Opinion
14-P-1349
06-15-2015
GEORGE K. MORRIS, trustee, v. FITZHUR BROWN.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
This case involves the disputed ownership of a parcel of land at 24-26 Moreland Street in the Roxbury section of Boston (the property). The plaintiff, as trustee of the 24-26 George Moreland Trust, brought this declaratory judgment action in the Land Court against three competing claimants. Prior to trial, the plaintiff acquired release deeds from two of them, Tracy Hutson and Micah Williams. Those deeds transferred any interest that Hutson and Williams had in the property to the plaintiff, thus resolving the plaintiff's dispute with them. Accordingly, the claims against both Hutson and Williams were dismissed. The case went to trial against the remaining defendant, Fitzhur Brown (also known as Lee Brown). As set forth below, the trial judge ruled that Fitzhur Brown had no valid claim to title, and Fitzhur Brown has not appealed. However, the judge went on to declare that the plaintiff also had no valid claim of title and that title instead was held by someone who was not a party to the litigation. On the plaintiff's appeals from the original judgment and from the denial of two postjudgment motions, we vacate the judgment in part.
The plaintiff also obtained a release deed from Sandra Brown, whose role is discussed infra.
Background. Acquisition of the property by the common grantor. Each of the four initial claimants traced their ownership to that of Dorothy Essor. She acquired title in 1988 as trustee of a nominee trust known as the Cole B. Realty Trust (the trust). It was established by a declaration of trust dated January 9, 1987, that included standard language that the trustee could not act with respect to "the trust estate except as directed by all of the beneficiaries." The declaration of trust also included language stating that a recorded deed executed by someone who appears to be the trustee constitutes "conclusive evidence" that the trustee has been authorized by the beneficiaries to execute the deed. See Penta v. Concord Auto Auction, Inc., 24 Mass. App. Ct. 635, 641 (1987) (holding that such a "conclusive evidence" provision relieves someone purchasing trust property from the duty to inquire as to the trustee's actual authority). The declaration of trust did not identify the beneficiaries of the trust, but instead referenced a schedule of beneficiaries that is not before us. The trial record includes evidence of various persons claiming to be beneficiaries.
The "conclusive evidence" provision read in full as follows:
"Every instrument executed by any person who according to the records in said place of recording appears to be a [t]rustee hereunder shall be conclusive evidence in favor of every person relying thereon or claiming thereunder that at the time of the delivery thereof, this trust was in full force and effect and that the [t]rustees were duly directed by the beneficiaries to execute and deliver the same."
Defendant's claim to title. Fitzhur Brown was once married to Essor's daughter, Sandra Brown. At trial, he claimed that in 2002, Essor, as trustee, transferred title to him, as trustee of a separate trust, that he (as trustee) sold the property that year to Rachelle Thomas, that Thomas sold it to Taraneh Carroll in 2009, and that Carroll then sold it back to him in 2010. The judge found that Fitzhur Brown displayed "a total lack of credibility." Without hesitancy, the judge ruled his claim invalid on numerous grounds. For example, he found that Fitzhur Brown had forged at least two of the deeds in his purported chain of title. Fitzhur Brown did not appeal, nor has he participated in the instant appeal.
The record reveals that at the time of trial, Fitzhur Brown was facing criminal charges relating to his role in this matter.
The plaintiff's claims to title. At no point during trial did the plaintiff rely on his acquisition of the Hutson and Williams chains of title as providing him superior title to that of Fitzhur Brown. Instead, the plaintiff relied on his original claim to title, which was based on a chain of title that ran to him from Patricia Brown (Fitzhur Brown's sister), and he characterized the dismissals of Hutson and Williams merely as simplifying the case. As the plaintiff stated at the start of trial, with Hutson already having been dismissed, the dismissal of Williams "will leave as the only remaining chains of title [Fitzhur] Brown and [the plaintiff]." The judge accepted this view, commenting to Fitzhur Brown that "the only two chains of title that will be at issue in this case [are] the chain of title into the plaintiff and the chain into you."
In his opening statement, the plaintiff framed what remained to be tried as follows: "[t]he legal issue involved is whether [Fitzhur] Brown has no title to the subject property, as [the plaintiff] contends, or whether [the plaintiff] has no title to the subject property, as Brown contends." The plaintiff then described the chain of title from Patricia Brown on which he was relying. Patricia Brown purported to terminate the trust in 2001, claiming at that time to be its sole beneficiary. She sold the property to the plaintiff's predecessor in title in 2006. After examining the validity of this chain of title, the judge ruled on various grounds that the plaintiff had not demonstrated its validity. For example, he found that the plaintiff had not carried his burden of establishing that Patricia Brown was ever a beneficiary of the trust. On appeal, the plaintiff does not challenge this ruling.
Whether Patricia Brown herself executed the termination of trust and the subsequent deed out, or whether someone else forged the documents, is not clear.
The Hutson and Williams chains of title. The judge also went on to assess the validity of the interests that the plaintiff had obtained in the Hutson and Williams chains of title, and he determined them to be invalid. Based on this, he declared that title was still retained by Essor, as trustee of the trust. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that it was error for the judge to reach those issues and to resolve them as he did. Because the plaintiff focuses especially on the Williams chain of title, we proceed to lay out some detail on that chain of title.
The judge expressly declined to determine who the beneficiaries of the trust were, on whose behalf Essor had a duty to act.
