Opinion
Index No. CV-011242-22/BX
08-17-2023
Isaac Morris, Plaintiff, v. Violet Pivonka, Defendant.
Unpublished Opinion
Jeffrey S. Zellan, J.
Hon. Jeffrey S. Zellan, J.C.C.
Defendant having answered the complaint, but subsequently having twice failed to appear in the instant action, the Court adjourned the action for an inquest. Plaintiff having appeared as scheduled for the inquest, and defendant having again failed to appear, the Court proceeded to inquest. Based upon the credible testimony and evidence produced at the inquest, the Court finds that plaintiff has met its burden at inquest.
By a clerk-generated endorsed complaint, plaintiff asserts a cause of action for "Other for $25,000.00 with interest from 10/20/2022. Defamation of Character. Emotionally distressed, emotional harm, mental anguish, mental distress, mental disturbance, mental suffering. Slandering. Harassment." The Court notes that the parties are self-represented, and thus the formal pleading requirements of the CPLR and the Civil Court Act do not apply. CCA §§ 902(a) and 903. Rather, as long as plaintiff can articulate "an arguable cause of action," through a combination of pleadings language, motions or other practice, a cause of action that might otherwise require specificity in pleading may proceed by endorsed complaint. Southern Blvd. Sound v. Felix Storch, Inc., 165 Misc.2d 341, 342 (Civ. Ct., New York Co. 1995), affd. in relevant part, 167 Misc.2d 731 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 1996). See also, Holloway v. New York City Transit Auth., 182 Misc.2d 749, 753 (Civ. Ct., 1999) (citing Southern Blvd. Sound and others in noting that "the only substantive pleading requirement of an endorsed complaint is that it shall set forth the nature and substance of the cause of action," and "that courts have sustained endorsed complaints which merely allege 'defamation'"). Defendant answered the complaint by oral answer asserting a general denial and affirmative defense of improper service and laches, and affirmatively stating that "he is suing me because I had him go to court for aggrevated (sic) harassment," effectively confirming that the complaint provided at least the minimum amount of information necessary. (Answer, ¶¶ 1; 3-4; 7; 15; and 17).
Defendant also denied owing the debt at issue in the action and disputing the amount of debt at issue, which are form choices that the Court construes, given the circumstances, as disputing liability and damages.
Turning to the merits of plaintiff's claim, the Court find that, after inquest, plaintiff has established a claim for relief. The Court finds that plaintiff testified credibly and believes, particularly in the absence of any sworn denial or appearance by defendant after having answered the complaint (from which the Court takes an adverse inference against defendant), that defendant falsely accused plaintiff of the crime of aggravated harassment in the second degree (itself a crime), which is a class A misdemeanor. See, Penal Law § 240.30(2). Specifically, plaintiff alleges, and the Court finds, that defendant falsely accused plaintiff of sending her obscene photographs, which harmed plaintiff.
The Court notes that plaintiff indicated that the New York City Police Department resisted plaintiff's requests for information concerning his own arrest, apparently on the basis that records of plaintiff's arrest and prosecution have been sealed. This is problematic, as plaintiff should have had access to those records. See, Brian Krist, Sealing the Bawdy House Door Open, 48 NYRPLJ 27, 27 n. 27 (2020) (collecting authorities and discussing waiver of sealing provisions in follow-on civil litigation). However, the Court is disinclined to effectively punish plaintiff because the Police Department, whose involvement in the surrounding facts of this case were instigated by defendant, did not cooperate with evidence gathering.
Although plaintiff has not met his burden to establish claims under defamation (which require the specific defamatory words be stated), or intentional infliction of emotional distress (requiring outrageous conduct as defined by New York caselaw), falsely accusing someone of a crime can be a prima facie tort, which is established by "(1) the intentional infliction of harm, (2) which results in special damages, (3) without any excuse or justification, (4) by an act or series of acts which would otherwise be lawful." Miller v. Walters, 46 Misc.3d 417, 427 (Sup. Ct., New York Co. 2014), quoting, Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 135. 142-143 (1985). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court will not simply presume to defendant's benefit that defendant acted with motive other than disinterested malevolence necessary to sustain a prima facie tort. Cf., Brooks v. Peconic Bay Med. Ctr., 152 A.D.3d 436, 438-439 (1st Dept. 2017). In considering damages for what is, at bottom, a false arrest claim, the Court is persuaded by other courts that have often ranged in or near $10,000.00. See, e.g., Francis v. City of New York, Dkt. No. 15-cv-7997, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197034, *27 (S.D.NY Nov. 12, 2019), adopted in full, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94923 (S.D.NY May 29, 2020) (collecting cases and discussing damages determinations).
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the clerk enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the amount of $10,000.00 together with costs and disbursements in this action, with interest from October 20, 2022.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.