Morissette v. United States

1,000+ Citing cases

  1. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.

    513 U.S. 64 (1994)   Cited 816 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Discussing Morissette v. United States , 342 U.S. 246, 255, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288

    Some applications of that reading would sweep within the statute's ambit actors who had no idea that they were even dealing with sexually explicit material, an anomalous result that the Court will not assume Congress to have intended. Moreover, Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 271, reinforced by Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619, instructs that the standard presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct, and the minority status of the performers is the crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct under ยง 2252. The legislative history, although unclear as to whether Congress intended "knowingly" to extend to performer age, persuasively indicates that the word applies to the sexually explicit conduct depicted, and thereby demonstrates that "knowingly" is emancipated from merely modifying the verbs in subsections (1) and (2). As a matter of grammar, it is difficult to conclude that the word modifies one of the elements in subsections (1)(A) and (2)(A), but not the other.

  2. Sandstrom v. Montana

    442 U.S. 510 (1979)   Cited 3,160 times   8 Legal Analyses
    Noting the "overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime" (quoting Morissette v. United States , 342 U.S. 246, 275, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) )

    Finding that under the instruction in question petitioner's sole burden was to produce "some" evidence that he did not intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, and not to disprove that he acted "purposely or knowingly," the Montana court held that the instruction did not violate due process standards. Held: Because the jury may have interpreted the challenged presumption as conclusive, like the presumptions in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, and United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, or as shifting the burden of persuasion, like that in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, and because either interpretation would have violated the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the instruction is unconstitutional. Pp. 514-527.

  3. Liparota v. United States

    471 U.S. 419 (1985)   Cited 655 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 423-24, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985), and Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 248, 270-71, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952), the statutes at issue specified a mens rea but were unclear as to which elements of the offense it applied.

    The Government argues that petitioner violated the statute if he knew that he acquired or possessed food stamps and if in fact that acquisition or possession was in a manner not authorized by statute or regulations. According to the Government, no mens rea, or "evil-meaning mind," Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952), is necessary for conviction. Petitioner claims that the Government's interpretation, by dispensing with mens rea, dispenses with the only morally blameworthy element in the definition of the crime.

  4. United States v. Bailey

    444 U.S. 394 (1980)   Cited 1,122 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Observing that, to hold a person criminally liable, "the concurrence of . . . 'an evil-meaning mind an evil-doing hand' " must be proved (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952))

    Yet we have written, reluctantly but we believe necessarily, a somewhat lengthy opinion supporting our conclusion, because in enacting the Federal Criminal Code Congress legislated in the light of a long history of case law that is frequently relevant in fleshing out the bare bones of a crime that Congress may have proscribed in a single sentence. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). I

  5. Elonis v. United States

    575 U.S. 723 (2015)   Cited 398 times   17 Legal Analyses
    In Elonis, however, the Supreme Court determined that ยง 875(c) "requires that the defendant be aware of the threatening nature of [his] communication," id. at 726, 135 S.Ct. 2001, drawing on the "universal and persistent" principle that "wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal," id. at 734, 135 S.Ct. 2001, quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250, 252, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952).

    We have repeatedly held that "mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal intent" should not be read "as dispensing with it." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). This rule of construction reflects the basic principle that "wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal." Id., at 252, 72 S.Ct. 240.

  6. Staples v. United States

    511 U.S. 600 (1994)   Cited 1,194 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Eschewing a mens rea requirement โ€œhardly seems apt ... for a crime that is a felony.... After all, โ€˜felonyโ€™ is ... โ€˜as bad a word as you can give to man or thing.โ€™ โ€ (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 260, 72 S.Ct. 240 )

    Id., at 436 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) ("The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil").

  7. U.S. v. Donato-Morales

    382 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2004)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that although 18 U.S.C. ยง 641 โ€œdoes not expressly require specific intent, the Supreme Court has held that Congress, in codifying the common law crimes described in ยง 641, intended to incorporate the common law requirement of specific intent as an element of the crimeโ€ (citing Morissette v. United States , 342 U.S. 246, 270โ€“73, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) )

    Section 641 requires, inter alia, that the defendant had specific intent to steal a "thing of value." See id.; Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). The question of intent is a question of fact for the trier of fact.

  8. Chicone v. State

    684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996)   Cited 175 times
    In Chicone the Florida Supreme Court, relying on the above emphasized language from Morissette, concluded that the felony and misdemeanor statutes involved in Chicone would be presumed to have "a scienter requirement in the absence of express contrary intent."

    However, since the legislature is vested with the authority to define the elements of a crime, determining whether scienter is an essential element of a statutory crime is a question of legislative intent. Staples, 511 U.S. at 603-605, 114 S.Ct. at 1796-97; Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 258-59, 72 S.Ct. 240, 247, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952); Balint, 258 U.S. at 252, 42 S.Ct. at 302. As noted in Oxx, notwithstanding this common law requirement, the legislature has the power to dispense with the element of intent and thereby punish particular acts without regard to the malicious or wrongful mental attitude of the offender.

  9. United States v. United States Gypsum Co.

    438 U.S. 422 (1978)   Cited 989 times   18 Legal Analyses
    In United States v. United States Gypsum Co. (1978) 438 U.S. 422, 436 [57 L.Ed.2d 854, 868, 98 S.Ct. 2864], the court again relied on Morissette in holding that a showing of intent was required to sustain criminal liability under the antitrust laws.

    Rather, we hold that a defendant's state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal antitrust offense which must be established by evidence and inferences drawn therefrom and cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal presumption of wrongful intent from proof of an effect on prices. Cf. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274-275 (1952). Since the challenged instruction, as we read it, had this prohibited effect, it is disapproved.

  10. United States v. Freed

    401 U.S. 601 (1971)   Cited 524 times
    Noting that a mens rea requirement is often not required for criminal "activities affecting public health, safety, and welfare." (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952))

    26 U.S.C. ยง 5861 (d) (1964 ed., Supp. V). The presence of a "vicious will" or mens rea ( Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251) was long a requirement of criminal responsibility. But the list of exceptions grew, especially in the expanding regulatory area involving activities affecting public health, safety, and welfare.