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Morrison v. Dr. Ramineni M.D.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Dec 21, 2018
17-cv-02609 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2018)

Opinion

17-cv-02609 (NSR)

12-21-2018

QUADEAN MORRISON, Plaintiff, v. DR. RAMINENI M.D.; DR. MAKRAN, M.D., Defendant.


OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Quadean A. Morrison ("Plaintiff") commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dr. Ramineni, M.D. and Dr. Makran, M.D. (together, "Defendants"), alleging that he was denied adequate medical care in violation of his Eight Amendment rights. (See Amended Complaint, ("AC"), ECF No. 11.) Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's AC pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 12(b)(6), and 12(e). For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

Background

Defendants are employees of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"). Plaintiff, a former inmate in DOCCS custody, alleged that from when he entered DOCCS custody on April 2, 2012 through December 1, 2016, he was denied adequate medical care, first at Mid-state Correctional Facility ("Mid-state") and then at Woodbourne Correctional Facility, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (See AC).

Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants failed to treat his knee condition. (Id.) Plaintiff states that before he entered DOCCS custody, he injured his knee. (Id. ¶¶ 1-3.) Upon his arrival at Downstate Correctional Facility on April 2, 2012, he notified medical staff of his injury, (id. ¶ 3), and one month later, when incarcerated at Mid-State Correctional Facility, a nurse practitioner referred him to Dr. Ramineni, who informed Plaintiff that "there was nothing wrong with [his] knee." (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) Over the next two-and-one-half years, Plaintiff asserts that he sought medical treatment 15 times at Mid-State's medical unit, but was ridiculed and only given Ibuprofen. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.)

Plaintiff also asserts that approximately two-and-one-half years after he arrived at Downstate, he was transferred to Otisville Correctional Facility, whereupon he immediately reported his injury and was referred by the nurse to a Dr. Goulding who determined that Plaintiff needed an MRI. (Id. ¶¶ 9-11.) In May, 2015, Plaintiff's MRI was done, and subsequently, on September 29, 2015, he had knee surgery. (Id. ¶¶ 12-14.) Plaintiff asserts that despite this surgery, he continued to have knee issues, resulting in another MRI being performed in June 2016. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) Based on the results of this MRI, Plaintiff learned he had a sprain in the medial collateral ligament but was told that "no orthopedic intervention [was] required." (Id. ¶ 19.)

Plaintiff claims that after the surgery, he continued to have "extreme pain" for which "nothing was done" other than his being given Ibuprofen. (Id. ¶ 20.) At some later point, his medical file was given to Defendant Dr. Makran, who reviewed it but did nothing. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that again saw a physical therapist around when he met with Dr. Makran. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff states that on December 1, 2016, because of his injured knee, he fell down the stairs at Woodbourne Correctional Facility, was "denied medical treatment," and was also "made a target when the nurse recruited security personnel to determine Plaintiff's medical condition." (Id.) Thus, he claims, the nurse violated his right to medical confidentiality. (Id.) Plaintiff was subsequently examined by a doctor who told the nurse to give Plaintiff ibuprofen. (Id.) Further, Plaintiff claims that the nurse's interpretation of his "repeated attempts to get treatment for [his] injuries" as Plaintiff going to "sick-call" amounts to deliberate indifference of his serious injury, pain, and suffering. (Id.)

Plaintiff seeks $2,000,000 in damages.

Motion to Dismiss Standard

1. Rule 12(b)(6)

For Rule 12(b)(6), the inquiry is whether the complaint "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); accord Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content pleaded allows a court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must supply "factual allegations sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court must take all material factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor, but the Court is "'not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,'" or to credit "mere conclusory statements" or "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief, a district court must consider the context and "draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 662. A court is generally confined to the facts alleged in the complaint for the purposes of considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Cortec Indus. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991). A court may, however, consider documents attached to the complaint, statements or documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, matters of which judicial notice may be taken, public records, and documents that the plaintiff either possessed or knew about, and relied upon, in bringing the suit. See Kleinman v. Elan Corp., 706 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2013).

"[C]ourts must construe pro se pleadings broadly, and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 597 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996)). "A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) ("Pleadings must be construed as to do justice."). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, however, a pro se plaintiff's factual allegations must be at least "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

2. Rule 12(e)

FRCP 12(e) provides, in relevant part, that

[i]f a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within 10 days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). A motion under Rule 12(e) should only be granted where "a pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient notice" of the party's claims. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506,514, 122 S.Ct. 992,998, (2002). As with motions under Rule 8, motions under Rule 12(e) are not to be granted lightly:
The essence of a complaint is to inform the defendant as to the general nature of the action and as to the incident out of which a cause of action arose. Rule 12(e)
allows a party to move for a more definite statement if a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading. The Rule is designed to remedy unintelligible pleadings, not to correct for lack of detail. A motion pursuant to Rule 12(e) should not be granted unless the complaint is so excessively vague and ambiguous as to be unintelligible and as to prejudice the defendant seriously in attempting to answer it. Motions for a more definite statement are generally disfavored because of their dilatory effect. The preferred course is to encourage the use of discovery procedures to apprise the parties of the factual basis of the claims made in the pleadings.
See, In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (""MTBE") Products Liability Litigation, 233 F.R.D. 133, 134-135 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).

