Opinion
No. CV 04-4001070 S
October 12, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR EXPEDITED STAY OF PROCEEDINGS (#101)
The defendants' motion for expedited stay of proceedings appeared on the short calendar for October 4, 2004, at which the court heard oral argument. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendants sought to present testimony. The court also has reviewed their written submissions. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
In the first (slander) count of her six-count complaint, the plaintiff, Melissa Morrow, alleges that the defendant, Jennifer Ripley, is the ex-wife of John Scanlon, and that Scanlon and Jennifer Ripley are the parents of a now aged seven-year-old daughter (the minor child). Morrow alleges that she is the girlfriend and fiancée of Scanlon. She alleges, that, after a bitter and acrimonious divorce, Jennifer Ripley manipulated the minor child and directed her to make false and malicious allegations of sexual abuse upon her by Scanlon. She asserts that these false and malicious allegations "eventually expanded to include . . . Morrow, first as a spectator to the sexual abuse and ultimately as a participant," see Complaint, count one, ¶ 5, and that these allegations were reported to the Town of Glastonbury police department and to a child interviewer at St. Francis Hospital.
She further alleges that she was arrested and incarcerated on April 28, 2004, based "solely on the words created and implanted" by Jennifer Ripley, "who knew these words to be untrue, and these words were false and malicious intended to injure the Plaintiff." See Complaint, count one, ¶ 9. She also alleges that these charges were broadcast and published. She claims that Jennifer Ripley's slander of her has caused damage to her reputation, and has caused her to incur great expense in order to defend against the criminal charges.
In her second count, the plaintiff incorporates the paragraphs of the first count and claims that Jennifer Ripley is liable to her for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. In the third count, she asserts a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, based on the same allegations as set forth in count one.
In her fourth count, also premised on slander, in addition to incorporating allegations from count one, the plaintiff alleges that defendant Rochelle Ripley is Jennifer Ripley's mother and the grandmother of the minor child. She alleges that Rochelle Ripley conspired with her daughter, Jennifer Ripley, to engage in the extreme and outrageous conduct previously mentioned. She also claims that, in furtherance of her plan with her daughter, Rochelle Ripley's contact and acquaintance with the Town of Glastonbury's chief of police and youth unit agent enabled her to manipulate and use these Town employees to hurt and damage the plaintiff and Scanlon by using the minor child as the Ripleys' agent to utter the false and malicious allegations. In counts five and six, the plaintiff incorporates the paragraphs of count four and claims that Rochelle Ripley is liable to her for the intentional infliction of emotional distress and the negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In their motion for expedited stay of proceedings, filed on their behalf by the State of Connecticut Victim Advocate, the Ripleys seek a stay of this proceeding based on General Statute § 52-235e. They assert that the plaintiff is currently the subject of a criminal proceeding, stemming from her April 28, 2004 arrest, for conspiracy to commit sexual assault, and multiple counts of sexual assault in the first and third degrees (the criminal proceeding), all involving the minor child of Jennifer Ripley, who, as stated above, is also the grandchild of Rochelle Ripley.
General Statute § 46a-13c(5) provides that the Victim Advocate may "[f]ile a limited special appearance in any court proceeding for the purpose of advocating for any right guaranteed to a crime victim by the Constitution of the state or any right provided to a crime victim by any provision of the general statutes."
Section 52-235e provides, "[a]ny civil action brought against a crime victim, as defined in section 1-1k, by a defendant in a criminal proceeding on account of the exercise or intended exercise by such crime victim of any right guaranteed under the first amendment to the United States Constitution, section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the Constitution of the state or subsection b of article twenty-ninth of the amendments to the Constitution of the state or any right provided to such crime victim by any provision of the general statutes, shall, upon motion of such crime victim, be stayed during the pendency of such criminal proceeding."
The defendants contend that, pursuant to General Statute § 1-1k, they are crime victims, as members of the minor child's immediate family. They assert that the plaintiff's complaint in this action has been brought against them as a result of their exercise of their constitutional rights to free speech and as crime victims under the U.S. Constitution and the State of Connecticut Constitution. They contend that each count of the complaint is grounded in statements allegedly made by them to law enforcement officials and municipal agencies involved in the investigation of the criminal proceeding and that the essence of the plaintiff's action is stop them from further voicing their complaints against her to the proper authorities, including the prosecuting attorney and the court. They argue that, if this matter were permitted to proceed during the pendency of the criminal matter, "the state may be hampered in its efforts to proceed in the criminal matter because of restraints that might be imposed on the defendants' ability to fully cooperate in any prosecution." See motion, p. 4. They also state that allowing the plaintiff to proceed with her action after the criminal matter has been concluded "balances the right of the defendants to voice their claims against the plaintiff and the right of the plaintiff to seek redress against the defendants if their claims are false." See motion, p. 4.
