), the Supreme Court affirmed a preliminary injunction entered against brokers of reduced-fare railroad tickets.

    Argued November 4, 1907. Decided December 2, 1907.Railroad companies have the right to sell non-transferable reduced rate excursion tickets, Mosher v. Railroad Co., 127 U.S. 390; and the non-transferability and forfeiture embodied in such tickets is not only binding upon the original purchaser and any one subsequently acquiring them but, under the provisions of § 22 of the act to regulate commerce, 24 Stat. 387, 25 Stat. 862, it is the duty of the railroad company to prevent the wrongful use of such tickets and the obtaining of a preference thereby by anyone other than the original purchaser. An actionable wrong is committed by one who maliciously interferes in a contract between two parties and induces one of them to break that contract to the injury of the other, Angle v. Chicago St. Paul Railway Co., 151 U.S. 1; and this principle applies to carrying on the business of purchasing and selling non-transferable reduced rate railroad tickets for profit to the injury of the railroad company issuing them, and this even though the ingredient of actual malice, in the sense of personal ill will, does not exist. When, as in this case, the dealings of a class of sp

  2. Erie Railroad Co. v. Winter

    143 U.S. 60 (1892)   Cited 62 times
    In Railroad Co. v. Winter's Adm'r, 143 U.S. 60, 73, 12 Sup.Ct. 356, there is a clear recognition of the fundamental principles which we have announced.

    See also Grover Baker Co. v. Mo. Pac. Railroad, 70 Mo. 672; Phillips v. North Carolina Railroad, 78 North Carolina, 294; People v. Chicago Alton Railroad, 55 Ill. 95. We submit that substantially this case has been twice decided by this court; first in Mosher v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain c. Railway Co., 127 U.S. 390, and more recently in Boylan v. Hot Springs Railroad, 132 U.S. 146. As to the duty of the presiding judge to give the instructions asked, on the subject of damages, although he had already instructed on that subject, not inconsistently with them, we cite: Mosher v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain Southern Railway Co., 127 U.S. 390; Boylan v. Hot Springs Railroad, 132 U.S. 146; Townsend v. New York Central Railroad, 56 N.Y. 295; Shelton v. Lake Shore Michigan Southern Railway, 29 Ohio St. 214; Bradshaw v. South Boston Railroad, 135 Mass. 407; Frederick v. Marquette c. Railroad, 37 Mich. 342; Petrie v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 13 Vroom (42 N.J.L.) 449; Pennington v. Philadelphia, Wilmington Baltimore Railroad, 62 Md. 95; Rawitzky v. Louisville Nashville Railroad, 40 La. Ann. 47; Louisville Nashville Railroad v. Fleming, 14 Lea, 128; Churchill v. Chicago Alton Railroad, 67 Ill. 390; Chicago, Burlington Quincy Railroad v. Griffin, 68 Ill. 499; Baker v. Coflin, 31 Barb. 556.

  3. Boylan v. Hot Springs Railroad Co.

    132 U.S. 146 (1889)   Cited 21 times

    Mr. Charles Carroll Bonney, for plaintiff in error, submitted on his brief, citing: State v. Overton, 4 Zabr. (24 N.J. Law) 435; S.C. 61 Am. Dec. 671; Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181; Jennings v. Great Northern Railway, L.R. 1 Q.B. 7; Bass v. Chicago Northwestern Railway, 36 Wis. 450; Butler v. Manchester c. Railway, 21 Q.B.D. 207; Lamberton v. Connecticut Insurance Co., 39 Minn. 129; Hunter v. Stewart, 47 Me. 419; Goddard v. Grand Trunk Railway, 57 Me. 202; Brewster v. VanLiew, 119 Ill. 554, Chicago Alton Railroad v. Pillsbury, 123 Ill. 9; Philadelphia Reading Railroad v. Derby, 14 How. 468; Steamboat New World v. King, 16 How. 469; York Company v. Railroad Co., 3 Wall. 107; Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357. Mr. G.W. Kretzinger, for defendant in error, submitted on his brief, citing: Mosher v. St. Louis c. Railway, 127 U.S. 390; Petrie v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 42 N.J. Law (13 Vroom), 449; Bradshaw v. South Boston Railroad, 135 Mass. 407; Frederick v. Marquette c. Railroad Co., 37 Mich. 342; Yorton v. Milwaukee, Lake Shore c. Railway, 54 Wis. 234; Shelton v. Lake Shore c. Railway, 29 Ohio St. 214; Pittsburg St. Louis Railway v. Nuzum, 60 Ind. 533; McClure v. Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad, 34 Md. 532. THIS was an action of assumpsit against a railroad corporation by a person who, after taking passage on one of its trains, was forcibly expelled by the conductor.

  4. Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. American Coupon Exchange, Inc.

    913 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1990)   Cited 99 times
    Holding that frequent flyer coupon rights are rights of contract rather than property rights and concluding that "an explicit contractual provision forbidding assignment of a right created by contract is ordinarily enforceable according to its terms"

    is also settled. Mosher v. Railroad Co., 127 U.S. 390, 8 S.Ct. 1324, 32 L.Ed. 249 [1888]. See, also, Boylan v. Hot Springs Co., 132 U.S. 146, 10 S.Ct. 50, 33 L.Ed. 290 [1889].

  5. G., C. S.F. Ry. Co. v. St. John

    13 Tex. Civ. App. 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896)   Cited 11 times

    There is no evidence to show that the agent of the Cotton Belt was in any respect the defendant's agent. If, under the evidence in this case, there could have been any liability for the plaintiff's ejection, it was a liability on the part of the connecting line for the wrongful act of its agent in not stamping and properly fixing up plaintiff's ticket so that it would entitle him to return passage, and to allow the plaintiff to recover in this case would be to make the defendant liable for the wrongful act of the agent of another company against which liability it had expressly contracted. Mosher v. Railway, 127 U.S. 390, 8 Sup.Ct. Rep., 1324; Trust Co. v. Railway, 65 Fed. Rep., 332; Railway v. Daniels, 29 S.W. Rep., 426. R.L. Carlock and T.J. Powell, for appellee.

