Opinion
A22-0208
08-22-2022
June A. Morgan, Relator, v. Minnesota Department of Human Services, Respondent, Department of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent.
Department of Employment and Economic Development File No. 46973625-2
Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bjorkman, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
SUSAN L. SEGAL, CHIEF JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Relator June A. Morgan was employed by respondent Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) from November 4, 2020, until January 26, 2021, when she quit her employment. After she quit her employment, Morgan established an unemployment-benefits account with respondent Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) and applied for unemployment benefits. DEED issued an initial determination of ineligibility relying on the fact that Morgan quit her employment. Morgan filed an administrative appeal and a de novo hearing was held before an unemployment-law judge (ULJ).
2. During the entire term of Morgan's employment with DHS, Minnesota workplaces were governed by an emergency executive order requiring workers to wear face coverings to prevent the spread of COVID-19. See Emerg. Exec. Ord. No. 20-81, Requiring Minnesotans to Wear a Face Covering in Certain Settings to Prevent the Spread of COVID-19 , at 3 ¶ 2 (July 22, 2020) (the mask mandate); Emerg. Exec. Ord. No. 21-23, Amending Emergency Executive Orders 20-51, 20-81, 21-11, and 21-21, at 1 ¶ 2 (rescinding the mask mandate) (May 14, 2021). The mask mandate had "the full force and effect of law." See In re Murack, 957 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Minn.App. 2021) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 12.32 (2020)) (explaining that emergency executive orders issued pursuant to the Minnesota Emergency Management Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 12.01-.61 (2020), have the full force and effect of law).
3. During the hearing before the ULJ, Morgan testified that she quit her employment because her coworkers were not wearing masks and because DHS was not enforcing the mask mandate. When asked why she quit on the day that she did, she testified that she had received notice that day that her coworkers had filed the latest of several grievances about her using disinfecting products to clean her work area. But Morgan testified that she still would have resigned even if those grievances had not been filed. And she testified that she would not have resigned if her coworkers were wearing their masks.
4. The ULJ issued a decision determining that Morgan was ineligible for unemployment benefits because she quit her job and did not meet a statutory exception to ineligibility based on a quit. The ULJ found that Morgan quit her job "because her coworkers filed grievances about her, and they did not wear masks at all times in the workplace." On reconsideration, the ULJ affirmed the determination of ineligibility.
5. Morgan filed this certiorari appeal and argues in her appellate brief that the ULJ's decision should be reversed because it is unsupported by substantial evidence.
6. DEED filed a letter in lieu of a respondent's brief, conceding that the ULJ's decision is erroneous and requesting that this court reverse the decision or, in the alternative, remand the matter for an additional hearing.
7. In response to DEED's letter, we issued an order expediting the matter for consideration at special term. DHS was served with the petition for a writ of certiorari, appellants' brief, and DEED's letter in lieu of a respondent's brief, and was sent a copy of this court's order expediting the matter. DHS has not responded to DEED's assertion that the ULJ's decision should be reversed or otherwise appeared in this appeal.
8. In a certiorari appeal from a ULJ's decision on reconsideration, we may remand for further proceedings, or we may reverse the ULJ's decision if it is, among other things, legally erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2020).
9. An employee who quits her employment is ineligible for unemployment benefits unless a statutory exception to that ineligibility applies. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (2020). One exception applies when an employee quits her employment for a good reason caused by her employer, id., which is defined as a reason
(1) that is directly related to the employment and for which the employer is responsible;
(2) that is adverse to the worker; and
(3) that would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remaining in the employment.
Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a) (2020). These factors "must be applied to the specific facts of each case." Id., subd. 3(b) (2020). An applicant who quits because of "adverse working conditions . . . must complain to the employer and give the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the adverse working conditions before that may be a good reason caused by the employer for quitting." Id., subd. 3(c) (2020).
10. "Whether an employee had good cause to quit is a question of law, which we review de novo." Rowan v. Dream It, Inc., 812 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn.App. 2012) (quotation omitted).
11. We conclude that Morgan had a good reason to quit caused by DHS. DHS's failure to enforce the mask mandate was directly related to Morgan's employment, and DHS was responsible for it. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a). The failure to enforce the mask mandate was adverse to Morgan, and it was a reason that would compel an average reasonable worker to quit. See id.; see also Hawthorne v. Universal Studios, Inc., 432 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Minn.App. 1988) ("Illegal conduct by an employer may constitute good cause for an employee to quit.").
12. The ULJ reasoned that "Morgan might have had a legitimate concern of safety in the workplace," but found that Morgan did not notify DHS of this concern as required by Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(c). This finding is not supported by substantial evidence. The record reflects that Morgan discussed with her supervisor many times her concerns about her unmasked coworkers coughing and sneezing in the workplace, as well as a concern about one coworker returning to work when that coworker's husband had COVID-19. Although she did not complain directly about DHS's failure to enforce the mask mandate, as the ULJ found, this was because "the supervisor was the one who directed that mask wearing was optional." As DEED asserts, "In January 2021, in the context of the pandemic, [Morgan's complaints were] sufficient to notify DHS that Morgan was concerned about getting COVID-19 in the office."
13. The ULJ's decision that Morgan was ineligible for unemployment benefits is legally erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence. Morgan had a good reason to quit caused by DHS.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The ULJ's decision is reversed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.