Section 1-1k provides, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by the general statutes, `victim of crime' or `crime victim' means an individual who suffers direct or threatened physical, emotional or financial harm as a result of a crime and includes immediate family members of a minor, incompetent individual or homicide victim and a person designated by a homicide victim in accordance with section 1-56r."
In her objection to the motion (#105), the plaintiff asserts that the granting of a stay would victimize her a second time, as the target of false, malicious, and heinous allegations, and, by thwarting her right to an expeditious redress of her grievances through the court. The objection states two grounds. First, the plaintiff asserts that the office of the victim advocate does not have standing to bring the motion as there is no "crime victim" within the meaning of § 52-235e, since there has been no adjudication of the allegations against the plaintiff in the criminal proceeding. See objection, p. 2. Second, she argues that Rochelle Ripley, as the minor child's grandmother, is not an "immediate family member" of the minor child and therefore is not a "crime victim" as defined by § 1-1k. See objection, p. 2.
II. DISCUSSION
The motion presents issues of statutory interpretation. "The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . . [O]ur legislature recently has enacted the method of interpretation by which this court is to interpret statutes when the text is plain and unambiguous." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lombardo's Ravioli Kitchen, Inc. v. Ryan, 268 Conn. 222, 230-31, 842 A.2d 1089 (2004). Public Acts 2003, No. 03-154, § 1, provides: "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered."
"[W]ords in a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning . . . unless the context indicates that a different meaning was intended." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wiseman v. Armstrong, 269 Conn. 802, 810, 850 A.2d 114 (2004); see also Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, 259 Conn. 131, 162, 788 A.2d 1158 (2002), citing General Statutes § 1-1(a). It is a "well established canon of statutory construction that [i]n construing a statute, common sense must be used and courts must assume that a reasonable and rational result was intended." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, supra, 259 Conn. 164. "We construe statutes so as not to thwart their intended purpose; . . . and in a manner that will not lead to bizarre or irrational consequences." (Citation omitted and internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 80-81, 836 A.2d 224 (2003).
Section 1-1(a) provides, "In the construction of the statutes, words and phases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly."
In support of her argument that there is no "crime victim" since there has been as yet no adjudication, the plaintiff asks the court to look to the legislative history of § 52-235e. There is no need to look to legislative history when, as to this issue, the language is "plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results." Public Act No. 03-154, § 1.
The language of § 52-235e makes it clear that the Legislature did not require that a stay be issued only after an adjudication in the underlying criminal proceeding. The statute provides for a stay of a civil action filed by the defendant in the criminal proceeding "during the pendency of such criminal proceeding." See General Statute § 52-235e. The use of the words "during the pendency" plainly and unambiguously includes the period of time after the criminal proceeding's inception and prior to the time when a finding of guilt or an acquittal occurs. This is hardly an absurd or unworkable result, as it is in keeping with the obvious purpose of the legislation, the unintimidated participation in criminal prosecution proceedings by those who claim to be victimized by a crime.
In addition, the plaintiff incorrectly asserts that § 52-235e has yet to be interpreted by the courts. In Smith v. Smith, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. CV 02 0077959 (June 18, 2002, Scholl, J.) ( 32 CLR 367), the court addressed and granted a motion for expedited stay of proceedings pursuant to § 52-235e, there referring to Public Acts 2001, No. 01-211. There, the plaintiff accused a former spouse of slander, based on statements made which resulted in the plaintiff's arrest. See Smith v. Smith, supra.
Even if resort to the legislative history were appropriate as to this issue, it is not supportive of the plaintiff's contention. The plaintiff cites remarks made by legislators urging the enactment of Public Act No. 01-211. See plaintiff's objection, p. 3. As she notes, reference was made to an instance where an individual objected to an application for accelerated rehabilitation by a criminal defendant, which was denied, and where the individual was later sued and deposed as a form of intimidation. This legislative history was referenced also in Smith v. Smith, supra, where the court noted "[i]n urging the passage of Public Act 01-211(15), Representative Lawlor stated that it grew out of an incident where a victim had been sued regarding remarks she had made at a court hearing on the criminal defendant's motion for accelerated rehabilitation. Action which, Representative Lawlor claimed, was taken to intimidate the victim and which resulted in her being deposed shortly after the civil action was filed. Representative Knopp also stated that the legislation `protects the crime victim against a retaliatory civil action.' 44 H.R. Proc. Pt. 19, 2001 Sess., pp 006385-88."