The Williams chain of title ran from Essor, as trustee of the trust, to Sandra Brown (Essor's daughter) by deed dated November 11, 2010, and then from Sandra Brown to Williams by deed dated that same day. The transfer from Essor to Sandra Brown was accompanied by a contemporaneous affidavit from Essor (recorded with the deed) that included some statements that lie in potential tension. On one hand, the affidavit states that Essor established the trust "for the purpose of acquiring property on behalf of my daughter Sandra Brown who provided me with the purchase money deposit for the property." On the other hand, it identified the beneficiaries of the trust as Essor's grandchildren, Brandon Brown (son of Sandra and Fitzhur Brown) and Ashley Essor (niece of Sandra and Fitzhur Brown). The intended overall purpose of the affidavit is clear on its face: to counter two of the competing chains (those on which the plaintiff and Fitzhur Brown were relying at trial). The judge determined that the Williams chain of title was invalid on the ground that "Essor, as [t]rustee did not have authority to convey title to Sandra [Brown]."
Why the transaction was structured this way (that is, with title evanescently passing through Sandra Brown's hands) was never addressed at trial. We do note that there was uncontested testimony that Essor had by this time suffered from a stroke and Alzheimer's disease. Fitzhur Brown had raised Essor's mental condition as grounds that she lacked competency to execute the 2010 deed to Sandra Brown. The judge ruled that Fitzhur Brown's testimony, unaccompanied by expert proof, was insufficient to carry his burden of proving Essor's lack of competency.
Motion for reconsideration. A week after the judge issued his decision and judgment, the plaintiff filed a "motion to amend judgment per Mass.R.Civ.P. 59 [365 Mass. 827 (1974)] and for reconsideration per Land Court Rule 9" (motion for reconsideration). He argued that the judge should not have reached the validity of the Williams chain of title and that the judge in any event misapplied the law in concluding that this chain of title was invalid. The plaintiff further argued that, had he known that the validity of the Williams chain of title was going to be litigated, he would have called various witnesses such as Essor, Sandra Brown, the beneficiaries, and the attorney or attorneys who handled the sales from Essor to Sandra Brown to Williams. The judge denied the motion for reconsideration and the plaintiff appealed both the denial of that motion and the underlying judgment.
Having maintained at trial that Patricia Brown had been the sole beneficiary of the trust, the plaintiff appears in his motion for reconsideration to have accepted the statements included in the affidavit accompanying the sale from Essor to Sandra Brown that the beneficiaries of the trust were Essor's grandchildren.
Motion for relief from judgment. After judgment had entered, the purported beneficiaries of the trust (Brandon Brown, Ashley Essor, and a third apparent grandchild, Lincoln Brown) terminated Essor as trustee, and had Sandra Brown substituted in Essor's stead. Sandra Brown then contracted to sell the property to a third party. This marked the fifth time that a family member was purporting to sell the same property (and the second time that Sandra Brown herself was purporting to do so). Based on this new development, the plaintiff filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2), 365 Mass. 828 (1974). The judge denied the motion and the plaintiff appealed that order as well.
Discussion. As an initial matter, we note our disagreement with the plaintiff's contention that he did not put the validity of his own title at issue when he brought this action. Indeed, at least to some extent, the plaintiff's own claim to title provided the basis for him to challenge Fitzhur Brown's claim. That said, given how the parties and the judge framed the issues at trial, we agree with the plaintiff that the validity of the Williams and Hutson chains of title should not have been at issue. In this in personam action, which went to trial solely against Fitzhur Brown, the plaintiff was not seeking to rely on (or to challenge) the Williams or Hutson chains of title, and neither was Fitzhur Brown. In these circumstances, the plaintiff lacked notice that the validity of these chains of title was being tried. Jensen v. Daniels, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 816 (2003) (warning that fundamental fairness requires a careful examination of whether unpleaded issues were tried by implied consent).
Moreover, the lack of notice that the plaintiff faced was compounded in other respects. As the judge himself accurately observed, the transfer of the property in the Williams chain of title from Essor (as trustee) to Sandra Brown was facially valid. Further, there was no trial evidence that the beneficiaries had not endorsed that sale and, in light of the "conclusive evidence" provision of the trust, the plaintiff had no burden to establish that the beneficiaries had authorized or endorsed the sale. Therefore, even had the validity of the Williams chain been presented, the plaintiff had no burden to prove that this facially valid chain of title did not suffer from a hidden defect.
That leaves the question of what disposition is appropriate. Because we conclude that the validity of the Williams and Hutson chains of title should not have been at issue at trial, we vacate the fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs of the judgment (which purported to adjudicate the validity of those chains of title) as well as the final paragraph of the judgment (which declared that Essor still held title to the property). We let stand the other paragraphs of the judgment, which are not challenged on appeal. So much of the order denying the motion for reconsideration as denied the request that the judge "make no conclusion with respect to the validity of the plaintiff's chain of title via Micah Williams" is vacated; the remainder of that order is affirmed. The order denying the motion for relief from judgment is affirmed.
The motion for relief from judgment was based solely on "newly discovered evidence," and we agree with the judge that the plaintiff was seeking to rely on postjudgment developments, not newly discovered evidence. We emphasize that the appeal before us is a narrow one, and that this case does not include several parties with a potential stake in the dispute: Essor, Sandra Brown, the beneficiaries of the trust, and the putative new purchaser of the property. Nothing in this memorandum and order should be read as resolving who holds proper title to the property.
So ordered.
By the Court (Green, Milkey & Maldonado, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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Clerk Entered: June 15, 2015.