Morrison v. Potter

17 Citing cases

  1. In re Chreky

    450 B.R. 247 (D.D.C. 2011)   Cited 4 times

    The District of Columbia recognizes that a married couple can hold property as tenants by the entireties. Morrison v. Potter, 764 A.2d 234, 236 (D.C. 2000). "The characteristics of a tenancy by the entireties are: a right of survivorship, an inability of one spouse to alienate his interest, and a broad immunity from claims by separate creditors.

  2. United States v. TDC Mgmt. Corp.

    263 F. Supp. 3d 257 (D.D.C. 2017)   Cited 2 times
    Explaining that potential inability to collect a judgment may justify piercing the corporate veil in D.C.

    In the District of Columbia, "property subject to a tenancy by the entireties ... is unreachable by creditors of one but not of both of the tenants." Morrison v. Potter, 764 A.2d 234, 236–37 (D.C. 2000). WDG contends that "[t]ogether, the FDCPA and Morrison compel the conclusion that the government cannot garnish" the settlement funds.

  3. Malek v. Flagstar Bank

    70 F. Supp. 3d 23 (D.D.C. 2014)   Cited 18 times
    Noting that DJA count is not cognizable as a separate cause of action and more properly included in prayer for relief

    ” Compl. ¶ 7. “Many jurisdictions have abolished the tenancy by the entireties” but “the District of Columbia still recognizes [this form of ownership] ‘with most of its common law features still intact.’ ” Morrison v. Potter, 764 A.2d 234, 236 (D.C.2000) (citing In re Wall's Estate, 440 F.2d 215, 218 (1971) ). When spouses are tenants by the entireties, “each spouse is entitled to the enjoyment and benefits of the whole property held by the entireties.

  4. Ross v. Maryland (In re Ross)

    475 B.R. 279 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2012)   Cited 2 times
    Holding that "[t]he doctrine of 'unclean hands' is no defense to a preference action" brought by a debtor-in-possession pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)

    In any event, the issue will likely become moot. Dicta in Morrison v. Potter, 764 A.2d 234, 237 (D.C.2000), states that “one spouse alone cannot convey, encumber, or subject to the satisfaction of creditors' claims either that spouse's possessory estate for the joint lives of the co-tenants or that spouse's contingent right of survivorship” (quoting Cunningham, The Law of Property § 5.5, at 206 n. 19). See also Coleman v. Jackson, 286 F.2d 98, 99 (D.C.Cir.1960) (referring to “the inability of either spouse acting alone to alienate an interest in the property during the joint lives of the two” as one of the great attributes of a tenancy by the entirety); Roberts & Lloyd, Inc. v. Zyblut, 691 A.2d 635, 638 (D.C.1997) (referring to “the attribute of tenancy by the entireties that precludes alienation by one spouse, and its corollary that prevents execution of a judgment on property so held by the creditor of only one spouse”).

  5. Blount v. Padgett

    261 A.3d 200 (D.C. 2021)   Cited 1 times

    "Although property subject to a tenancy by the entireties is liable for the spouses’ joint debts and for the individual debts of the surviving co-tenant, it is unreachable by creditors of one but not of both of the tenants." Morrison v. Potter , 764 A.2d 234, 236-37 (D.C. 2000) ; see also Finley v. Thomas , 691 A.2d 1163, 1164 (D.C. 1997) (explaining that a tenancy by the entireties estate is not subject to execution or levy for the debts of only one of the co-tenants). The tenancy by the entireties doctrine indicates "a preference for marital community interests over the often competing interests of creditors."

  6. United States v. TDC Management Corp.

    827 F.3d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2016)   Cited 15 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding argument "forfeit because [the party] does not further develop it (or even mention it again) after 'single, conclusory statement'" (quoting Bryant v. Gates, 532 F.3d 888, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2008))

    WDG and the Government dispute the effect that D.C. law governing tenancy by the entireties has upon the garnishment in this case. See Morrison v. Potter , 764 A.2d 234, 236–37 (D.C. 2000) (holding that “property subject to a tenancy by the entireties is liable for the spouses' joint debts” and, upon the death of one spouse, “for the individual debts of the surviving co-tenant,” but “is unreachable by creditors of one but not of both of the tenants”). Inexplicably, neither party at any point in this litigation cited the proviso in the FDCPA that “[c]o-owned property shall be subject to garnishment to the same extent as co-owned property is subject to garnishment under the law of the State in which such property is located.” § 3205(a) ; see also § 3010(a) ( “The remedies available to the United States under this chapter may be enforced against property which is co-owned by a debtor and any other person only to the extent allowed by the law of the State where the property is located”).

  7. United States v. Aguinaldo

    CIV. 20-00434 JMS-KJM (D. Haw. Jan. 23, 2025)

    , when a couple holds property by the entirety and one spouse dies, the surviving spouse is liable for joint debts and the surviving spouse's own debts, but not the individual debts of the deceased spouse. See. e.g., Morrison v. Potter, 764 A.2d 234, 236-37 (D.C. 2000) (holding that “property subject to a tenancy by the entireties is liable for the spouses' joint debts” and, upon the death of one spouse, “for the individual debts of the surviving co-tenant,” but “is unreachable by creditors of one but not of both of the tenants”); Evans v. Evans, 290 Va. 176, 184, 772 S.E.2d 576, 580 (2015) (“[S]o long as the property remains held by them as tenants by the entirety, upon the death of one spouse, ownership of the property will pass to the other in fee simple outside the estate of the deceased spouse

  8. Cont'l Transfert Technique, Ltd. v. Fed. Gov't of Nigeria

    Civil Action. No. 08-2026 (PLF) (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2019)   Cited 2 times

    Although the Court has found no cases from any court in the District of Columbia declaring that one in whose name a bank account is held is the presumptive owner of the account, there is District of Columbia law that supports this principle. See e.g, Reed v. Rowe, 195 A.3d 1199 (D.C. 2018) (finding that plaintiff and his sister, whose names appeared on a bank account, continued to own the account even after plaintiff's marriage because plaintiff had not successfully filed the paperwork required to change the name on the account); Morrison v. Potter, 764 A.2d 234 (D.C. 2000) (determining that an account was a joint tenancy by the entireties and assuming ownership thereof based on the names present on the account). In short, under the principles announced in Heiser, the Court draws from the laws of both New York and the District of Columbia - which mirror longstanding banking law and the consensus of other states - to conclude that a bank account is presumed to be the property of the person or entity whose name appears on the account or to whom the account is registered.

  9. Webster v. Walker (In re Barkats)

    Case No. 14-00053 (Bankr. D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2020)

    American Wholesale Corp. v. Aronstein, 10 F.2d 991, 992 (1926). See also In re Wall's Estate, 440 F.2d 215, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Morrison v. Potter, 764 A.2d 234, 236 (D.C. 2000) (referring to "an inability of one spouse to alienate his interest," and citing In re Wall's Estate, 440 F.2d at 219); Clark v. Clark, 644 A.2d 449, 450 (D.C. 1994), quoting 4A Richard R. Powell, The Law of Real Property ¶ 620[3] (1991):

  10. Jensen v. Anderson (In re Anderson)

    561 B.R. 230 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2016)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that because the debtor and his wife had no joint creditors, their D.C. tenancy by the entirety property was not subject to the claims of the debtor's creditors, and the transfer of the property to a trust was not subject to avoidance as a fraudulent transfer

    In re Wall's Estate , 440 F.2d 215, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1971).Morrison v. Potter, 764 A.2d 234, 236 (D.C. 2000) (quoting In re Wall's Estate , 440 F.2d at 220 ).X.