Opinion
Case No. 2:99-CV-1357
April 3, 2003
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter was assigned, by random draw, to the undersigned on March 31, 2003 for a limited purpose pursuant to an Order of Chief Judge Walter H. Rice. The Chief Judge has directed that this Court consider the Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate an Order of Consent to disposition of this case by Chief Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King.
This case was originally assigned to Judge Joseph P. Kinneary of this Court. On April 10, 2000, the parties consented to disposition of the case by Magistrate Judge King. (Doc. #14). In light of the consent, no district judge was assigned to this case. In his February 25, 2003 motion to the Chief Judge, Plaintiff, who is an attorney proceeding pro se, argues that "[t]he lack of a district court judge in this case is . . . inconsistent with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) which mandates that the district court retain supervisory jurisdiction and authorizes the district judge to vacate a reference on its own motion." ( Plaintiff's Motion at 2).
In a separate motion filed on March 6, 2003, Plaintiff argues that "extraordinary circumstances" warrant vacating the Order of consent to disposition by the Magistrate Judge. In his motion, Plaintiff makes numerous allegations of conspiracy on the part of Defendants to deprive him of his civil rights. Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge has aided in the conspiracy, presumably by rulings which Plaintiff perceives as disadvantageous to his position. According to Plaintiff, the Magistrate Judge has "shown a prejudice and bias against [Plaintiff] and in favor of the defendants and defense counsel." ( Motion at 22). Plaintiff contends that, as a result, the integrity of the proceedings has been tainted and thus, extraordinary circumstances exist to set aside the consent order.
Plaintiff also requests an evidentiary hearing on the motion. The Court concludes that a hearing is unnecessary. As such, Plaintiff's request is denied.
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) provides, in relevant part:
Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate . . . may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he serves.
After consent is given, "[t]here is no absolute right, in a civil case, to withdraw consent to trial and other proceedings before a magistrate judge." Dixon v. Ylst, 990 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1993), citing Carter v. Sea-Land Servs., 816 P.2d 1018, 1020 (5th Cir. 1987); Fellman v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 735 F.2d 55, 58 (2nd Cir. 1984). The statute does provide, however, for withdrawal upon a showing of "extraordinary circumstances" by any party. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(6).
After a thorough review of Plaintiff's motion, the Court does not find "extraordinary circumstances" so as to warrant setting aside the parties' consent to disposition of this case by the Magistrate Judge. It is clear that Plaintiff's motion is motivated by his dissatisfaction with certain rulings, which has led him to make conclusory, unsubstantiated claims of "conspiracy" on the part of the Magistrate Judge and defense counsel. These claims do not constitute an extraordinary circumstance that would warrant setting aside the order of consent under § 636(c)(6). Furthermore, contrary to Plaintiff's contention, when the parties consent to disposition by the Magistrate Judge, an Article III judge is no longer assigned to the case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
In sum, the fact that this case lacks an Article III judge is of no significance in light of the fact that the parties consented to disposition by Magistrate Judge King, as reflected by the April 10, 2000 Order of Judge Kinneary, and in light of this Court's finding that extraordinary circumstances to set aside the consent order are not present. Thus, Plaintiff's Motion (Doc. #118) is DENIED. In accordance with the directive of Chief Judge Rice, this matter is hereby returned to Chief Magistrate Judge King for further disposition.