Messrs. Love, Thornton, Arnold Thomason, of Greenville, for Appellants, cite: As to the issue being one of lawfor the Court to decide: 249 S.C. 363, 154 S.E.2d 569; 248 S.C. 526, 151 S.E.2d 671; 242 S.C. 331, 130 S.E.2d 896; 241 S.C. 446, 129 S.E.2d 59; 206 Va. 280, 142 S.E.2d 562; 182 F.2d 269. As to the plaintiffs being entitled to broad construction ofword "Household" when used in a policy of insurance toextend coverage: 241 S.C. 446, 129 S.E.2d 59; 248 S.C. 389, 150 S.E.2d 233; 227 S.C. 38, 86 S.E.2d 603; 35 N.J. 1, 170 A.2d 800; 172 P.2d 520; 235 N.Y.S.2d 152, 154, 37 Misc.2d 652; 266 N.C. 430, 146 S.E.2d 410; 62 Wn.2d 595, 384 P.2d 367; 151 Cal.App.2d 755; 312 P.2d 401; 77 N.J. Super. 476, 187 A.2d 20; 324 F.2d 340. As to the named insured and his nephew being membersof the same household: 266 N.C. 430, 146 S.E.2d 410; 88 Ga. App. 844, 78 S.E.2d 354; 113 Ga. App. 53, 147 S.E.2d 20. As to the nephew being,in fact, a member of his uncle's household: 113 Ga. App. 53, 147 S.E.2d 20; 88 Ga. App. 844, 78 S.E.2d 354; 239 Minn. 250, 58 N.W.2d 855; 84 N.H. 526; 153 A. 6; 399 Pa. 656, 161 A.2d 47; 6 Wis.2d 561; 95 N.W.2d 230; 80 F.2d 802; 204 F.2d 821; 113 Ga. App. 53, 147 S.E.2d 20; 50 Cal. Rpter. 508, 241 Cal.App.2d 303; 80 F.2d 802; 266 N.C. 430, 146 S.E.2d 410; 260 N.C. 402, 133 S.E.2d 3; 26 Wis.2d 399, 132 N.W.2d 517; 80 F.2d 802. Messrs. Leatherwood, Walker, Todd Mann, of Greenville, for Respondent, cite: As to the evidence, and thereasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom requiring submissionof the issues to the jury, and there is competentevidence to sustain their verdict: 247 S.C. 521, 148 S.E.2d 338; 230 S.C. 310, 95 S.E.2d 619; 231 S.C. 75, 97 S.E.2d 205; 234 S.C. 291; 108 S.E.2d 86; 176 S.C. 433, 180 S.E. 471; 243 S.C. 405, 134 S.E.2d 217; 35 C.J.S. 935; 241 S.C. 446, 129 S.E.2d 59; 227 S.C. 38, 86 S.E.2d 602; 334 S.W.2d 45

While appellant cites authority from foreign jurisdictions in support of her arguments that this exclusion should be ruled invalid, the law in our state has been that an exclusion as set forth above is valid and not contrary to public policy. Lauer v. Bodner, 137 Ga. App. 851, 852 (1) ( 225 S.E.2d 69) (1976); Varnadoe v. State Farm c. Ins. Co., 112 Ga. App. 366, 367 ( 145 S.E.2d 104) (1965); Shaw v. State Farm c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 8 ( 129 S.E.2d 85) (1962); Morris v. State Farm c. Ins. Co., 88 Ga. App. 844, 846 (1)-847 ( 78 S.E.2d 354) (1953). Thus, although under the policy provisions Kirkland was an insured because he was driving appellant's car with her permission, appellant's policy operates to preclude her recovery under the policy as against Kirkland by reason of the family exclusion clause.

This exclusion clearly excludes liability for bodily injuries under the facts of this case. See in this connection Morris v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 88 Ga. App. 844 (1) ( 78 S.E.2d 354). This provision, however, does not exclude liability for property damages; this is excluded under Paragraph 10 of the exclusions to Part I of the policy, which excludes "damage to property (a) owned . . . by the insured, . . .

" These terms, within the meaning of insurance coverage, have received considerable attention in Court of Appeals opinions. It is significant to note that in each of the earlier cases treating these terms, the person seeking recovery was physically residing in the insured's home or curtilage. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 122 Ga. App. 584 ( 178 S.E.2d 215); Keene v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 114 Ga. App. 625, 626 (2) ( 152 S.E.2d 577); Teems v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 53 ( 147 S.E.2d 20); Varnadoe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Ga. App. 366 ( 145 S.E.2d 104); Morris v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 88 Ga. App. 844 ( 78 S.E.2d 354). In the Varnadoe case, supra, this court said (p. 369): "... and while as between single adults constituting a `household' (e.g. adult children living with their parents) mere intent to no longer continue as a member of such `household' coupled with some action to remove themselves from such household may be sufficient to end their membership in such household."

