Opinion
No. C 02-3658 WHA (PR)
February 18, 2003
JUDGMENT
The court has dismissed this prisoner in forma pauperis compliant. A judgment of dismissal without prejudice is entered in favor of defendants. Plaintiff shall take nothing by way of his complaint.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Federal Detention Center in Dublin, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Venue is proper in this district because the defendants reside, and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the action occurred, in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
STATEMENT
Plaintiff, who was on federal parole at the time, contends that defendants arrested him without cause.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief See id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
B. Legal Claims
The United States Supreme Court has held that to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994).
Heck generally bars claims challenging the validity of an arrest, prosecution or conviction. See Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (Heck barred plaintiff's false arrest and imprisonment claims until conviction was invalidated);Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (Heck barred plaintiffs claims that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him and brought unfounded criminal charges against him). As plaintiffs claim here is that his arrest was not valid, it is barred by Heck.
Also, several circuits have held that the common law rule barring suits for false arrest, false imprisonment or malicious prosecution where the plaintiff was actually convicted of the crime is applicable to § 1983 actions. See, e.g., Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380, 386-89 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987). The legislative history of § 1983 gives no clear indication that Congress intended any wholesale abolition of common law immunities that might bar suits under the statute. In a common law action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must show the absence of probable cause to arrest and that the proceedings previously commenced against him terminated in his favor. See id. at 386. In a common law action for false arrest or imprisonment, the plaintiff need not show that the prior proceedings against him terminated in his favor, but the defendant is entitled to prevail if he can establish that there was probable cause for the arrest. See id. at 387. Because a conviction of the plaintiff following the arrest is viewed as establishing probable cause, the common law rule, equally applicable to actions asserting false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, was and is that the plaintiff can under no circumstances recover if he was convicted of the offense for which he was arrested. See id.; see also Malady v. Crunk, 902 F.2d 10, 10 (8th Cir. 1990) (court need not reach difficult collateral estoppel issues but will apply common law doctrine to dismiss action where plaintiff alleges lack of probable cause for arrest but was convicted of crime). In this case, it appears that plaintiff's federal parole was revoked, which would be the equivalent of a conviction under the cases discussed above; if it was not revoked, and instead he is presently serving a separate sentence resulting from his arrest, the same rationale applies.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff must succeed in getting his parole revocation or conviction set aside before he can maintain a section 1983 suit based on these facts. Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED without prejudice to reasserting them if a cause of action ever accrues.Leave to proceed in forma pauperis (doc 2) is DENIED. No fee is due.
The clerk shall close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.