The plaintiff argues that, in the instance of accelerated rehabilitation, in contrast to § 52-235e, a crime is presumed to have occurred as the statute, General Statute § 54-56e(b), provides for notice of the defendant's application and an opportunity to be heard to be afforded "to the victim or victims of such crime." See objection, p. 3. The court is unpersuaded. In the accelerated rehabilitation context, the defendant/applicant seeks approval of his or her application for accelerated rehabilitation in advance of any adjudication as to whether the defendant has committed the crime or crimes with which he or she has been charged. The quoted wording of § 54-56e(b) is indistinguishable from the wording "victim of crime" or "crime victim" in § 1-1k, quoted above, to which § 52-235e refers.
The plaintiff also argues there is no constitutional right being exercised by the defendants "during the course of a `criminal proceeding.' The evils they perpetrated, and which the Plaintiff herein seeks to redress, predated and initiated the `criminal proceeding.'" (Emphasis in original.) See plaintiff's reply (#107), p. 2. Section 52-235e does not require that the defendants' exercise of their constitutional and statutory rights, such as the right of freedom of speech, to complain to law enforcement officials about alleged criminal acts, have occurred "during the pendency of such criminal proceeding." Obviously, such a complaint may precede the initiation of a criminal proceeding. The plaintiff's interpretation would vitiate § 52-235e and thwart its intended purpose. See State v. Reynolds, supra, 264 Conn. 80-81.
Finally, the plaintiff argues that she is empowered by Article I, Sections 4 and 10 of the Connecticut Constitution to hold the defendants responsible for their abuse and to have remedy without delay. See plaintiff's reply, p. 3. To the extent that this may be construed as an argument that § 52-235e is unconstitutional, the court must deem it to be abandoned, since it is merely mentioned without being developed, either by being briefed or at oral argument. See State v. Vega, 259 Conn. 374, 384 n. 15, 788 A.2d 1221 (2002).
Article I, Section 4 provides, "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." Article I, Section 10 provides, "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay." In § 52-235e, our Legislature has balanced a plaintiff's right to redress without delay against the right of a crime victim to freely participate in a criminal proceeding without having to deal, at the same time, with a civil action arising from his or her complaint against the plaintiff.
As stated in Smith v. Smith, supra, "The provisions of [§ 52-235e] do not deprive the plaintiff of any cause of action that [s]he may have against the defendant[s] but only postpones its determination until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings . . . There is a clear public interest in allowing a criminal matter to proceed unfettered by orders that may be entered in a private civil dispute restricting, or at least chilling, a part[y's] willingness to cooperate in the resolution of the criminal matter. This procedure for allowing the plaintiff to proceed with [her] libel and slander action after the criminal proceedings have concluded balances the right of the defendant to voice her claims against the plaintiff and the right of the plaintiff to seek redress against her if her claims are false. This is the essence of the right to free speech embodied in the state constitution, the right to speak and to be responsible for what one has spoken."
As the minor child's mother, Jennifer Ripley is a "crime victim" as a member of her immediate family. As noted, however, the plaintiff asserts that § 52-235e's provisions do not apply to defendant Rochelle Ripley since she, as the minor child's grandmother, is not a member of her immediate family, and, therefore, is not a "crime victim," as defined in General Statute § 1-1k, quoted above. Section 1-1k does not provide a definition for the phrase "immediate family members of a minor." Thus, as to this issue, the language of § 1-1k is not "plain and unambiguous." See Public Act No. 03-154. Its relationship to § 52-235e, which specifically refers to § 1-1k for the definition of "crime victim," does not make the meaning clear. Accordingly, the court must consider extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute.
The parties do not claim that the legislative history of either § 1-1k or § 52-235e sheds light on this question. The court's review of the legislative history likewise has not found anything there which is of assistance as to the definition.
Our Supreme Court, however, has, in Fisher v. Hodge, 162 Conn. 363, 294 A.2d 577 (1972), in the context of interpreting a rental car contract, addressed the question of the meaning of "immediate family." "We concluded that the term `immediate family' as used in the lease agreement included the siblings of the lessee." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fojtik v. Hunter, 265 Conn. 385, 390, 828 A.2d 589 (2003). In Fisher, the court noted that "[t]he word `family' is a word of great flexibility, its meaning varying according to the connection in which it appears." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fisher v. Hodge, supra, 162 Conn. 367. It added that "the word is one of flexible and uncertain meaning and will be construed differently as the circumstances require, in order that the meaning in which it is apparently used in any given case may be carried into effect." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
"When used in connection with the word `family' as meaning `a group of persons living under one roof' the limiting word `immediate' has no relevance because there exists no degree of membership in the group. An individual is either a member of the group living under the one roof or he is not. On the other hand, when `family' is defined as a group of persons of common ancestry, the word `immediate' is used to limit the degree of relationship which will be considered and the phrase `immediate family' takes on some meaning. Even then `immediate' does not provide us with a universal test which may be invariably applied to separate one class of relatives from another. If blood relationship or common ancestry should be taken as the decisive test, then a spouse would be excluded from membership in the family — an obviously ridiculous result." Id., 162 Conn. 368. There, our Supreme Court resolved the ambiguity by construing the automobile rental contract against the party which had drawn it. See id.
