Opinion
December 19, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Jiudice, J.).
Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The wife's allegations of coercion and duress are not sufficiently specific or detailed to warrant rescission of the parties' separation agreement (see generally, Christian v Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63; Tirrito v Tirrito, 191 A.D.2d 686; Torsiello v Torsiello, 188 A.D.2d 523). Moreover, simultaneous with the execution of the separation agreement, the wife signed a letter, drafted by her attorney, stating that she understood her rights, that she was leaving her marriage "as [she] came into it, with nothing," that she had "no interest in anything that [her] husband and [she had] worked for all these years," and that she was doing so "for [her] own personal reasons." These circumstances negate the wife's claim of duress (see, Gaton v Gaton, 170 A.D.2d 576).
The wife contends that the separation agreement is unconscionable. While the agreement may have been improvidently entered into, under the circumstances of this case, we do not find that it rises to the level of unconscionability to warrant rescission (see, Wilutis v Wilutis, 184 A.D.2d 639; Gaton v Gaton, supra). Sullivan, J.P., Rosenblatt, Miller and Ritter, JJ., concur.