Morris Canal Co. v. Baird

7 Citing cases

  1. Nabisco, Inc. v. Korzen

    68 Ill. 2d 451 (Ill. 1977)   Cited 7 times

    In the second Central of Georgia case, which merely adopted the holding of the first case, the court referred to Jetton with approval and stated that it was not controlling because "of the exceptional facts and language that had to be considered" in the first case. In Morris Canal Banking Co. v. Baird, 239 U.S. 126, 60 L.Ed. 177, 36 S.Ct. 28, the court stated that the holdings in the Central of Georgia cases were based upon the terms of the charters "which were interpreted as contemplating and permitting subsequent transfers without subjecting the fee to taxation." 239 U.S. 126, 132, 60 L.Ed. 177, 181, 36 S.Ct. 28, 30.

  2. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright

    250 U.S. 519 (1919)   Cited 3 times

    It can not be said of either charter that it "contemplated" or "permitted" any extension of the tax contract to another. They fall, therefore, within the general rule confining the immunity to the immediate grantee in the absence of express words to the contrary, and this distinction was fully recognized in Morris Canal Co. v. Baird, 239 U.S. 132, and Rochester Ry. Co. v. Rochester, 205 U.S. 247. The Act of January 22, 1852, Laws 1851-1852, p. 119, authorized the Central R.R. Banking Company to lease certain connecting railroads, namely the Augusta and Savannah and the Southwestern, and authorized them to lease to the Central, for a term of years or during their respective charters.

  3. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright

    248 U.S. 525 (1919)   Cited 8 times

    But the constitution was subsequent to the charters that created the exemption and must yield to them if they apply to the present attempt. We are of opinion that although the decision in the former case necessarily was confined to the question before the Court, the reasoning applies with equal force to that now before us. The cases of Rochester Ry. Co. v. Rochester, 205 U.S. 236, and Jetton v. University of the South, 208 U.S. 489, were urged as opposed to the conclusion reached but were thought not to control in view of the exceptional facts and language that had to be considered, as was recognized in Morris Canal Banking Co. v. Baird, 239 U.S. 126, 132. We must follow the precedent that was established after full discussion and with recognition of the difficulties involved.

  4. Antilles Industries v. Government of V. I

    529 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1976)   Cited 1 times

    " (citation omitted) Later, the Court recited this language with approval in Morris Canal and Banking Co. v. Baird, 239 U.S. 126, 131, 36 S.Ct. 28, 60 L.Ed. 177 (1915). See also 173 A.L.R. § 118 (1948).

  5. Bowie v. Gonzalez

    117 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1941)   Cited 96 times
    In Bowie v. Gonzalez, 1 Cir., 117 F.2d 11, 20, the Circuit Court of Appeals held "dead" season employees who were "engaged in the repair and maintenance of the milling and transportation facilities" of a company engaged in gathering and refining sugar cane, were covered by the Act.

    Being a remedial statute, the appellants must bring themselves within both the letter and spirit of the exceptions since they are subject to a strict construction. Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., supra; cf. Morris Canal Co. v. Baird, 1915, 239 U.S. 126, 36 S.Ct. 28, 60 L.Ed. 177; Citizens' Bank v. Parker, 1904, 192 U.S. 73, 85, 24 S.Ct. 181, 48 L.Ed. 346. It may be well to summarize briefly the provisions of the statute with which we are most closely concerned.

  6. Fleming v. American Stores Co.

    42 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Pa. 1941)   Cited 18 times

    Being a remedial statute, the appellants must bring themselves within both the letter and spirit of the exceptions since they are subject to a strict construction. Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., supra; cf. Morris Canal [ Banking] Co. v. Baird, 1915, 239 U.S. 126, 36 S.Ct. 28, 60 L.Ed. 177; Citizens' Bank v. Parker, 1904, 192 U.S. 73, 85, 24 S.Ct. 181, 48 L.Ed. 346." (Emphasis supplied.)

  7. Duke Power Co. v. Bell, County Treasurer

    156 S.C. 299 (S.C. 1930)   Cited 73 times
    In Duke Power Co. v. Bell, 156 S.C. 299, 152 S.E. 865 (1930), our supreme court made a specific determination that Duke Energy is a manufacturer.

    Messrs. Gregory Gregory for appellant, cite: Exemptionstatute: 34 Stat., 891. Exemption statute strictly construed: 37 Cyc., 890. Cooley Taxation, 4th Ed., Sec. 572; 16 S.Ct., 471; 6 U.S. 461; 89 U.S. 215; 99 U.S. 348; 143 U.S. 192; 64 A.L.R., 110; 25 A.L.R., 27; 153 Mass. 185; 69 L.R.A., 776; 115 S.C. 108; 151 Ky., 758. Statute to induce new plants, not enlargements or improvementof old: 143 Ky., 258; 149 Ky., 149; L.R.A., 1916-D, 108; 142 Ky., 759; 170 Ky., 557. Exemption isa gratuity and may be revoked: 26 R.C.L., 304; 22 S.Ct., 888; 19 Mich., 259. Exemption personal and not assignable: 26 R.C.L., 308; 205 U.S. 236; 239 U.S. 126; 49 S.E., 506; 3 S.Ct., 193; 21 S.Ct., 240; 5 S.Ct., 813; 23 S.Ct., 860; 28 S.Ct., 401; 89 Md., 89. Merger eliminated GreatFalls Power Company: Cooley Taxation 4th Ed., Sec. 722; 205 U.S. 236; 60 L.R.A., 34; 7 R.C.L., 155; 3 Civ. Code 1922, page 1452; 92 U.S. 265; 14 S.Ct., 592. Exemption is discrimination against other corporations: 64 L.Ed., 989; 247 U.S. 350; 28 S.Ct., 7; 30 S.Ct., 287; 17 S.Ct., 255; 75 S.C. 62; 53 S.C. 259; 53 S.C. 285. Statute violates Section 1, Article 10, Constitution ofS.C. 1895: 10 S.E., 845; 20 S.E., 526; 37 Cyc., 735-36; 3 S.Ct., 193; 255 U.S. 288; 21 S.Ct., 240; 14 S.Ct., 592; 101 U.S. 153; 37 S.Ct., 693; 41 Calif., 351; 13 Am. Rep., 143; 68 Ill., 530; 28 L.R.A., 65; 59 Ill., 142; 99 U.S. 309; 178 Pa. St., 171; 35 S.E., 73; 78 S.E., 807; 54 S.E., 729; 69 Ind., 375; 53 N.E., 168; 16 Am. Rep., 375; 43 S.E., 362; 52 S.E., 638; 68 L.R.A., 92; 2 A.L.R., 465; 9 Wis. 378; 3 Ohio St., 15; 30 L.R.A., 218; 34 L.R.A., 725; 12 A.L.R., 552; 106 Md., 281; 64 L.R.A., 3