  6. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Pauson

    70 F. 585 (9th Cir. 1895)   Cited 2 times

    In a majority of the cases cited by the plaintiff in error in support of its contention, it affirmatively appears that the passenger was himself at fault, and that the railroad company was free from any fault, negligence, carelessness, or mistake. Especially is this true in the following cases: Railway Co. v. Bennett, 1 C.C.A. 544, 50 F. 496; Dietrich v. Railroad Co., 71 Pa.St. 433; Railway Co. v. Griffin, 68 Ill. 499; Pennington v. Railroad Co., 62 Md. 95; Johnson v. Railroad Co., 63 Md. 106; Petrie v. Railroad Co., 42 N.J.Law, 449. In Mosher v. Railroad Co., 127 U.S. 390, 8 Sup.Ct. 1324, upon which plaintiff in error principally relies, neither party seems to have been at fault. In that case there was a special contract in regard to a tourist's ticket sold by the St. Louis, Railroad Company to Mosher at St. Louis, Mo., 'good for one first-class passage to Hot Springs, Ark., and return, when officially stamped on back hereof, and presented with coupons attached. '

  7. Ebsary v. Raymond Whitcomb Co.

    4 F.2d 285 (W.D.N.Y. 1925)

    Defendant could not refuse to take the plaintiff and his wife on the side trip without substantial reasons for not doing so, and whether there was substantial reason for refusing him the side trip was a question for the jury. The adjudications cited by defendant, viz.: Fonseca v. Cunard Steamship Co., 153 Mass. 553, 27 N.E. 665, 12 L.R.A. 340, 25 Am. St. Rep. 660; Tewes v. North German Lloyd Co., 186 N.Y. 151, 78 N.E. 864, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 199, 9 Ann. Cas. 909; Steers v. Liverpool, 57 N.Y. 1, 15 Am. Rep. 453; and Mosher v. St. Louis, 127 U.S. 390, 8 S. Ct. 1324, 32 L. Ed. 249 — do not apply to the facts here, and were decided, as it seems to me, upon a different principle. It was proper to receive evidence tending to show that the suffering of plaintiff's wife in consequence of the refusal to permit taking the trip to Damascus aggravated the physical and mental condition of the plaintiff.

  8. Mason v. R. R

    159 N.C. 183 (N.C. 1912)   Cited 1 times

    The defendant agreed that the plaintiff might travel for a fare which is not the full fare the law allowed, and the defendant had a right to impose such conditions as they saw fit." To the same effect is Bitterman v. R. R., 207 U.S. 171; Mosher v. R. R., 127 U.S. 390; Boylan v. R. R., 132 U.S. 146; Watson v. R. R., 49 L.R.A., 454. The consensus of all the authorities, without a single exception so far as we have been able to find, is that by accepting such a contract at a reduced rate when he has the opportunity to purchase the usual and ordinary ticket, the passenger enters into a contract with the carrier different from that implied by law upon the purchaser of an ordinary ticket at full rate of fare.

  9. Houston Texas Central Ry. Co. v. Lee

    104 Tex. 82 (Tex. 1911)   Cited 3 times

    — Since the ticket constituted a valid contract, and provided that it should be signed on the back by the party using it who signed the face thereof, and further provided that no agent or representative of the railroad company had a right to alter, change or waive any of the provisions thereof, any statement of the agent at Jennings changing or varying the terms of the ticket was outside of the scope of his authority. International G.N.R. Co. v. Best, 93 Tex. 348; Ketcheson v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 19 Texas Civ. App. 288[ 19 Tex. Civ. App. 288]; Reed v. Texas N.O.R. Co., 50 S.W. 432; Abram v. Galveston, H. S.A. Ry. Co., 83 Tex. 61 [ 83 Tex. 61]; Mosher v. St. Louis, I.M. S. Ry., 127 U.S. 390; Rose Notes (U.S. Sup. Ct.), Vol. 11, 582 Warren W. Moore and Kyrie Thrasher, for defendants in error.

  10. DesPortes v. Southern Railway

    87 S.C. 160 (S.C. 1910)   Cited 4 times

    Action by John A. DesPortes against Southern Ry. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Messrs. Harley Best, for appellant, cite: Plaintiff isbound by his contract: 26 S.C. 96; Lawson on Car. sec. 102; 32 Am. Dec. 506; 62 S.C. 1; 72 S.C. 361; 17 Am. St. R. 415; 12 L.R.A. 823; Hutch. on Car. sec. 568, 580a, 580b; 81 Mich. 364; Fetter on Car. secs. 284, 289; 127 U.S. 390; 132 U.S. 146; 67 S.C. 268; 173 U.S. 684. Punitivedamages not recoverable: 69 S.C. 444. Plaintiffshould minimize damages: 75 S.C. 355. Messrs. G. Duncan Bellinger, W.H. Townsend and R.C.Holman, contra, cite: That there was no evidence to supportcause of action must be raised by motion for nonsuit ordirection of verdict: Rule 77 C.C.; 75 S.C. 571. Meaningof "practicable" and "impracticable:" 81 N.E. 487; 18 A. 45; 42 Cal. 245; 54 Tex. 294; 16 A. 607; 16 S.E. 352. Train sheet not evidence of facts stated: 77 Ind. 110; 63 S.C. 572; 74 S.C. 337; 4 McC. 76; 75 Fed. 866; Wig. on Ev. secs. 1074, 1518; 18 Wall. 516.