Opinion
Civil Action 22-659
06-06-2022
SHELDON LEE MORRIS, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE PBPP; DANIEL RUSH, a/k/a Dan Rush in his official and individual capacities; and as of yet known or unidentified individuals and any as of yet unknown groups Defendants
Re: ECF No. 8
W. Scott Hardy District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAUREEN P. KELLY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Complaint, ECF No. 8, be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as frivolous, malicious, and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. It is further recommended that limited leave be granted for Plaintiff to amend with respect to any constitutional claim arising from alleged “physical altercations” which he has been forced to endure due to Defendant Rush's alleged acts, as set forth below. It is further recommended that, if Plaintiff is unable to state a constitutional claim with respect to the alleged “physical altercations,” his remaining state law claims be dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court, if appropriate.
II. REPORT
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Sheldon Lee Morris (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner currently incarcerated in the State Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI-Greene”) in Waynesburg, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff raises claims pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C § 1983, as well as various state common law claims against a multiple Defendants. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on May 24, 2022. ECF No. 7.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied parole because Defendant Rush wrote a letter to Defendant Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“PBPP”) accusing Plaintiff of being involved in a murder. ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 13-16 and 19-22. Plaintiff alleges that he never has been charged with a murder, and denies any involvement. Id. ¶¶ 23-25. Plaintiff asserts that he has been subject to death threats and physical altercations, presumably because Defendant Rush relayed his accusations to “multiple people in the community.” Id. ¶¶ 25-26. Defendant Rush's accusations also have interfered with Plaintiff's personal relationships. Id. ¶¶ 24 and 27.
By way of relief, Plaintiff seeks to have this Court compel Defendants to issue an apology along with statements that Plaintiff was not involved in the murder, and release Plaintiff from custody. Plaintiff also seeks monetary damages. Id. ¶¶ 35-37.
B. Legal Standard
28 U.S.C. § 1915 establishes the criteria for allowing an action to proceed IFP. Section 1915(e) requires the federal courts to review complaints filed by persons that are proceeding in forma pauperis and to dismiss, at any time, any action that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Thus, a court must dismiss, sua sponte, a complaint that lacks arguable merit in fact or law. Stackhouse v. Crocker, 266 Fed.Appx. 189, 190 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)).
The standard for reviewing a complaint under Section 1915(e)(2)(B) is the same as that for determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Banks v. Mozingo, No. 08-004, 2009 WL 497572, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2009). Under that Rule, dismissal is appropriate if, reading the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accepting all factual allegations as true, no relief could be granted under any “reasonable reading of the complaint” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008).
A complaint must be dismissed even if the claim to relief is “conceivable,” because a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that, when determining whether to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a district court should apply a two-part test in order to determine whether a pleading's recitation of facts is sufficient. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009). “First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions.” Id. at 210-11 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “‘plausible claim for relief.'” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
A court must employ less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). In a Section 1983 action, a court must liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings and “‘apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.'” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). “‘Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.'” Higgins, 293 F.3d at 688 (quoting Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)).
That said, it is not proper for a court to assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Assoc.'d Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Further, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. California Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004).
Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that, in civil rights cases, a court must give a plaintiff the opportunity to amend a deficient complaint - regardless of whether the plaintiff requests to do so - when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim, unless doing so would be inequitable or futile. Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).
C. Legal Analysis
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must meet two threshold requirements. First, the alleged misconduct giving rise to the cause of action must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law; and second, the defendants' conduct must have deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), (overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 - 331 (1986)).
1. Plaintiff has failed to state a due process claim.
On the face of the Complaint, Plaintiff's sole constitutional claim is that Defendants' alleged acts or omissions violated his due process rights because they “alter[ed] the Plaintiff's term of imprisonment as well as imposition an atypical and significant hardship on Plaintiff ....” ECF No. 8 ¶ 34. It appears that this claim is based on the denial of Plaintiff's parole. However, it is well-established that there is no right to parole under the federal or Pennsylvania state constitutions. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (“There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence .... [T]he conviction, with all its procedural safeguards, has extinguished that liberty right”); see also Rogers v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 555 Pa. 285, 289 n.2 (Pa. 1999) (“A prisoner has no absolute right to be released from prison on parole .... A prisoner has only a right to apply for parole at the expiration of his or her minimum term and to have that application considered by the Board”).
To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to raise a substantive due process claim with respect to the denial of his parole, the same should be dismissed. The Complaint itself states that Defendant PBPP's Notice of Board Decision indicated that parole was denied based on “‘[t]he negative recommendation made by the trial judge' as well as ‘[t]he negative recommendation made by the prosecuting attorney.'” ECF No. 8 ¶ 20. It is well-recognized that “federal courts are not authorized by the due process clause to second-guess parole boards and the requirements of substantive due process are met if there is some basis for the challenged decision.” Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 487 (3d Cir. 2001). In this case, the allegations in the Complaint with respect to the denial of Plaintiff's parole fail to shock the conscience, and thus fail to support a substantive due process claim. Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Conduct can violate substantive due process if it shocks the conscience, which encompasses only the most egregious official conduct.”) (internal quotations omitted).
Additionally, one of the forms of relief that Plaintiff seeks - release from confinement - is not cognizable in a Section 1983 lawsuit, and must be brought as part of a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973); Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540, 542 (3d Cir. 2002).
As such, Plaintiff's due process claim should be dismissed. As amendment would be futile, this claim should be dismissed with prejudice.
2. It is unclear whether Plaintiff attempts to raise additional constitutional claims.
It is noteworthy that Plaintiff makes allegations of facing “death threats” and “physical altercations” as a result of Defendant Rush telling “multiple people in the community that he knows Plaintiff to have committed the murder or to have actively participated in the murder[.]” ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 25-26. The Complaint is unclear as to the specific circumstance of those threats and altercations, their connection to Defendant Rush's statements to “people in the community” as well as Defendant Rush's state of mind with respect to the same.
While courts need not assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged[,]” Assoc.'d Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 526, the undersigned is mindful of the relaxed pleading standards enjoyed by pro se plaintiffs. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Therefore, out of an abundance of caution, Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend any constitutional claim he is attempting to raise with respect to the alleged physical altercations he has been forced to endure due to the alleged conduct of Defendant Rush, if appropriate.
3. If Plaintiff fails to state a constitutional claim on amendment, this Court should decline to extend supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims.
A district court may decline to extend supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim where “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Whether supplemental jurisdiction will be extended under these circumstances is discretionary. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir.2009).
Ordinarily, when “all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendant jurisdiction doctrine - judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity - will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7, (1988). If a district court decides not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, it should dismiss the state law claims without prejudice. Kach, 589 F.3d at 650.
The interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity will not be served by extending supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims if he is unable to amend the Complaint to state a constitutional claim. In that event, this Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and dismiss Plaintiff's state-law claims without prejudice to refiling in state court, if appropriate.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Complaint, ECF No. 8, be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as frivolous, malicious, and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
It is further recommended that limited leave be granted for Plaintiff to amend with respect to any constitutional claim arising from alleged “physical altercations” which he has been forced to endure due to Defendant Rush's alleged acts, as set forth above.
It is further recommended that, if Plaintiff is unable to state a constitutional claim with respect to the alleged “physical altercations,” his remaining state law claims be dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court, if appropriate.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).