However, we note that those decisions, when traced to their origin in a single opinion by the Court of Appeals in Berry v. State , 210 Ga. App. 789, 791 (3), 437 S.E.2d 630 (1993), adopted language from the field of ineffective assistance of counsel without a discussion in any of them of why doing so was warranted or advisable. See Nichols , 282 Ga. at 405 (2), 651 S.E.2d 15 (citing Belmar v. State , 279 Ga. 795, 800 (3), 621 S.E.2d 441 (2005) ); Morris v. State , 280 Ga. 179, 180 (3) (a), 626 S.E.2d 123 (2006) (citing Felder v. State , 270 Ga. 641, 646 (8), 514 S.E.2d 416 (1999) ); Belmar , 279 Ga. at 800 (3), 621 S.E.2d 441 (citing Felder v. State , 266 Ga. 574, 576, 468 S.E.2d 769 (1996) ); London v. State , 274 Ga. 91, 94 (4) (c), 549 S.E.2d 394 (2001) (citing Felder , 266 Ga. at 576, 468 S.E.2d 769 ); Felder , 266 Ga. at 576 (2), 468 S.E.2d 769 (citing Berry , 210 Ga. App. at 791 (3), 437 S.E.2d 630 ); Hahn v. State , 356 Ga. App. 79, 81 (1), 846 S.E.2d 258 (2020) (citing King v. State , 346 Ga. App. 362, 369-370 (1), 816 S.E.2d 390 (2018) ); Maqrouf v. State , 349 Ga. App. 174, 180 (1) (b) & n.19, 825 S.E.2d 569 (2019) (citing Sanchez-Villa v. State , 341 Ga. App. 264, 273 (1) (b), 799 S.E.2d 364 (2017) ), overruled on other grounds by Flowers v. State , 307 Ga. 618, 621 (2) n.3, 837 S.E.2d 824 (2020) ; Sanchez-Villa , 341 Ga. App. at 273 (1) (b), 799 S.E.2d 364 (citing Lowther v. State , 263 Ga. App. 282, 283 (1), 587 S.E.2d 335 (2003) ); King , 346 Ga.

Dugger v. State , 297 Ga. 120, 123 (5), 772 S.E.2d 695 (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Morris v. State , 280 Ga. 179, 181 (3) (b), 626 S.E.2d 123 (2006) ("This court has long held that where one offense could be committed in several ways, it is permissible to incorporate the different ways in one count." (punctuation omitted) (quoting Leutner v. State , 235 Ga. 77, 79 (2), 218 S.E.2d 820 (1975) ).

In addition, in combination with Mitchell's testimony, the other evidence implicating Appellant in the shooting, including Foster's identification of Appellant as the shooter and Dukes' testimony regarding Williams' dying declaration, makes it highly probable that the hearsay testimony did not contribute to the verdict. See Morris v. State, 280 Ga. 179(3)(a), 626 S.E.2d 123 (2006). Accordingly, this enumeration is without merit.

Accordingly, any erroneous admission of Davis's testimony was harmless as the evidence was cumulative, and thus it is highly probable that Davis's testimony did not contribute to the verdicts. See Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 22, 27(4), 709 S.E.2d 217 (2011); Morris v. State, 280 Ga. 179, 180(2)(a), 626 S.E.2d 123 (2006); White v. State, 273 Ga. 787, 791(4), 546 S.E.2d 514 (2001). c.) Marquez Miguel Heard was named as a co-indictee with Lewis as to the crimes against Williams, Perdue, Givens, and the Cox brothers. Over objection, the trial court allowed Jesse Jones to testify that Heard told him that Heard and Lewis had committed robberies at Morris Brown College. Lewis was not present when Heard made this statement to Jones.

" [Cit.]Morris v. State, 280 Ga. 179, 180 (3) ( 626 SE2d 123) (2006). The jury was not present during the contempt proceeding.

' [Cit.]" Morris v. State, 280 Ga. 179, 180 (3) ( 626 SE2d 123) (2006). With regard to the deficiency prong, Hardeman must show that his trial lawyer "made errors so serious that [he or she] was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment."

In this case, the State did not introduce evidence that Martin made threats against Barbara on the date in question other than threats to kill her, and, as such, no reasonable possibility exists that the jury convicted Martin for threatening to commit some other unspecified crime of violence. Morris v. State, 280 Ga. 179, 180 (2) ( 626 SE2d 123) (2006) (jury charge tracking aggravated assault statute did not violate defendant's due process rights where State did not introduce evidence that defendant committed aggravated assault in a manner not alleged in indictment). Even if the record included evidence of other types of threats, Martin's due process claim would fail nonetheless because "a reversal is not mandated where, as here, the charge as a whole limits the jury's consideration to the specific manner of committing the crime alleged in the indictment."

" Without a showing of harm, Hill's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this basis fails. See Morris v. State, 280 Ga. 179, 180 (3) (a) ( 626 SE2d 123) (2006). (Punctuation omitted.)

We will affirm the trial court's determination that an accused has not been denied effective assistance of counsel unless that determination is clearly erroneous.Morris v. State, 280 Ga. 179, 180 (3) ( 626 SE2d 123) (2006). See Adkins v. State, 280 Ga. 761, 762 (2) ( 632 SE2d 650) (2006).

(Citations omitted.) Morris v. State, 280 Ga. 179, 180 (3) ( 626 SE2d 123) (2006); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). Allen alleges that his defense counsel was deficient because she failed to call Allen's biological brother as a witness and failed to object when the trial court repeated the jury charge on similar transaction evidence.