3. Deliberate Indifference Under the Eight Amendment

To state a claim for inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that correction officials were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's serious medical condition. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).

Deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment is evaluated under a two-pronged test comprised of both objective and subjective components. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 32-35 (2d Cir. 2017); Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011). "[T]o establish an objective deprivation, 'the inmate must show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health,' which includes the risk of serious damage to 'physical and mental soundness.'" Darnell, 849 F.3d at 30 (citations omitted). To meet the objective prong, a plaintiff must assert that the alleged medical need is a "sufficiently serious" condition that "could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that standard contemplates "a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain").

The subjective component requires a prisoner to show that the defendant officials acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind" in depriving him of adequate medical treatment. Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 2006)). "That is, the official must 'know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Hill, 657 F.3d at 122 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (internal alterations omitted)).

A plaintiff who asserts that a defendant inadvertently or negligently failed to provide adequate care fails to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment because "[m]edical malpractice does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation unless the malpractice involves culpable recklessness - 'an act or a failure to act by [a] prison doctor that evinces a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm.'" Id. at 116 (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Discussion

Defendants raise several bases upon which the Court may grant their Motion to Dismiss. The Court addresses them in turn.

1. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Defendants first claim that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his Administrative Remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PRLA") because there is no statement regarding what happened with the one grievance that Plaintiff filed in 2016. (See Def. Mem. at Part I.)

Plaintiff's AC does reference a "Grievance # WB-17313-16" that seems to be related to an incident on December 1, 2016, when Plaintiff fell down the stairs at Woodbourne Correctional Facility. (See AC ¶ 12.) It is unclear, however, whether this was the only grievance that Plaintiff ever filed, whether it was one related only to the instance when he fell down the stairs and the nurse called security personnel, and whether he fully appealed this decision.

Considering the paucity of information concerning how far Plaintiff went in availing his administrative remedies for all the claims in the instant action, for purposes of this motion only, the Court declines to rule that Plaintiff failed to fully exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss on this basis will be denied at this juncture. The issue of exhaustion pursuant to the PLRA may be revisited upon a more fully developed record.

2. Failure to Properly Plead Under FRCP 12(b)(6)

Defendants next claim that Plaintiff failed to specifically and plausibly plead a claim against each of Defendants. (See Def. Mem. at Point II.) ("There are, however, no allegations whatsoever in support of such claims."). Defendants argue that Plaintiff already had a pre-existing knee injury and never alleges that any of the named Defendants acted with the requisite deliberate disregard for his medical needs. (Id.). The Court agrees with Defendants.

With regards to Dr. Ramineni, all that Plaintiff claims is that in May 2012, once he was transferred to Mid-State Correctional facility, he met Dr. Ramineni and Dr. Ramineni informed Plaintiff that there was nothing wrong with his knee. (AC ¶¶ 4-5.) Plaintiff then began physical therapy, which he claims "magnified the pain," and consequently, he was discharged from his physical therapy treatment but returned to Mid-State's clinic 15 times. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) Then, sometime after June 6, 2013, Plaintiff claims that Dr. Ramineni reviewed Plaintiff's medical records and did nothing but ridicule him and give him ibuprofen, which was "deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's serious medical needs." (Id. at ¶ 8.) No further allegations are made by plaintiff regarding any treatment or interactions with Dr. Ramineni anywhere in the AC.

The Court finds that there is no plausible reading of Plaintiff's barebones statements that color a claim for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment, even with all the latitude that is afforded to pro se litigants. At best, Plaintiff's assertion demonstrates that Dr. Ramineni's initial observation was wrong. (See Def Mem. at Part III. i.) This is a far cry from pleading both the subjective and objective elements of deliberate indifference. Plaintiff has not pleaded that he had a sufficiently serious medical condition, that Dr. Ramineni knew about it and caused serious risk of harm to Plaintiff, and that Dr. Ramineni acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind when so doing. In short, the 12(b)(6) requirements are woefully lacking.

