Opinion
Civil Action 2:24-242
03-11-2024
ARTHUR MOSES, Plaintiff, v. RED DIAMOND TRUCKING, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that this case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II. Report
On February 28, 2022, Plaintiff Arthur Moses filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) with an attached Complaint against Defendant Red Diamond Trucking. His motion was granted and the Complaint was filed (ECF No. 3). Upon review, however, the Court concluded that the Complaint does not present a basis for subject matter jurisdiction.
An order was entered on March 7, 2024, that directed Plaintiff to show cause, on or before March 28, 2024, why this action should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (ECF No. 5). Plaintiff filed a response on March 8, 2024 (ECF No. 6).
A. Analysis
As the Supreme Court has held:
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree. It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). A district court has a duty to raise doubts about its jurisdiction at any time, and the party asserting jurisdiction “bears the burden of showing that the case is properly before the court at all stages of the litigation.” Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1045 (3d Cir.1993). See also Fed R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”)
In order to provide a federal forum for plaintiffs who seek to vindicate federal rights, Congress has conferred on the district courts original jurisdiction in federal-question cases-civil actions that arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In order to provide a neutral forum for what have come to be known as diversity cases, Congress also has granted district courts original jurisdiction in civil actions between citizens of different States, between U.S. citizens and foreign citizens, or by foreign states against U.S. citizens. § 1332. To ensure that diversity jurisdiction does not flood the federal courts with minor disputes, § 1332(a) requires that the matter in controversy in a diversity case exceed a specified amount, currently $75,000.Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that either of these statutes applies.
The Complaint contains no allegations regarding subject matter jurisdiction; rather, that entire section of the Complaint has been left blank, except for a statement that Plaintiff is seeking “over $100,000” (Compl. § II). The Civil Cover Sheet has a check mark in the box for “Federal Question” and another check mark in the box for “U.S. Government Plaintiff,” although that check mark has been crossed out. Three boxes have checked in the Nature of Suit section: insurance, tort product liability and property damage/product liability. The cause of action is listed as “Property Damage,” which appears to be accurate.
However, it is noted that the Civil Cover Sheet explicitly states that it “and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet.” Thus, there is considerable doubt that the Court can rely on a Civil Cover Sheet to supply required information that is missing from a Complaint. See Favors v. Coughlin, 877 F.2d 219, 220 (2d Cir. 1989).
In the Statement of Claim section, the Complaint alleges that on January 25, 2024, a Red Diamond Trucking truck “slammed on their brakes [and caused] the plaintiff to total their car” on the McKees Rocks Bridge. (Compl. § III.) These factual allegations do not present a federal question, but rather a state law claim for negligence, and thus subject matter jurisdiction cannot be based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Furthermore, the Complaint does not allege a basis for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, which could be exercised over a state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). On the contrary, the Complaint states that Plaintiff resides at 206 Camp Avenue, Braddock, Pennsylvania 15104, which strongly suggests that he is a citizen of Pennsylvania. It further states that Red Diamond Trucking is located at 1 John Street, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15136. (Compl. § I.) Plaintiff's motion for service (ECF No. 4) requests that Defendant be served at this address.
A corporation is a citizen of both its state of incorporation and the state in which it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). For diversity jurisdiction to exist, Red Diamond Trucking would have to be incorporated in and have its principal place of business in states other than Pennsylvania. See Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015). The Complaint does not allege the citizenship of the parties at all, and to the extent that it mentions facts relating to citizenship, they indicate that both Plaintiff and Defendant are likely citizens of Pennsylvania, which means that diversity of citizenship subject matter jurisdiction does not exist in this case.
In fact, in his response to the order to show cause,Plaintiff does not contend that diversity jurisdiction exists. Rather, he asserts that the bridge where the incident occurred is federally funded and that Red Diamond Trucking is a carrier of United States federal documents in the form of mail. Even if these statements are true, however, they have no bearing on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.
As he has done in previous cases, Plaintiff has styled his response as though it was an order issued by the undersigned. Plaintiff has been repeatedly advised that he must submit documents as briefs or responses in his own name, not as an order that appears to be issued by the Court.
To demonstrate that federal-question jurisdiction exists over a state law claim, a party . . . has to establish that the “state-law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc., v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005). The category of cases alleging a state law claim that arises under federal law is “special and small” and “slim.” Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006). See also Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306, 310 (3d Cir.1994) (no federal question where the complaint merely alluded to a federal contract).
The United States is not a party to this case, nor could it be. The Complaint fails to identify any federal question for the Court to consider. Even assuming that the bridge on which the incident occurred was federally funded and Red Diamond Trucking was transporting federal documents, these facts are irrelevant to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, the Complaint asserts a straightforward negligence claim under Pennsylvania law between two parties who are Pennsylvania citizens. It is not a “federal case” and this Court therefore cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over it.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, it is recommended that this case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff may seek review of this Report and Recommendation by the district judge by filing objections on or before March 25, 2024. Failure to file timely objections will waive the right of appeal.