Opinion
C. A. 8:24-cv-01161-DCC-KFM
04-29-2024
Brandon Scott Morton, Plaintiff, v. Honorable Margaret B. Seymour, Justin Holloway, Ronald Gambrell, S.C.U.S.M.O. 100/300, Katherine Evatt, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. MCDONALD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
The plaintiff, a state pretrial detainee, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action seeking money damages (docs. 1; 1-1). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on March 7, 2024 (doc. 1). By order filed March 22, 2024, the plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring his case into proper form for judicial screening (doc. 7). The plaintiff complied with the court's order, and the case is now in proper form for judicial screening. However, for the reasons that follow, it is recommended that this matter be dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Anderson County Detention Center (the “Detention Center”) filed this action appearing to seek money damages from the defendants (doc. 1). The plaintiff's current pretrial detention is unrelated to the claims he asserts in this action, which involve his federal supervised release sentence (doc. 1-1 at 1). See United States v. Morton, C/A 8:02-cr-00871-MBS (D.S.C.).
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and his due process rights, wrongfully imprisoned him, and were negligent because he over-served time (docs. 1 at 6; 1-1 at 9-30). The plaintiff contends that Judge Seymour violated his rights by sentencing him to an excessively long supervised release sentence (docs. 1 at 7; 1-1 at 14-29). The plaintiff contends that AUSA Justin Holloway also violated his rights by letting Judge Seymour impose an unlawful sentence (docs. 1 at 7; 1-1 at 14-15). He contends that USPO Ronald Gambrell, the probation officer, violated his rights by filing a pre-sentence report that was wrong and not objecting to the impermissible sentence (docs. 1 at 8; 1-1 at 5-6). AFPD Katherine Evatt, the plaintiff's appointed counsel, allegedly violated his rights by failing to prevent his unlawful sentence (docs. 1 at 8; 1-1 at 5-6). The plaintiff also contends that the U.S. Marshal Service arrested him for violating the terms of his supervised release (doc. 1-1 at 11-12, 18, 30). The plaintiff contends that he only recently became “aware” of the violation (id. at 4).
The plaintiff's alleged injuries include mental and emotional trauma (docs. 1 at 10; 1-1 at 31-32, 34-35). The plaintiff also contends that he lost job opportunities because he was incarcerated (doc. 1-1 at 33-34). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages (docs. 1 at 10; 1-1 at 36-37).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action seeking money damages. However, the instant matter is subject to summary dismissal. In Bivens, the Supreme Court established a direct cause of action under the Constitution of the United States against federal officials for violations of federal constitutional rights. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1999). A Bivens claim is analogous to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; federal officials cannot be sued under § 1983, however, because they do not act under color of state law. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-20 (1982). Case law involving § 1983 claims is applicable in Bivens actions and vice versa. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839 (1994); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). To state a claim under Bivens, a plaintiff must plausibly allege two elements: (1) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and (2) the defendant did so under color of federal law. See Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (setting forth requirements for a § 1983 claim under color of state law); see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389 (“In [a previous case], we reserved the question whether violation of [the Constitution] by a federal agent acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his unconstitutional conduct. Today we hold that it does.”).
As noted, in Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized an implied private action for damages against FBI agents alleged to have violated a plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights from unreasonable search and seizure when the agents handcuffed the plaintiff in his own home without a warrant. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. Since then, the Supreme Court has only recognized Bivens claims in two additional contexts: (1) under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause for gender discrimination when a Congressman fired his female administrative assistant (Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)); and (2) under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause against prison officials for failing to provide emergency medical care for an inmate's asthma (Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)). However, as recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Egbert v. Boule, during the last 42 years, the court has “declined 11 times to imply a similar cause of action for other alleged constitutional violations.” 596 U.S. 482, 486 (2022) (collecting cases). The Court in Egbert further noted that recognizing additional causes of action under Bivens is disfavored. Id. at 491-92 (internal citation omitted). As recognized recently by the Fourth Circuit in a published opinion, although the Supreme Court has not overruled any of the Bivens cases, the Supreme Court has demonstrated not only regret over the Bivens cases, but also demonstrated hostility to any expansion of them. See Tate v. Harmon, 54 F.4th 839, 843-44 (4th Cir. 2022). Thus, the Supreme Court has imposed a highly restrictive analysis for Bivens cases by “(1) narrowing the precedential scope of Bivens, Davis, and Carlson and (2) imposing a broad standard of criteria that, if satisfied, require courts to reject any expansion of Bivens remedies.” Id. Under Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Supreme Court framed the inquiry as a two step process: (1) first asking whether the case presents a new Bivens context and (2) if the claim arises in a new context, doing a special factors analysis to determine whether to extend Bivens to said context. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135-38 (2017) (citation omitted). In Egbert, the Supreme Court decided that “[w]hile our cases describe two steps, those steps often resolve to a single question: whether there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped to create a damages remedy.” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492. Here, liberally construed the plaintiff asserts two Bivens claims: that he was arrested for violating the terms of his supervised release and that his supervised release sentence was impermissibly long. The court will address the claims in turn.
