Morvant v. Arnoult

8 Citing cases

  1. In re Manville Forest Products Corp.

    99 B.R. 543 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)   Cited 5 times

    Fejta v. GAF Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1395 (5th Cir. 1986); Tedesco, 521 So.2d at 723-24; Daigle Assoc., Inc. v. Coleman, 385 So.2d 349 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 396 So.2d 1270 (La. 1981); Krupp v. Nelson, 50 So.2d 464 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1951). See also Morvant v. Arnoult, 490 So.2d 549, 551 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1986); Sanders v. Rudd, 427 So.2d 1271, 1275 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1983). Appellant Gulf notes that this line of cases is not dispositive because the Louisiana Supreme Court, in affirming the appellate court's decision in Daigle, expressly refused to reach the question whether a contract for immovable property would require a writing ratifying authority.

  2. In re Manville Forest Products Corp.

    89 B.R. 358 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that "bar-dates are likened to statutes of limitations which must be strictly observed"

    See La.Civ. Code Ann. art. 2996, 2997 (West 1952), see, generally, id. at art. 3010 (West 1952);Morvant v. Arnoult, 490 So.2d 549, 551 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1986) ("if an agent executes the contract on behalf of the buyer or seller, the agent's authority must be expressed and in writing."); Ward v. Pennington, 434 So.2d 1131, 1137 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1983).

  3. In re Manville Forest Products Corp.

    896 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1990)   Cited 448 times
    Holding that party who filed a proof of claim against the debtor was, unlike the defendant in Marathon, not "a third party related only peripherally to the adjudication of [the debtor's] estate" and "[t]he determination of the objection to and allowance of its claim is clearly within the traditional core jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court"

    In contrast, the line of cases cited by the bankruptcy court holding that only written ratification is proper for immovable property expressly distinguishes between movable and immovable property. Fejta v. GAF Companies, Inc., 800 F.2d 1395, 1396 (5 Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Tedesco v. Gentry Dev., Inc., 521 So.2d 717, 723-24 (La.Ct.App. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 540 So.2d 960 (La. 1989); Daigle Assoc., Inc. v. Coleman, 385 So.2d 349, 350 (La.Ct.App. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 396 So.2d 1270 (La. 1981); see also Daigle, supra, 396 So.2d at 1272 (Blanche, J., concurring); Morvant v. Arnoult, 490 So.2d 549, 551 (La.Ct.App. 1986); Sanders v. Rudd, 427 So.2d 1271, 1275 (La.Ct.App. 1983); Krupp v. Nelson, 50 So.2d 464, 467-68 (La.Ct.App. 1951). In view of this authority, we are constrained to agree with the lower courts that Louisiana law requires a writing for ratification of immovable property contracts.

  4. Riss v. Angel

    131 Wn. 2d 612 (Wash. 1997)   Cited 193 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "in Washington the intent, or purpose, of the covenants, rather than free use of the land, is the paramount consideration in construing restrictive covenants"

    Upon remand, the burden of proof is on Plaintiffs. See generally, e.g., Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank, 253 Ga. 233, 319 S.E.2d 440 (1984); Morvant v. Arnoult, 490 So.2d 549 (La.Ct.App. 1986); Hutcheson Co. v. Providence-Washington Ins. Co., 341 S.W.2d 142 (Mo.Ct.App. 1960); A.B.F. Freight Sys., Inc. v. Austrian Import Serv., Inc., 798 S.W.2d 606 (Tex.Ct.App. 1990); Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Miles, 711 P.2d 390 (Wyo. 1985). Following fact-finding, the appellant homeowners (petitioners) who participated in or ratified the decision to reject Plaintiffs' proposal shall be jointly and severally liable, along with those defendant homeowners who did not appeal and those who moved for dismissal from the appeal and therefore are not entitled to the benefit of this decision.

  5. Rousset v. Smith

    176 So. 3d 632 (La. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 15 times

    An award of attorneys' fees cannot be based upon the provisions of a null, unenforceable contract. See Morvant v. Arnoult, 490 So.2d 549, 552 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986). And the Tubbs have not directed us to any other source upon which to base an attorneys' fee award.

  6. Myers v. Burger King Corp.

    618 So. 2d 1123 (La. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 16 times
    In Burger King, Parkway Construction Company (“Parkway”) and Burger King entered into a contract to renovate one of its restaurants.

    The contract does not contain a clause pertaining to recovery of attorney's fees. As a general rule, attorney's fees are not allowed unless provided by statute or contract. Morvant v. Arnoult, 490 So.2d 549, 552 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1986); Quealy v. Paine, Webber, Jackson Curtis, Inc., 475 So.2d 756 (La. 1985). A breach of contract does not fall within one of the exceptions to this rule.

  7. Conoco, Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc.

    524 So. 2d 1305 (La. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 23 times

    In Louisiana, attorney's fees are only recoverable when authorized by statute or contract. Morvant v. Arnoult, 490 So.2d 549 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1986). The contract in question does not provide for attorney's fees and there is no statutory authority in Louisiana for recovery of attorney fees in this case.

  8. Milliman v. Peterman

    519 So. 2d 238 (La. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 6 times

    In the case before us, appellants signed the actual agreement to purchase on August 19, 1985. That same day, the real estate agent contacted Mr. Milliman by phone, and, the very next day, several hours before the offer was to expire, the Millimans sent a telegram (contents reproduced supra) with their names typed out at the bottom. Appellants cite Morvant v. Arnoult, 490 So.2d 549 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1986) and Rebman v. Reed, 335 So.2d 37 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1976), Writ denied 338 So.2d 699 (La. 1976) for the legal principle that "A contract to sell immovable property, to be enforceable, must be in writing and must be signed by the buyer and seller, and if an agent executes the contract on behalf of the buyer or the seller, the agent's authority must be express and in writing."