Morris v. State

11 Citing cases

  1. Reynolds v. State

    617 P.2d 1357 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980)   Cited 11 times

    Clearly, this use of a prior statement was not impeachment by the prosecutor of his own witness. The situation in this case is similar to the one in Morris v. State, 35 Okla. Cr. 5, 247 P. 418 (1926). There, we stated in the second paragraph of the Syllabus:

  2. Ramsey v. State

    558 P.2d 1179 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977)   Cited 9 times

    "It is generally held that when a witness proves unresponsive to questions or gives answers substantially contrary to what he is expected to give, or has given in the past, the party calling him has the right to express surprise, and it is then within the discretion of the court to allow cross-examination for the purpose of impeaching the witness. See Morris v. State, 35 Okla. Cr. 5, 247 P. 418 (1926). . . ."

  3. Patterson v. State

    527 P.2d 596 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974)   Cited 4 times

    "However, even more relevant in the instant case than whether a counsel can impeach his own witness, is whether counsel may be allowed to lead a witness on direct examination. We think the law in this regard is well stated in the case of Morris v. State, 35 Okla. Cr. 5, 247 P. 418 (1926): `Where a witness called by a party and examined by him is unfriendly, or appears to evade the questions asked, or to have a lapse of memory, it is in the discretion of the trial court to permit the party to ask leading questions, or to refresh the recollection of his own witness.

  4. Cooper v. State

    524 P.2d 793 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974)   Cited 7 times

    It is generally held that when a witness proves unresponsive to questions or gives answers substantially contrary to what he is expected to give, or has given in the past, the party calling him has the right to express surprise, and it is then within the discretion of the court to allow cross-examination for the purpose of impeaching the witness. See Morris v. State, 35 Okla. Cr. 5, 247 P. 418 (1926). The fact that in the instant case the trial judge interrupted a long series of questions to which the witness had repeatedly answered he "didn't remember" must be interpreted as merely expeditious when taken in context.

  5. Cantrell v. State

    462 P.2d 342 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969)   Cited 4 times

    However, even more relevant in the instant case than whether a counsel can impeach his own witness, is whether counsel may be allowed to lead a witness on direct examination. We think the law in this regard is well stated in the case of Morris v. State, 35 Okla. Cr. 5, 247 P. 418 (1926): "Where a witness called by a party and examined by him is unfriendly, or appears to evade the questions asked, or to have a lapse of memory, it is in the discretion of the trial court to permit the party to ask leading questions, or to refresh the recollection of his own witness."

  6. McDonald v. State

    317 P.2d 775 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957)   Cited 1 times

    Apparently the issues arising from the crime charged were lost sight of, and defendant had a field-day in the examination of his defense witnesses, many of whom were apparently hostile witnesses, and if defendant had shown surprise and had kept the examination relevant, would have entitled him to ask leading questions. Melton v. State, 57 Okla. Cr. 57, 47 P.2d 195; Gullatt v. State, 80 Okla. Cr. 208, 226, 158 P.2d 353; Morris v. State, 35 Okla. Cr. 5, 247 P. 418; People v. Flores, 37 Cal.App.2d 282, 99 P.2d 326. But no such showing was made as to surprise or relevancy.

  7. Jenkins v. State

    80 Okla. Crim. 328 (Okla. Crim. App. 1945)   Cited 14 times

    " Jones v. State, 20 Okla. Cr. 233, 202 P. 187, 189; Culpepper v. State, 4 Okla. Cr. 103, 104, 111 P. 679, 31 L.R.A., N.S., 1166, 140 Am. St. Rep. 668." In Morris v. State, 35 Okla. Cr. 5, 247 P. 418, the instruction here complained of was given in substance and approved. When this case was called for trial on the 22nd day of September, 1941, an affidavit for continuance was filed by the defendant, because of the absence of one witness, Vess Fugquay, whom it was alleged was a resident of Oklahoma City, Okla., and that if present, he would testify that about 20 minutes prior to the killing of deceased, he talked with him on the road from Weleetka to his home and that he had a short barreled 38 caliber pistol in his right-hand front pocket.

  8. Gullatt v. State

    158 P.2d 353 (Okla. Crim. App. 1945)   Cited 14 times

    The exception to this rule of law is where a witness proves hostile to the party putting him upon the stand and friendly to his adversary, or where the witness is trying to evade the questions asked. Then, the trial court in its discretion may relax the general rule of law and permit leading questions to be asked. Gardner v. State, 5 Okla. Cr. 531, 115 P. 607; Morris v. State, 35 Okla. Cr. 5, 247 P. 418. We are not here confronted with a case where the witness is hostile, evasive, illiterate, or unfriendly to the prosecution.

  9. Melton v. State

    47 P.2d 195 (Okla. Crim. App. 1935)   Cited 3 times

    Where a witness is hostile, suffers a lapse of memory, is evasive, or deceives the party calling him as to what his testimony will be, the court in his discretion may permit a degree of cross-examination. No prejudice to defendant resulted, nor were the questions in the nature of impeachment. Morris v. State, 35 Okla. Cr. 5, 247 P. 418, and cases cited. Defendant next argues error in the introduction of the written dying declaration.

  10. Smith v. State

    293 P. 569 (Okla. Crim. App. 1930)   Cited 2 times

    "Where the defendant is convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and punishment assessed at the minimum under the law, and defendant's own testimony shows him to be guilty of the crime of which he was convicted, alleged errors in the instructions and in the refusal to give a requested instruction will not be held prejudicial." See, also, Morris v. State, 35 Okla. Cr. 5, 247 P. 418; Canada v. Territory, 12 Okla. 409, 72 P. 375. Defendant next contends that the court erred in admitting certain incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial testimony over the objection and exception of the defendant.