No. 05-06-00030-CR.
Opinion Filed March 23, 2007. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7 Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F05-52096-SNY.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, MOSELEY, and O'NEILL Opinion By Justice MOSELEY
JIM MOSELEY, Justice.
A jury convicted James Moseley of the murder of Porter Bledsoe and set punishment at confinement for life and a fine of $10,000. Moseley appeals, asserting in two issues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in admitting his oral and written statements. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties; thus we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
There is evidence that at approximately 11:00 a.m. on April 29, 2003, Moseley drove to the Dallas County Justice Center and told sheriff's deputies in the lobby that he had killed his friend with an axe. Moseley was handcuffed and escorted to the county's Intelligence Unit. About an hour later, Moseley made a statement to a City of Dallas police detective, which she recorded and which Moseley signed. In his statement, Moseley admitted killing Bledsoe with an axe. Moseley filed a pretrial motion to exclude his oral statements. However, at Moseley's request it was not heard at the pretrial hearing; he told the court, "I'm not going to request a hearing on that at this time." He asked the court "just to hold that motion." The trial court conducted a hearing on Moseley's pretrial motion to exclude his written statement and ruled it admissible. During the trial, Moseley orally objected to admission of the written statement and the card showing Miranda warnings on the same grounds as the pretrial objection. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the card and the written statement. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of discretion, giving almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony. Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 23 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Therefore, we will not disturb the trial court's findings if those findings are supported by the record. Id. We consider only whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts. Id. When the defense relitigates the suppression issues at trial, we may consider evidence from the trial in reviewing the motion to suppress. See Rachal v. State, 917 S.W.2d 799, 809 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Oral Statements
In his first issue, Moseley argues his written and oral confessions were not voluntary because he was deprived of his faculties by intoxication. In his second issue, he contends his "confession" was elicited through interrogation while he was under custodial arrest and prior to Miranda warnings. Under his second issue, he argues the Miranda warnings should have been given after he made his first statement in the lobby and "before any further interrogation and/or conversation" because he "went on to incriminate himself and once again re-tell his story" to the police officers. However, the record shows that Moseley requested the trial court not hear his motion to suppress his oral statements and "just to hold" that motion. Thus, Moseley did not present any pretrial objections to his oral statements. At trial, Moseley did not object to the police officers' testimony that Moseley voluntarily made oral statements to them that he had killed his roommate with an axe. Thus the record shows that Moseley failed to object on these grounds at the suppression hearing and at trial. Only on appeal does he argue that his oral statements were inadmissible. Because he did not raise these objections with the trial court, they are waived. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. (for complaint to be presented on appeal, timely request, objection, or motion must have been made to trial court stating grounds for ruling "with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint"). Accordingly, we resolve his first and second issues as they relate to his oral statements against him. Written Statements Intoxication
We address Moseley's argument in his first issue that his written statement was not voluntary because he was deprived of his faculties by intoxication. Although he did not raise this issue in his motion to suppress his written statement, Moseley testified at the pretrial hearing that he had been drugged and was hallucinating when he made his written statement. However, even if Moseley were under the influence of intoxicants at the time of his statement, this would not automatically render the statement involuntary. See Nichols v. State, 754 S.W.2d 185, 190 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Green v. State, 764 S.W.2d 242, 247 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989). Intoxication, while relevant, is not per se determinative of the voluntariness of a statement. See id. The central question is the extent to which appellant was deprived of his faculties due to the intoxication. Id. If an appellant's intoxication rendered him incapable of making an independent, informed choice of free will, then his statement was given involuntarily. Id. Moseley testified at the pretrial hearing that he was not coherent and was seeing "vivid colors, and when he would look at the wall or floor he would see patterns of things." At the trial, on cross-examination of one State witness, the witness admitted that Moseley did at times, "say things that were — sounding confusing." However, there is also testimony that Moseley appeared tense and upset that he committed the crime, but was calm and his speech was "quite clear." See Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 651 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) (evidence included interviewers' statements that accused "did not appear to them to be intoxicated"); Garcia v. State, 919 S.W.2d 370, 387 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) (same). There is further testimony that Moseley made "small talk" for fifty-six minutes with Detective Robert Burris, who accompanied Moseley from the lobby to the Intelligence Unit, and Burris testified that Moseley was not "frantic." Burris testified that, in almost twenty-four years' experience dealing with "people on the streets," he had occasion to deal with people on drugs and Moseley did not appear to "strung out on drugs." Moseley contends he was not able to read what was written on the statement, but the record shows he made changes to the statement, initialed those changes, and signed it. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Moseley's motion to exclude his written statement because of involuntariness by intoxication. Thus, we resolve Moseley's first issue as to his written statement against him. Miranda Warnings
In his second issue, Moseley argues the trial court erred by overruling his motion to suppress his written statement because the statement does not contain his knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966), and article 38.21 of the code of criminal procedure, thus violating his constitutional and statutory rights. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.21 (Vernon 2005). "[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 38.22, § 2(a). "The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 2(b); Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 23. To determine whether a confession is voluntary, we examine the totality of circumstances surrounding its making. See Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 23. At the pretrial hearing, Detective Mary Brady testified that she read Moseley his Miranda warnings; he indicated he understood the warnings; he signed a waiver of those warnings on a Miranda warning card; and then he agreed to give Brady a statement. Moseley testified he signed the Miranda card after his statement was written and he signed it. However, the written statement contains the Miranda warnings and Moseley's initials by each one. The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony. See id. Thus, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Moseley's motion to suppress his written statement on grounds it did not contain his knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights pursuant to Miranda and article 38.21 of the code of criminal procedure. Conclusion
Having resolved Moseley's two issues against him, we affirm the trial court's judgment