Arrest Claim
At first blush, the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim regarding his arrest for violating the terms of his supervised release appears to be a context to which Bivens applies. However, because the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim in this action presents more than “trivial” differences with Bivens, it does present a new context to which Bivens has not been extended. See Egbert, 596 U.S. at 495 (affirming a finding of a new context despite “almost parallel circumstances.”). For example, unlike the Fourth Amendment claim in Bivens, the plaintiff's claim in this action involves a different federal agency and a different circumstance - the plaintiff was arrested after warrants were issued for his arrest for violating the terms of his supervised release sentence. As such, the plaintiff's claims do not involve FBI agents handcuffing the plaintiff in his own home without a warrant (as set forth in Bivens); thus, the plaintiff's claims involve a new Bivens context. See Tun-Cos v. Perrotte, 922 F.3d 514, 523, 525 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding that new contexts do not require “radical” differences and holding that differences in contexts include new categories of defendants). Because the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim involves a new Bivens context, the court must examine whether special factors exist that require the court to hesitate before extending Bivens to this situation absent action from Congress. Here, the undersigned finds, as set forth in Egbert, that special factors exist requiring the court to hesitate before extending a Bivens condition in this situation absent action from Congress. Egbert, 142 S.Ct. at 491. As such, the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim is subject to summary dismissal because special factors counsel hesitation about extending Bivens to the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim. Nevertheless, even presuming that the plaintiff's claim was not an expansion of Bivens, it would still be subject to dismissal. Here, the crux of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim is that the U.S. Marshal Service arrested him for violating the terms of his supervised release (doc. 1-1 at 11-12, 18, 30). A review of the filings in the plaintiff's underlying criminal case shows that no matter which arrest the plaintiff challenges, the plaintiff's multiple arrests for violating the terms of his supervised release were each preceded by the issuance of an arrest warrant. See United States v. Morton, C/A 8:02-cr-00871-MBS, at docs. 40; 80; 104; 132; 169. Absent additional allegations of a lack of probable cause (which are not included in the instant matter), officers are not liable for arresting an individual pursuant to a facially valid arrest warrant. See Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998). As such, any such Fourth Amendment Bivens claim, even presuming Bivens extended to include such a claim, is subject to summary dismissal.
Supervised Release Sentence Claim
The plaintiff's claim that his supervised release sentence was impermissibly long against the Honorable Margaret B. Seymour (then a United States District Judge), AUSA Justin Holloway, USPO Ronald Gambrell, and AFPD Katherine Evatt, is a new context to which Bivens has not yet been extended. Because the plaintiff's claim is a new Bivens context, the undersigned must consider whether “there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped to create a damages remedy.” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492 (emphasis added). Further, as recognized in Egbert, in determining if a damages remedy is more suitable for Congress to create, “a court likely cannot predict the ‘systemwide' consequences of recognizing a cause of action under Bivens” and that “uncertainty alone is a special factor that forecloses relief.” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 493 (internal citations omitted). As such, under the highly restrictive analysis imposed by the Supreme Court regarding the extension of Bivens to new contexts, special factors counsel against extending Bivens to the plaintiff's claim that his supervised release sentence was too long; thus, the claim is subject to summary dismissal. In addition to the foregoing, even presuming the plaintiff's supervised release violation sentence claim did not involve a new Bivens context, this matter would still be subject to dismissal, as set forth in more detail below.