With regards to Dr. Makran, Plaintiff provides even scarcer detail related to his claim of deliberate indifference. Plaintiff first states that in June 2016, he had an MRI done. (AC ¶ 19.) Then in July 2016, he saw a surgeon for the results of his MRI and the surgeon told him that he had a grade 1 sprain for which no orthopedic intervention was required. (Id.) Plaintiff then went to sick-call multiple times for his pain, and nothing was supposedly done other than Plaintiff being given ibuprofen. (Id. ¶ 20.) At some point in or after this time, Plaintiff went to a physical therapist for the third time but "never was examined by any medical staff at Woodbourne" to determine if he needed physical therapy. In this allegation, Plaintiff states "Dr. Makran clearly knows Plaintiff's medical history and has not helped Plaintiff with his medical issue." (Id.). Other than this singular statement, Dr. Makran is nowhere mentioned in the AC.

For the exact same reasons that the Court found Plaintiff's claims insufficient with regards to Dr. Ramineni, the Court finds Plaintiff's claims against Dr. Makran wholly deficient, as they are even more sparse, vague, and conclusory than those against Dr. Ramineni. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plead any claims of deliberate indifference sufficient to meet the standards of 12(b)(6) for either Defendant. Therefore, based on FRCP 12(b)(6), Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

3. Vagueness Under FRCP 12(e) and FRCP 8

Finally, as an alternative, Defendants claim that Plaintiff should be directed to provide more details about each Defendant's involvement and their deliberate indifference. (See Def. Mem. at Part III.). Upon reviewing the amended pleadings, and for the reasons explained above, the Court agrees that the pleadings are too vague to provide a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference under the Eight Amendment. At this juncture, however, the Court refrains from directing Plaintiff to provide more details about each Defendant's involvement and their deliberate indifference. Plaintiff has already received three opportunities to amend his original Complaint. (See Order to Amend, ECF No. 8; Order, ECF No. 10; Order, ECF No.13.) Plaintiff has neither been timely nor diligent in providing the required additional details necessary to make out a proper Section 1983 claim.

Despite the leeway given to pro se litigants, the Court will not direct Plaintiff to provide additional details. It will be incumbent on Plaintiff to stay abreast of his litigation. As the Court is only granting Defendant's motion without prejudice, Plaintiff may still properly pursue his claims should he be more diligent. But it is Plaintiff's responsibility to inform the Court of his latest whereabouts and to make sure that the docket is updated with his latest mailing address. Accordingly, Defendants alternative request for additional details to be provided to Plaintiff are presently DENIED.

4. Claims against Dr . Ramineni are Time Barred

Defendants claim that Plaintiff's claims against Dr. Ramineni are time-barred as the limitation period for a Section 1983 claim is three years and Plaintiff only alleges that Dr. Ramineni acted deliberately indifferent through his commission of discrete acts that were clearly outside the relevant statutory period. (See Def. Mem. at Point IV.)

Again, the Court agrees with Defendants. There is no evidence that Plaintiff was trying to allege the existence of any ongoing policy of deliberate indifference with regards to Dr. Ramineni. Thus, the discrete claims against Dr. Ramineni are time barred and dismissed on this basis as well.

5. Qualified Immunity

Defendants claim that if the Court finds that Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to show that he suffered a sufficiently serious medical condition of which Defendants knew posed an excessive risk to Plaintiff's health or safety, and of which they then deliberately disregarded, they are still entitled to qualified immunity because their actions did not violate clearly established law with respect to Plaintiff's medical needs. (See Def. Mem. at Part V.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has nowhere near sufficiently pleaded that he suffered a sufficiently serious medical condition, nor that Defendants personally knew about such a condition and deliberately disregarded it. Accordingly, the Court need not assess the merits of a qualified immunity argument at this time.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, without prejudice. Plaintiff shall have until February 15, 2019 to file a second amended complaint consistent with this Opinion and Order. Failure to timely comply may result in dismissal of the action with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate Defendant's Motion at ECF No. 21. The Clerk of the Court is also asked to mail a copy of this decision to Plaintiff at Plaintiff's last address listed on ECF, as well as to the address below, and to show proof of service on the docket.

Franklin Correctional Facility
62 Bare Hill Road, P.O. Box 10
Malone, New York 12953
SO ORDERED Dated: December 21, 2018

White Plains, New York

/s/_________

NELSON S. ROMÁN

United States District Judge


Summaries of

Morrison v. Dr. Ramineni M.D.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Dec 21, 2018
17-cv-02609 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2018)
Case details for

Morrison v. Dr. Ramineni M.D.

Case Details

Full title:QUADEAN MORRISON, Plaintiff, v. DR. RAMINENI M.D.; DR. MAKRAN, M.D.…

Court:UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Date published: Dec 21, 2018

Citations

17-cv-02609 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2018)