Morrisseau v. State of New York

8 Citing cases

  1. Grevelding v. State

    132 A.D.3d 1332 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)   Cited 5 times

    We reject that contention. Mindful that the findings of the court are entitled to deference because it was in a position to observe the witnesses and view the evidence firsthand ( see Muhammad v State of New York, 15 AD3d 807, 808; Morrisseau v State of New York, 237 AD2d 803, 804), we conclude that there is a " fair interpretation of the evidence' " supporting the court's finding that defendant failed to meet its burden of establishing that decedent was negligent, and its finding that, even assuming, arguendo, decedent was negligent, such negligence was not a proximate cause of decedent's injuries ( Guyotte v State of New York, 22 AD2d 975, 975, lv denied 15 NY2d 483). Indeed, the evidence supports the court's finding that, even if decedent was negligent in the operation of his vehicle, such negligence would not have resulted in the vehicle leaving the roadway.

  2. Garofalo v. State

    17 A.D.3d 1109 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 13 times

    We reject the further contention of claimant that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. The court's findings are entitled to great deference, as the court was in a position to observe the witnesses and view the evidence firsthand ( see Muhammad v. State of New York, 15 AD3d 807, 808; Morrisseau v. State of New York, 237 AD2d 803, 804). The court's verdict will not be set aside as against the weight of the evidence "`unless it can be plainly seen that the preponderance in favor of [claimant] is so great that the trier of facts could not have reached the conclusion upon any fair interpretation of the evidence'" ( Guyotte v. State of New York, 22 AD2d 975, 975, lv denied 15 NY2d 483). While there is evidence in the record that claimant's injuries might have been avoided if an appointment had been scheduled more promptly, there is also evidence, properly credited by the court, establishing that the blood vessel would have ruptured regardless of whether claimant had been seen earlier.

  3. Wilson v. State

    269 A.D.2d 854 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 19 times
    In Wilson v State of New York, 269 AD2d 854 [4th Dept 2000], affd sub nom. Riley v County of Broome, id. at 460, the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal at trial of a claim against the State for the actions of a snowplow operator.

    The court properly determined that the snowplow, plowing snow on a highway at the time of the accident, was a "vehicle or other equipment * * * actually engaged in work on a highway" within the meaning of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) ( see, McDonald v. State of New York, 176 Misc.2d 130, 139; see also, Riley v.County of Broome, 263 A.D.2d 267 [decided Jan. 6, 2000]). "According considerable deference to the findings of the Court of Claims, as is appropriate" ( Morrisseau v. State of New York, 237 A.D.2d 803, 804), we conclude that its determination that the snowplow operator did not act in "reckless disregard for the safety of others" is fully supported by the record (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 [b]; see, McDonald v. State of New York, supra, at 143; see also, Szczerbiak v. Pilat, 90 N.Y.2d 553, 557). Finally, the court properly concluded that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 need not be pleaded as an affirmative defense ( see, McDonald v. State of New York, supra, at 141).

  4. Morrisseau v. State

    265 A.D.2d 647 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 14 times
    Concluding that jury award of $80,000.00 in future noneconomic damages was insufficient to compensate plaintiff for ankle injury, when plaintiff's daily activities "continued to be significantly restricted since the accident," plaintiff "continue[d] to experience pain in her foot and difficulty walking," plaintiff's condition was unlikely to improve further, and plaintiff would likely always experience some degree of orthopedic pain

    Following the commencement of this litigation against the State, a bifurcated trial was held which resulted in a finding that the State was negligent. That decision was affirmed on appeal ( 237 A.D.2d 803). In January 1998, the Court of Claims conducted a trial on the issue of damages.

  5. Guang v. State

    263 A.D.2d 745 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 3 times

    The kitchen supervisor testified that when he discovered claimant, it appeared as though he was having a seizure because he was on the floor shaking and bleeding from his mouth. The State's medical expert indicated that evaluations of claimant revealed that he had a history of seizures. According substantial deference to the Court of Claims' findings (see, Morrisseau v. State, 237 A.D.2d 803), and in view of the dearth of proof to support claimant's version of the events, we concur that claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was a victim of sodomy or assault by fellow inmates. In the absence of proof of an attack, we need not address the State's alleged negligence. Similarly, we are unpersuaded that claimant was entitled to the benefit of theNoseworthy doctrine since he failed to demonstrate the causal connection between his alleged memory loss and the State's fault (see, Sawyer v. Dreis Krump Mfg. Co., 67 N.Y.2d 328, 335).

  6. Matter of Dumond v. State [4th Dept 1999

    (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 31, 1999)

    That determination is not against the weight of the evidence. The argument of claimants that a different reasonable interpretation of the testimony supports their position is unavailing. "According considerable deference to the findings of the Court of Claims, as is appropriate", we conclude that its determination is fully supported by the record ( Morrisseau v. State of New York, 237 A.D.2d 803, 804; see, Zecca v. State of New York, 247 A.D.2d 776). Claimants failed to show that defendant's traffic signal study and decision with regard to the intersection was plainly inadequate or without a reasonable basis ( see, Friedman v. State of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 271, 284; see also, Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 588-589, rearg denied 8 N.Y.2d 934).

  7. Matter of Dumond v. State of New York

    259 A.D.2d 1033 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 1 times

    That determination is not against the weight of the evidence. The argument of claimants that a different reasonable interpretation of the testimony supports their position is unavailing. "According considerable deference to the findings of the Court of Claims, as is appropriate", we conclude that its determination is fully supported by the record (Morrisseau v. State of New York, 237 A.D.2d 803, 804; see, Zecca v. State of New York, 247 A.D.2d 776). Claimants failed to show that defendant's traffic signal study and decision with regard to the intersection was plainly inadequate or without a reasonable basis (see, Friedman v. State of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 271, 284; see also, Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 588-589, rearg denied 8 N.Y.2d 934). Present — Green, J. P., Pine, Wisner, Scudder and Callahan, JJ.

  8. Zecca v. State

    247 A.D.2d 776 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 17 times

    The Court of Claims also found that the proximate cause for this accident was Zecca's negligence in the operation of his motorcycle. As we accord considerable deference to the findings of the Court of Claims (see, Morrisseau v. State of New York, 237 A.D.2d 803), we shall not disturb this finding as it is fully supported by the record. Specifically, the investigating officer attributed the accident to the unsafe speed of the motorcycle and the fact that Zecca was passing in this area.