Morris v. Schwartz

2 Citing cases

  1. Turner v. 1212 S. Michigan Partnership

    355 Ill. App. 3d 885 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)   Cited 28 times
    Stating that to avoid application of ISDRA or RLTO, a landlord must come forward with some evidence of a good faith dispute to avoid a presumption that the security deposit was withheld based on a claim of damages

    Thus, there has been no violation of the Act or RLTO for failure to provide an itemized statement of deductions from the security deposit. While it might be beneficial for tenants to receive an itemized statement detailing the disposition of their security deposits for any reason, it would be inappropriate for us to read terms, exceptions, or procedures into an unambiguous statute that the legislature did not express. Solich v. George Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83, 630 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1994); Morris v. Schwartz, 326 Ill. App. 274, 306, 61 N.E.2d 690, 703 (1945) (Scanlan, J., specially concurring) ("nor have we the right, in interpreting this Act, to read into it provisions that, in our judgment, would tend to make the proceedings under the Act more equitable as between the parties"). Accordingly, there was no error in dismissing this count of the Turners' complaint.

  2. People v. Anderson

    352 Ill. App. 3d 934 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)   Cited 25 times
    In People v. Anderson, 352 Ill. App. 3d 934, 942 (2004), the First Division of the First District concurred with Pearson in finding that it is unfair to a defendant, when faced with the proposed dismissal of his section 2-1401 petition, to be deprived of notice and an opportunity to respond.

    People v. Northup, 279 Ill. App. 129, 150 (1935), quoting Welch v. People, 30 Ill. App. 399, 414 (1889) (Moran, J., concurring); see also O'Gara Coal Co. v. Emmerson, 326 Ill. 18, 46, 156 N.E. 814, 825 (1927) ("[i]t is the province of the legislature, alone, to make the law and of the courts only to construe and apply it"). Courts should not read terms, exceptions, or procedures into an unambiguous statute that the drafter did not express. Solich v. George Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83, 630 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1994); In re C.T.A., 275 Ill. App. 3d 427, 430, 655 N.E.2d 1116, 1119 (1995); Morris v. Schwartz, 326 Ill. App. 274, 306, 61 N.E.2d 690, 703 (1945) (Scanlan, J., specially concurring) ("nor have we the right, in interpreting this Act, to read into it provisions that, in our judgment, would tend to make the proceedings under the Act more equitable as between the parties"). Because summary dismissal is a drastic procedure, and a significant departure from the usual adversarial process ( Pearson, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 194, 802 N.E.2d at 389), we do not believe that we should read summary dismissal procedures into the Code by analogy when the legislature did not express its intent to make that procedure available outside of the Act.