Indeed, a past "chill" may constitute an injury-in-fact sufficient to support standing even when the offensive policy has since been changed. See Morrison v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd County, 507 F.3d 494, 502-03 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that a plaintiff had standing to seek nominal damages for alleged past "chilling" of his First Amendment rights). Although the Supreme Court has admonished that "[a]llegations of a subjective `chill' are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm," Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 -14, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972), that case dealt with claims for forward-looking relief, which we have addressed above, see supra Part III.A.
COOK, Circuit Judge. This panel heard arguments in the matter before us on July 25, 2007, after which we filed an opinion, Morrison v. Board of Education of Boyd County, 507 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2007), reversing the judgment of the district court and remanding for further proceedings. Subsequently, the Board of Education of Boyd County (the "Board") filed a petition for rehearing en banc.
Plaintiffs do not claim a general right of censorship, only that they have a right to notice and exemption.See, e.g., Leebaert, 332 F.3d 134 (no free exercise or parental due process right violated by school's refusal to exempt student from mandatory health class); Littlefield, 268 F.3d 275 (no parental due process or free exercise violation in refusal to exempt child from mandatory uniform policy); Morrison ex rel. Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 419 F.Supp.2d 937 (E.D.Ky. 2006) (no right to exempt child from mandatory school diversity training on homosexuality), rev'd on other grounds, 507 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2007). In two cases in which plaintiffs did not raise a related parental rights due process claim, federal courts have rejected free exercise claims seeking exemptions from the schools' assignment of particular books.