Opinion
No. 05-05-00077-CV
Opinion issued February 3, 2006.
On Appeal from the 256th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 03-02487-Z.
Affirmed.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, WRIGHT, and MAZZANT.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Bruce H. Morgan appeals the trial court's judgment awarding Mary J. Morgan (now Jabin) $8365 in damages. In three points of error, appellant alleges the trial court erred in awarding appellee $8365 with six percent post-judgment interest and attorney's fees because there is no evidence to support the award, interest rate, or attorney's fees. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Appellant and appellee were divorced on May 19, 2003. At the time of the divorce, appellee drove a leased 2002 Lincoln Navigator. The lease was in appellant's name only. Under the terms of the divorce decree, appellant was ordered to pay the monthly lease payment on the Navigator and appellee would have the use and possession of the vehicle. The $915 monthly lease payments were designated "alimony payments" in the divorce decree. On April 22, 2004, appellant took the vehicle from appellee without her permission. Appellee sued appellant, seeking to have the vehicle returned to her, or in the alternative, for money damages. In response, appellant claimed that, under the divorce decree, appellee was required to insure the vehicle and had failed to do so. He further claimed he was entitled to repossess the vehicle because appellee had failed to insure the vehicle. Following trial, the trial court awarded appellee $8365 in damages with six percent interest from the date of judgment until the date of payment. The trial court also awarded attorney's fees. After the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, this appeal ensued.
In his first point of error, appellant claims the trial court erred in awarding appellee damages because there was no evidence presented to support the $8365 amount awarded. The trial court found that appellant agreed to pay alimony to appellee in the form of monthly car payments of $915, appellant repossessed the Navigator, and did not make alimony payments to appellee totaling $10,980. The trial court also found that appellee owed appellant $2615 resulting from her improperly withdrawing money from appellant's bank account. After offsetting the amount owed by appellee to appellant, the court concluded appellant was indebted to appellee in the amount of $8365. A review of the record shows that, under the terms of the divorce decree, appellant was responsible for making the $915 monthly lease payments on the Navigator for appellee's use and possession through the end of the lease term and that these payments were contractual alimony payments. The record also shows that appellant repossessed the vehicle in April 2004, and the lease expired in March 2005. Appellant failed to make payments on her behalf, nor did he make direct payments to appellee in lieu of the car payment. This constitutes some evidence to support the trial court's finding that appellant owed $8365 in monthly alimony payments to appellee. Therefore, appellant's first point of error lacks merit. In reaching this conclusion, we reject appellant's argument that he was justified in repossessing the vehicle because appellee failed to maintain insurance coverage on it. Whether appellant was justified in repossessing the vehicle or not is irrelevant because the divorce decree provided that the $915 monthly alimony payments ceased only upon the expiration of the lease term. The divorce decree did not state that appellant's obligation to pay appellee the $915 monthly alimony payment would cease if, prior to the lease term expiring, she returned the vehicle to him or he repossessed the vehicle from her. Thus, under the clear terms of the divorce decree, appellant was contractually obligated to pay appellee $915 per month as alimony for the duration of the lease term regardless of who possessed the vehicle and nothing expressly relieved him of that obligation. We overrule appellant's first point of error.
In his second point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in awarding appellee postjudgment interest of six percent on the $8365 award. Appellee concedes the rate assessed by the trial court was excessive and suggests this Court reform the judgment to reflect a post-judgment interest rate of 5.25 percent.
Section 304.003(c) of the Texas Finance Code provides that the post-judgment interest rate is "the prime rate as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on the date of computation." Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 304.003(c) (Vernon Supp. 2005). The Federal Reserve Board prime rate on December 14, 2004, the date of the judgment in this case, was 5.25 percent. See http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/Business-day/ H15-PRIME-NA.txt. We therefore modify the judgment in this case to reflect the correct post-judgment interest rate of 5.25 percent. See Dees v. State, 822 S.W.2d 703, 707 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, writ ref'd.).
In his third point of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in awarding appellee attorneys' fees because there was no evidence to show the amount awarded was reasonable. Appellant also claims appellee is not entitled to recover attorney's fees under section 38.002(2) of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code. Appellant, however, cites no authority for his claims, nor does he analyze his positions. Rule 38.1(h) of the rules of appellate procedure requires an appellant to include in his brief a "clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record." Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h). A point of error not supported by argument and authority is waived. See Kang v. Hyundai Corp. (U.S.A.), 992 S.W.2d 499, 503 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.). Therefore, we conclude appellant waived this point. We overrule appellant's third point of error.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.