In other statutes, our Legislature has reflected this flexibility by defining "immediate family" in a variety of ways in different contexts. For example, Public Acts 1979, No. 79-493, § 1-79(f), concerning the code of ethics for public officials, defined "immediate family" as meaning "any spouse, children or dependent relatives who reside in the individual's household." Section 1-91 (Public Acts 1979, No. 79-615), concerning the code of ethics for lobbyists, defined the term in a like manner. Public Acts 1986, No. 86-99, concerning expenditures by political candidates, General Statute § 9-3331(c), defined "immediate family" as "the candidate's spouse and issue." In 1995, Public Act No. 95-331, General Statute § 20-553, concerning athlete agents, defined "immediate family" as "a person's spouse, child, parent, stepparent, brother or sister." Section 1-1k, concerning "crime victim" or "victim of crime" was adopted in Public Acts 1997, No. 97-257. Later, in Public Acts 1998, No. 98-67, concerning the return of absentee ballots, "immediate family" was defined as "a dependent relative who resides in the individual's household or any spouse, child or parent of the individual." See General Statute § 9-140b(a). Public Acts 2000, No. 00-67, concerning private land deer permits for certain farmers, General Statute § 26-29c, defined "immediate family" as meaning "a spouse, child, grandchild, sibling or parent." More recently, in Public Acts 2002, No. 02-73, the Connecticut Credit Union Act, General Statute § 36a-435b(10) defined the term "immediate family member" as meaning "any person related by blood, adoption or marriage to a person within the field of membership of the Connecticut credit union."
None of these cited definitions of "immediate family" is set forth in a context which is closely related to the purposes of § 52-235e. "Language similar to that set forth in [§ 52-235e] appears in General Statutes 31-51q. That statute . . . creates a statutory cause of action for damages against an employer by an employee who has been subjected `to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the Constitution of the state . . .' The Court in Cotto v. United Technologies Corporation, 251 Conn. 1, 9 (1999), noted that: `as a remedial statute, § 31-51q deserves a generous construction that implements its purpose at one of the important places, the private workplace, in which those rights may be impaired' . . . As a remedial statute, the provisions of [§ 52-235e] must also be liberally construed . . ." (Citations omitted.) Smith v. Smith, supra.
Our Supreme Court has stated that "[o]urs is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202, 220, 789 A.2d 431 (2002). "Especially in times of adversity, such as the death of a spouse or economic need, the broader family has tended to come together for mutual sustenance and to maintain or rebuild a secure home life . . . We recognize that in many households, grandparents, as well as people who have no biological relationship with a child, undertake duties of a parental nature and that states have sought to ensure the welfare of children by protecting those relationships." (Citation omitted and internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The court concludes that by liberally construing § 52-235e to accomplish its purpose, the defendant Rochelle Ripley, the minor child's grandmother, is a "crime victim" under § 52-235e, as a member of the minor child's "immediate family." See General Statute § 1-1k. The situation at bar, in which one of the minor child's parents has been accused of sexually abusing her, and the plaintiff has been arrested on similar charges, presents a "time of adversity" involving the "broader family." Here, the plaintiff's allegations directly implicate Rochelle Ripley in the events which led to the plaintiff's arrest. Under these circumstances, § 52-235e's protection, that of a temporary stay, ought to be available to her.
At the oral argument on the motion, the court asked the parties to make a submission concerning the residences of the minor child and her grandmother. After reviewing the post-argument submissions, it is apparent that they now have separate residences, although they did live in the same residence for a period of time. The court has concluded that these facts are not dispositive. As noted, General Statute § 1-1k, in contrast to other statutes, does not refer to a person's residence as a criterion for determining if one is a member of the "immediate family." Also, as stated above, the minor child's grandmother, Rochelle Ripley, is closely involved in the allegations which are at issue, concerning the underlying allegations in the criminal proceeding, whether or not she resided in the same household as the minor child at a particular time.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion for expedited stay of proceedings is granted. This matter is stayed during the pendency of the criminal proceeding concerning the plaintiff. It is so ordered.
BY THE COURT
ROBERT B. SHAPIRO JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT