In the second Central of Georgia case, which merely adopted the holding of the first case, the court referred to Jetton with approval and stated that it was not controlling because "of the exceptional facts and language that had to be considered" in the first case. In Morris Canal Banking Co. v. Baird, 239 U.S. 126, 60 L.Ed. 177, 36 S.Ct. 28, the court stated that the holdings in the Central of Georgia cases were based upon the terms of the charters "which were interpreted as contemplating and permitting subsequent transfers without subjecting the fee to taxation." 239 U.S. 126, 132, 60 L.Ed. 177, 181, 36 S.Ct. 28, 30.

It can not be said of either charter that it "contemplated" or "permitted" any extension of the tax contract to another. They fall, therefore, within the general rule confining the immunity to the immediate grantee in the absence of express words to the contrary, and this distinction was fully recognized in Morris Canal Co. v. Baird, 239 U.S. 132, and Rochester Ry. Co. v. Rochester, 205 U.S. 247. The Act of January 22, 1852, Laws 1851-1852, p. 119, authorized the Central R.R. Banking Company to lease certain connecting railroads, namely the Augusta and Savannah and the Southwestern, and authorized them to lease to the Central, for a term of years or during their respective charters.

But the constitution was subsequent to the charters that created the exemption and must yield to them if they apply to the present attempt. We are of opinion that although the decision in the former case necessarily was confined to the question before the Court, the reasoning applies with equal force to that now before us. The cases of Rochester Ry. Co. v. Rochester, 205 U.S. 236, and Jetton v. University of the South, 208 U.S. 489, were urged as opposed to the conclusion reached but were thought not to control in view of the exceptional facts and language that had to be considered, as was recognized in Morris Canal Banking Co. v. Baird, 239 U.S. 126, 132. We must follow the precedent that was established after full discussion and with recognition of the difficulties involved.

" (citation omitted) Later, the Court recited this language with approval in Morris Canal and Banking Co. v. Baird, 239 U.S. 126, 131, 36 S.Ct. 28, 60 L.Ed. 177 (1915). See also 173 A.L.R. § 118 (1948).

Being a remedial statute, the appellants must bring themselves within both the letter and spirit of the exceptions since they are subject to a strict construction. Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., supra; cf. Morris Canal Co. v. Baird, 1915, 239 U.S. 126, 36 S.Ct. 28, 60 L.Ed. 177; Citizens' Bank v. Parker, 1904, 192 U.S. 73, 85, 24 S.Ct. 181, 48 L.Ed. 346. It may be well to summarize briefly the provisions of the statute with which we are most closely concerned.

Being a remedial statute, the appellants must bring themselves within both the letter and spirit of the exceptions since they are subject to a strict construction. Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., supra; cf. Morris Canal [ Banking] Co. v. Baird, 1915, 239 U.S. 126, 36 S.Ct. 28, 60 L.Ed. 177; Citizens' Bank v. Parker, 1904, 192 U.S. 73, 85, 24 S.Ct. 181, 48 L.Ed. 346." (Emphasis supplied.)

Messrs. Gregory Gregory for appellant, cite: Exemptionstatute: 34 Stat., 891. Exemption statute strictly construed: 37 Cyc., 890. Cooley Taxation, 4th Ed., Sec. 572; 16 S.Ct., 471; 6 U.S. 461; 89 U.S. 215; 99 U.S. 348; 143 U.S. 192; 64 A.L.R., 110; 25 A.L.R., 27; 153 Mass. 185; 69 L.R.A., 776; 115 S.C. 108; 151 Ky., 758. Statute to induce new plants, not enlargements or improvementof old: 143 Ky., 258; 149 Ky., 149; L.R.A., 1916-D, 108; 142 Ky., 759; 170 Ky., 557. Exemption isa gratuity and may be revoked: 26 R.C.L., 304; 22 S.Ct., 888; 19 Mich., 259. Exemption personal and not assignable: 26 R.C.L., 308; 205 U.S. 236; 239 U.S. 126; 49 S.E., 506; 3 S.Ct., 193; 21 S.Ct., 240; 5 S.Ct., 813; 23 S.Ct., 860; 28 S.Ct., 401; 89 Md., 89. Merger eliminated GreatFalls Power Company: Cooley Taxation 4th Ed., Sec. 722; 205 U.S. 236; 60 L.R.A., 34; 7 R.C.L., 155; 3 Civ. Code 1922, page 1452; 92 U.S. 265; 14 S.Ct., 592. Exemption is discrimination against other corporations: 64 L.Ed., 989; 247 U.S. 350; 28 S.Ct., 7; 30 S.Ct., 287; 17 S.Ct., 255; 75 S.C. 62; 53 S.C. 259; 53 S.C. 285. Statute violates Section 1, Article 10, Constitution ofS.C. 1895: 10 S.E., 845; 20 S.E., 526; 37 Cyc., 735-36; 3 S.Ct., 193; 255 U.S. 288; 21 S.Ct., 240; 14 S.Ct., 592; 101 U.S. 153; 37 S.Ct., 693; 41 Calif., 351; 13 Am. Rep., 143; 68 Ill., 530; 28 L.R.A., 65; 59 Ill., 142; 99 U.S. 309; 178 Pa. St., 171; 35 S.E., 73; 78 S.E., 807; 54 S.E., 729; 69 Ind., 375; 53 N.E., 168; 16 Am. Rep., 375; 43 S.E., 362; 52 S.E., 638; 68 L.R.A., 92; 2 A.L.R., 465; 9 Wis. 378; 3 Ohio St., 15; 30 L.R.A., 218; 34 L.R.A., 725; 12 A.L.R., 552; 106 Md., 281; 64 L.R.A., 3