State Farm cites four Georgia cases in which the exclusion in question was found applicable. Morris v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 88 Ga. App. 844 ( 78 S.E.2d 354); Varnadoe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Ga. App. 366 ( 145 S.E.2d 104); Teems v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 53 ( 147 S.E.2d 20); Keene v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 114 Ga. App. 625 ( 152 S.E.2d 577). In each case there was some close blood relationship, such as we have here, and some other factor tending to show a degree of independence from the family (e.g., employed adult children who paid board at home; husband who was sleeping in his attached office rather than the marital bed). Nevertheless, each of these various family relationships operated within a "domestic establishment under single management," the definition of "household" as applied to this exclusion.

Held; The issue presented in these cases was decided by this court in Morris v. State Farm Mut. c. Ins. Co., 88 Ga. App. 844, 848 ( 78 S.E.2d 354). Cf. Varnadoe v. State Farm Mut. c. Ins. Co., 112 Ga. App. 366 ( 145 S.E.2d 104); see Anno. 50 ALR2d 120. The plaintiffs in the present cases, the mother and father of the insured, were members of the family residing in the same household as the insured. Judgment affirmed. Nichols, P. J., and Deen, J., concur.

The policy of insurance obligated the insurer to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which he should become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury to persons or damages to property except that it excluded from such coverage bodily injuries sustained by "the insured or any member of the family of the insured residing in the same household as the insured." In Morris v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 88 Ga. App. 844 ( 78 S.E.2d 354), it was held that the above exclusionary clause was not against public policy. Therefore, the sole question for decision in the present case is whether under a proper construction of the evidence presented in support of the insurer's motion for summary judgment the children of Sammy K. Varnadoe, Jr., were members of his family residing in his household. If a genuine issue of fact was presented as to such issue, then the judgment granting the insurer a summary judgment and exonerating it from liability on such insurance contract must be reversed.

However, appellant has not directed our attention to any cases which so hold, and those which he does cite relate only to the construction of ambiguous provisions in policies and they are of no help here. In Morris v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 88 Ga. App. 844, 78 S.E.2d 354, 356, the Georgia Court of Appeals had occasion to consider almost the identical question here under consideration and in construing the same exclusion clause (e) here involved said: "The plaintiffs in error contend that the exception should be construed to mean that the policy did not apply to the insured, etc., and that under that interpretation the coverage of the policy would be nullified.

Citing the proposition that "[w]hen the policy behind a rule no longer exists, the rule itself should disappear," Johnson v. Peoples First National Bank Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 120, 145 A.2d 716, 718 (1958); Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 443, 184 A. 663 (1936), plaintiff argues that the danger of collusive claims against the insurer ceased upon the death of the insured, and the policy underlying the exclusion clause should not be given effect. See, e.g., Heltcel v. Skaggs, 234 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1936) (applying Oklahoma law); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 233 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1956) (applying South Carolina law); McManus v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 225 Tenn. 106, 463 S.W.2d 702 (1971); Guy v. Egano, 236 So.2d 542 (La.App. 1970); writ refused, 256 La. 843, 239 So.2d 354 (1960); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 340 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1970); Morris v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 88 Ga. App. 844, 78 S.E.2d 354 (1953); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Superior Court for Maricopa County, 104 Ariz. 544, 456 P.2d 914 (1969); Perry v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 251 Miss. 544, 170 So.2d 628 (1965); Allen v. West American Ins. Co., 467 S.W.2d 123 (Ky. 1971); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cartmel, 250 Ark. 77, 463 S.W.2d 648 (1971). Wisconsin, adopting a contrary position, has by statute prohibited exclusionary clauses which would withdraw its statutory omnibus coverage from any member of the family of the insured.

In the absence of a statute to the contrary, those courts that have considered the question have upheld the validity of family-exclusion clauses in liability policies. See, e.g., Holloway v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 275 Ala. 41, 151 So.2d 774 (1963); Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 387 So.2d 932 (Fla. 1980); Morris v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 88 Ga. App. 844, 78 S.E.2d 354 (1953); Porter v. Farmers Insurance Co. of Idaho, 102 Idaho 132, 627 P.2d 311 (1981); Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Harp, 423 S.W.2d 233 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967). But seeBishop v. Allstate Insurance Co., 623 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1981) (invalidating family exclusion after adoption of a compulsory insurance law).