Judge Seymour
The plaintiff alleges that Judge Seymour violated his rights by imposing a sentence for his supervised release that was unlawful (docs. 1 at 6, 7; 1-1 at 14-29). It is well-settled that judges have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions unless they acted in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-64 (1978); see also Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining that if a challenged judicial act was unauthorized by law, the judge still has immunity from a suit seeking damages). Whether an act is judicial or non-judicial relates to the nature of the act, such as whether it is a function normally performed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Immunity applies even when the judge's acts were in error, malicious, or in excess of his authority. Id. at 12-13. Absolute immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Moreover, immunity applies even when a judge is alleged to have acted “maliciously or corruptly.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978). The allegations as to Judge Seymour concern her judicial actions; as such, judicial immunity squarely applies and the claims against her should be dismissed.
AUSA Justin Holloway
The plaintiff's claims against AUSA Justin Holloway are subject to dismissal based upon prosecutorial immunity. The plaintiff contends that AUSA Holloway violated his rights by allowing Judge Seymour to impose an unlawful supervised release sentence (docs. 1 at 7; 1-1 at 14-15). Prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings such as criminal trials, bond hearings, bail hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pretrial motions hearings. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 267-71 (1993); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff's claims regarding AUSA Holloway involve his actions in judicial proceedings - specifically the plaintiff's supervised release hearings. As such, AUSA Holloway is entitled to prosecutorial immunity.
USPO Ronald Gambrell
Mr. Gambrell, who acted as the United States Probation Officer for the plaintiff, is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Here, the plaintiff asserts that USPO Gambrell erred in submitting a flawed presentence report and by not objecting to the supervised release sentence imposed by Judge Seymour (docs. 1 at 8; 1-1 at 5-6). However, United States Pretrial and Probation Office employees are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for their role in investigating, preparing, and submitting reports. See Williams v. United States, C/A No. 1:21-cv-00537-DKC, 2021 WL 1720230, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 30, 2021) (collecting cases recognizing quasi-judicial immunity for federal probation officers). Here, the plaintiff's claims regarding USPO Gambrell involve his action in preparing the presentence investigation report and his purported failure to object to the sentence imposed - actions which fall squarely into a prosecutorial/quasi-judicial function. As such, USPO Gambrell is likewise entitled to immunity.
AFPD Katherine Evatt
The plaintiff's claims against Assistant Federal Public Defender Katherine Evatt, his defense attorney during the federal criminal proceedings, are subject to summary dismissal because AFPD Evatt, is not a government actor. As noted, the plaintiff's claims against AFPD Evatt are based on her representation of him during his supervised release proceedings - including that she allowed an unlawful sentence to be imposed for his supervised release (docs. 1 at 8; 1-1 at 5-7). It is well-settled that “[a]nyone whose conduct is ‘fairly attributable to the [government]' can be sued as a [government] actor” under § 1983 or pursuant to Bivens. Filarsky, 566 U.S. at 383. To determine whether government action is present, no single factor is determinative and the “totality of the circumstances” must be evaluated. See Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 341-43. The law is well-established that defense attorneys - including federal defenders - whether appointed or retained, are not government actors. See High v. Chandler, et al., C/A No. 4:20-cv-03235-RBH-TER, 2021 WL 3410646, at *2-3 (D.S.C. June 1,2021) (finding that federal defenders are not federal officials subject to suit under Bivens), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 2885902 (D.S.C. July 9, 2021); see also Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 323 n.13 (1981); Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding no state action under § 1983, even where the plaintiff's attorney was court-appointed). As such, AFPD Evatt is also entitled to summary dismissal because she is not a government actor.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the defects identified above cannot be cured by amending the complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 791 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
The plaintiff is warned that if the United States District Judge assigned to this matter adopts this report and recommendation, the dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim could later be deemed a strike under the three-strikes rule. See Pitts v. South Carolina, 65 F.4th 141 (4th Cir. 2023).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).