Morgan v. Richard Bowers Co.

4 Citing cases

  1. Gibson Technical Services, Inc. v. JPay, Inc.

    327 Ga. App. 82 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 7 times

    GTS failed to enumerate or argue the denial of its motion for partial summary judgment as error on appeal. Accordingly, GTS waived this issue. See Georgia Court of Appeals Rule 25; Morgan v. Richard Bowers & Co., 280 Ga.App. 533, 538(5) n. 11, 634 S.E.2d 415 (2006).On appeal from the grant of summary judgment this Court conducts a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

  2. Gibson Technical Svcs, Inc. v. Jpay, Inc.

    A13A2251 (Ga. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2014)

    GTS failed to enumerate or argue the denial of its motion for partial summary judgment as error on appeal. Accordingly, GTS waived this issue. See Georgia Court of Appeals Rule 25; Morgan v. Richard Bowers & Co., 280 Ga. App. 533, 538 (5) n.11 (634 SE2d 415) (2006). On appeal from the grant of summary judgment this Court conducts a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

  3. Hill v. Boozer

    658 S.E.2d 268 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)

    Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed favorably to the nonmovant, demonstrates that no genuine issues of material fact remain and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Morgan v. Richard Bowers Co., 280 Ga. App. 533, 534 ( 634 SE2d 415) (2006). Construed in this manner, the record shows that the Boozers are both licensed real estate agents.

  4. IHI E&C Int'l Corp. v. Robinson Mech. Contractors

    Civil Action 1:19-cv-04137-JPB (N.D. Ga. Sep. 30, 2022)

    In short, rules of grammar cede to the parties' intent. See Morgan v. Richard Bowers & Co., 537, 634 S.E.2d 415, 418 (Ga.Ct.App. 2006) (noting that “[i]t has long been [the] practice [under Georgia law] to interpret contracts ‘so as to give a reasonable, lawful and effective meaning to all manifestations of intention by the parties'” (citation omitted)); Langley, 834 S.E.2d at 805 (stating that “‘[t]he context in which a contractual term appears always must be considered in determining the meaning of the term'” (citation omitted)).