Morgan v. Wright

9 Citing cases

  1. Claire v. Rue De Paris, Inc.

    236 S.E.2d 272 (Ga. 1977)   Cited 5 times
    In Claire v. Rue de Paris, 239 Ga. 191, 193 (236 S.E.2d 272) (1977), wherein a shareholder filed a petition for dissolution of a corporation and an injunction to prevent the corporate officers from disposing of corporate assets, the Supreme Court quoted the above Code section and noted that the plaintiff's complaint under that section "seeks equitable relief."

    The defendants need not invoke the clean hands maxim as the court will apply it of its own accord. McKinney v. Atkinson, 209 Ga. 49 (2) ( 70 S.E.2d 769) (1952); Morgan v. Wright, 219 Ga. 385 (2) ( 133 S.E.2d 341) (1963); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 238 Ga. 1 ( 230 S.E.2d 842) (1977); Daniell v. Collins, 222 Ga. 1 ( 148 S.E.2d 295) (1966). The rule is firmly established that "...where stockholders in a corporation participate in the performance of an act, or acquiesce in and ratify the same, they are estopped to complain thereof in equity."

  2. Reynolds v. Reynolds

    238 Ga. 1 (Ga. 1976)   Cited 8 times

    Accordingly, those allegations of the plaintiff's complaint which disclose that the handwritten prenuptial agreement between the plaintiff and Richard J. Reynolds was in consideration of the sum of $10 and the agreement of plaintiff to marry him at a time when he was then married to another person cannot be disputed nor can the allegation that the common stock was never transferred on the books of the corporation be disputed. Under the dissenting opinion of Presiding Justice Atkinson in Guffin v. Kelly, 191 Ga. 880, 891 ( 14 S.E.2d 50) (1941), adopted by this court in a full bench opinion ( Morgan v. Wright, 219 Ga. 385, 387 ( 133 S.E.2d 341) (1963)), it is required that the judgment of the trial court granting the defendant's motions for summary judgment as to Counts 1 through 6 be affirmed. The dissent of Presiding Justice Atkinson adopted in Morgan, supra, reads as follows: "In 1 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.), 738, ยง 397, it is said: "The maxim ... he who comes into equity must come with clean hands, ... assumes that the suitor asking the aid of a court of equity has himself been guilty of conduct in violation of the fundamental conceptions of equity jurisprudence, and therefore refuses him all recognition and relief with reference to the subject matter or transaction in question.

  3. Cooper v. Smith

    2003 Ohio 6083 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 40 times
    Holding that only what the donor expressly declares at the time the gift is given is relevant to determine intent; a donor's expectations of living in a house in the future are not relevant

    {ยถ 15} Under the first approach, the donor is denied recovery if the donee was legally married to someone else at the time the donor and donee became engaged. See Morgan v. Wright (1963), 219 Ga. 385, 133 S.E.2d 341; Lowe v. Quinn (1971), 27 N.Y.2d 397, 267 N.E.2d 251;Hooven v. Quintan (Colo.App. 1980), 618 P.2d 702. But, cf., Witkowski v. Blaskiewicz (1994), 162 Misc.2d 66, 615 N.Y.S.2d 640. This approach recognizes that an agreement to marry where one party is already married is void as against public policy.

  4. Miles v. Deen

    184 Ga. App. 198 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 2 times

    That doctrine has application only to actions in equity. See generally Morgan v. Wright, 219 Ga. 385 ( 133 S.E.2d 341) (1963). Although the executrix's claim to the insurance proceeds is based on an alleged equitable right of ownership therein, she seeks no equitable remedy but only a money judgment.

  5. Feagin v. Smith

    220 S.E.2d 41 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975)   Cited 1 times

    5. While this is not a case in equity, an equitable maxim applies, to wit, "one with unclean hands can not obtain relief in equity." Morgan v. Wright, 219 Ga. 385, 387 ( 133 S.E.2d 341); and "Equity follows the law," Carter v. Jordan, 15 Ga. 76. Here, Smith complains because plaintiff learned something which Smith was duty-bound to disclose in the first instance, and without putting plaintiff to the trouble of having to make inquiry of others.

  6. Cummins v. Goolsby

    255 So. 3d 1257 (Miss. 2018)   Cited 9 times

    And conditioning a gift on marriage when one cannot lawfully marry violates public policy and constitutes unclean hands. See, e.g. , Morgan v. Wright , 219 Ga. 385, 133 S.E.2d 341, 343 (1963) (holding that an action to recover an engagement ring given to a married woman was barred by the doctrine of unclean hands). Dr. Cummins could not legally marry Jordan at the time he gave her the rings.

  7. Taylor v. Frost

    202 Neb. 652 (Neb. 1979)   Cited 2 times
    Adopting rule that "' bargain in whole or in part for or in consideration of illicit sexual intercourse or of a promise thereof is illegal; but subject to this exception such intercourse between parties to a bargain previously or subsequently formed does not invalidate it'" (quoting Restatement of Contracts ยง 589)

    The second defense offers considerably more difficulty. It is a sound public policy to protect the marital relationship from interference, and agreements which interfere with the relationship are ordinarily unenforceable. Breiner v. Olson, 195 Neb. 120, 237 N.W.2d 118; Morgan v. Wright, 219 Ga. 385, 133 S.E.2d 341. When the parties to this action began their sexual relationship, and when they first contemplated marriage in 1971, Phyllis was a married woman and not free to contract marriage.

  8. Lowe v. Quinn

    27 N.Y.2d 397 (N.Y. 1971)   Cited 28 times
    In Lowe, the court morally rejected plaintiff's attempt to recover his ring because he was legally married at the moment he made the gift.

    Based on such reasoning, the few courts which have had occasion to consider the question have held that a plaintiff may not recover the engagement ring or any other property he may have given the woman. (See Malasarte v. Keye, 13 Alaska 407, 412; Morgan v. Wright, 219 Ga. 385; Armitage v. Hogan, 25 Wn.2d 672.) Thus, in Armitage v. Hogan ( 25 Wn.2d 672, supra), which is quite similar to the present case, the high court of the State of Washington declared (pp. 683, 685):

  9. Lowe v. Quinn

    32 A.D.2d 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969)   Cited 6 times
    In Lowe, the donor was married to another woman when he proposed to the donee and presented her with an engagement ring.

    It would logically follow that, there being no valid agreement which could be breached, the gift remains absolute. However, in jurisdictions where the question has arisen decision denying recovery has been placed on grounds of public policy and the equitable principle of clean hands ( Malasarte v. Keye, 13 Alaska 407; Morgan v. Wright, 219 Ga. 385; Armitage v. Hogan, 25 Wn. [2d] 672). The ordered entered January 7, 1969, should be reversed on the law, the motion granted, and cross motion denied, with costs and disbursements to appellant.