Opinion
No. 05-11-00439-CR No. 05-11-00440-CR No. 05-11-00441-CR
02-02-2012
BRIAN ALLEN MORROW, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
AFFIRM and Opinion Filed February 3, 2012
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F09-23714-Y, F09-23715-Y, F09-55872-Y
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Murphy, and Myers
Opinion By Justice Murphy
Brian Allen Morrow appeals from the adjudication of his guilt in three cases. In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by finding appellant violated the condition of his deferred adjudication community supervision based on the level of proof of the allegations. We affirm. Procedural Background
Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to tampering with physical evidence, possession with intent to deliver cocaine in an amount of one gram or more but less than four grams, and possession of less than one gram of cocaine. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 37.09(a)(1) (West 2011); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.112(a), (c), 481.115(a), (b) (West 2010). Pursuant to plea agreements, the trial court deferred adjudicating guilt in each case. The court placed appellant on three years' community supervision in the tampering and cocaine possession cases. The Court placed him on five years' community supervision and assessed a $2,000 fine in the possession with intent to deliver case. The State later moved to adjudicate guilt in each case, alleging appellant violated the conditions of his community supervision by committing the offense of assault-family violence; failing to pay court costs, fine, and fees; and failing to complete community service hours. Appellant pleaded not true to all of the allegations in a hearing on the motions to adjudicate guilt.
Manuclaire Long testified the complainant, Kimberly Ranson, is her sister, and that Ranson did not come to the hearing because she "just doesn't care" about appellant anymore. Long testified that on December 1, 2010, Ranson was spending the night at Long's apartment. Appellant called at about 10:00 p.m. and asked Ranson to come outside. Appellant and Ranson argued back and forth over the telephone. Ranson refused to go outside to talk with appellant. Long testified appellant sat outside the apartment in his truck all night, and he continually called Ranson on the telephone asking "for his stuff back." Long said she answered the call once and said she would drive Ranson over to their mother's house to get appellant's "things" and that appellant could follow them. Appellant agreed. Long went outside to appellant's truck and talked to him. Appellant was calm until Ranson came outside. Ranson began arguing with appellant and calling him names. Appellant got out of the truck, grabbed Ranson by the neck, and "flung her to the ground." Appellant hit Ranson twice in the face with his fist. When Ranson got up, she and appellant continued arguing. Long led Ranson away from appellant, but he followed. When they were near the leasing office, appellant threw Ranson to the ground again and pushed her face into the concrete. The apartment manager and maintenance men came outside and "broke it up." Ranson testified appellant said he was going to "run them over." Appellant got in his truck and drove directly toward them, then he sped out of the complex. During cross-examination, Long testified Ranson provoked the situation, and that she had never seen appellant be violent toward anyone before that day.
Kimberly Chalk, appellant's probation officer, testified appellant reported regularly. Chalk testified appellant was behind on "making payments," his community service hours, and "a couple of classes he was supposed to take."
Appellant testified he and Ranson had an "altercation" when he went to her apartment to get some "minor stuff" from Ranson. Appellant denied that he stayed outside Long's apartment in his truck all night. On the morning of December 1, 2010, after reporting at the probation department, appellant went to Ranson's apartment to get his "stuff." When Ranson came outside, she cursed him and called him names. Appellant testified he did get out of the truck and pushed Ranson "out of my face." Appellant denied he hit Ranson with his fist or that he forced her face to the ground. He testified he did "push her to the ground twice." When the apartment manager came outside, appellant got in his truck and left the complex. Appellant denied he drove toward Ranson or Long or tried to run over them with his truck.
The trial court found all of the allegations true, adjudicated appellant guilty in each case, and assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment in the tampering with physical evidence and possession with intent to deliver cases, and two years' confinement in a state jail in the possession of cocaine case. Applicable Law
Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). An order revoking community supervision must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence that would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of probation. Id. at 763-64. A finding of a single violation of community supervision is sufficient to support revocation. See Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). Thus, in order to prevail, appellant must successfully challenge all the findings that support the revocation order. See Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Discussion
In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by finding he violated the conditions of community supervision. Specifically, appellant argues there was no proof offered for the "technical violations," and the nature of the evidence of the allegation of assault-family violence was "hotly contested."
Chalk's testified that appellant was behind in paying fees, costs, and in completing community supervision hours, and he did not attend some classes he was ordered to take. Long testified that appellant threw Ranson on the ground twice, hit Ranson in the face with his fist twice, and pushed Ranson's face against the concrete. Appellant denied he hit Ranson during their "altercation." It was the trial court's role, as the fact finder in this case, to reconcile any conflicts in the evidence and judge the witnesses' credibility. See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Lee v. State, 952 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.) (en banc).
We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's findings. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community supervision and adjudicating his guilt in each case. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763-64; Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 871. We resolve appellant's sole issue against him. We affirm the trial court's judgments adjudicating guilt.
ARY MURPHY
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
110439F.U05