Nor is time an essential element of the crime of fondling. Mosby v. State, 134 So.3d 850, 854 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). "[D]ifficulty recalling exact times and dates is not uncommon in child-abuse cases."

¶ 14. In an attempt to distinguish Friley, the State relies on Mosby v. State, 134 So.3d 850 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014), and Faulkner v. State, 109 So.3d 142 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). However, each of these cases involves separate and distinct sexual acts.

Although "an indictment must contain the essential elements of the offenses charged in order to provide the defendant with sufficient notice of the charges against him," "'an allegation of the date of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment.'" Humbles v. State, 228 So.3d 838, 844 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (emphasis added) (quoting Mosby v. State, 134 So.3d 850, 853 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014)); see also Patton v. State, 109 So.3d 66, 81 (¶46) (Miss. 2012) (holding that an indictment could be amended "to correct a mistake" in "the dates charged in the indictment" because "time [was] not an essential element or factor in the crime" and "there was no factual dispute regarding the[] dates"-the mistake and amendment "were to form only," not the substance of the indictment). Indeed, "[a]n indictment for any offense shall not be insufficient for omitting to state the time at which the offense was committed in any case where time is not of the essence of the offense, nor for stating the time imperfectly, nor for stating the offense to have been committed on a day subsequent to the finding of the indictment, or on an impossible day, or on a day that never happened ...."

Indeed, "failure to precisely prove an offense occurred during a specific time period is not grounds for reversal." Mosby v. State, 134 So.3d 850, 853 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). And "[w]ithin reasonable limits, proof of any date before the return of the indictment is sufficient."

These facts, taken in the light most favorable to the State, show that a rational juror could have found that Anderson committed the crime charged in the time periods set forth in each of the seven counts in the indictment. McBride , 61 So. 3d at 150 (¶¶47-51) (finding that the victim's testimony that the sexual abuse occurred within two months of the charged date was within reasonable limits of the charged time frame to support a sexual battery conviction); Mosby v. State , 134 So. 3d 850, 853-54 (¶¶9-11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that the victim's testimony that he was fondled "in the months prior to his moving to Oklahoma in January 2006" and evidence that the victim "was fondled the last time he stayed with [the defendant] in ... late February or early March 2006" was sufficient to place defendant's conduct within the September 1, 2005 through March 2006 charged time frame in order to sustain defendant's convictions); Faulkner , 109 So. 3d at 148-49 (¶¶25-28) (finding that the victim's testimony "that the fondlings started ‘within the first months’ of his stay [in defendant's home], which began in August 2006," was sufficiently near the "during August 2006" charged time frame to sustain defendant's conviction). B. Lustful Intent

¶ 33. In Mosby v. State , 134 So.3d 850, 857 (¶ 25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014), this Court found the victim's testimony established two distinct criminal acts—that the defendant (1) fondled her breast and (2) digitally penetrated her vagina. As a result, we found no merit to the defendant's claim that his sexual-battery and fondling convictions merged and violated his right against double jeopardy.

But "an allegation of the date of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment." Mosby v. State, 134 So.3d 850, 853 (¶ 11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). ¶ 23.