Morgan v. Cohen

16 Citing cases

  1. Rolland v. Cellucci

    52 F. Supp. 2d 231 (D. Mass. 1999)   Cited 27 times
    In Rolland v. Cellucci (D.Mass. 1999) 52 F. Supp.2d 231, 243, the district court held: "The single state agency mandate arose out of Congress' desire to minimize the improper denial of benefits and to ensure a certain level of services and quality of care. Morgan v. Cohen, 665 F. Supp. 1164, 1177 (E.D.Pa. 1987).

    The single state agency mandate arose out of Congress' desire to minimize the improper denial of benefits and to ensure a certain level of services and quality of care. Morgan v. Cohen, 665 F. Supp. 1164, 1177 (E.D.Pa. 1987). The mandate accomplishes these goals by limiting the authority to make administrative decisions to a single state agency.

  2. Sobky v. Smoley

    855 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. Cal. 1994)   Cited 63 times
    Holding that current text of § 1396a(B) requires comparability between groups of the categorically needy as well as between individuals within the same group

    With little or no discussion of jurisdictional issues, a succession of courts, in cases pre-dating Suter (and many even pre-dating Wilder), have routinely permitted beneficiary and provider actions under § 1983 to enforce various sections of the Medicaid Act. See, e.g., King v. Sullivan, 776 F. Supp. 645 (D.R.I. 1991); Clark v. Kizer, 758 F. Supp. 572 (E.D.Cal. 1990), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds sub nom., Clark v. Coye, 967 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1992) (table); Linton v. Carney, 779 F. Supp. 925 (E.D.Tenn. 1990); Morgan v. Cohen, 665 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.Pa. 1987); Kessler v. Blum, 591 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Christy v. Ibarra, 826 P.2d 361 (Colo. 1991).

  3. Harris v. James

    896 F. Supp. 1120 (M.D. Ala. 1995)   Cited 2 times

    Most such court actions have resulted in judicial determinations that the challenged plans did not comport with the requirements of the Medicaid statute and regulations. See, e.g., Morgan v. Cohen, 665 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.Pa. 1987); Bingham v. Obledo, 147 Cal.App.3d 401, 195 Cal. Rptr. 142, (1983); Fant v. Stumbo, 552 F. Supp. 617 (W.D.Ky. 1982). Two cases dealing with challenges to state Medicaid transportation plans are especially relevant to this court's determination and merit a more detailed examination.

  4. Harris v. James

    127 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1997)   Cited 105 times
    Holding that 42 C.F.R. § 431.53 does not confer an enforceable right of transportation to and from medical providers

    According to the plaintiffs, the regulatory and statutory provisions create a federal right to transportation to and from providers. We note that a district court in Pennsylvania has held that the transportation regulation is enforceable through an action under Section(s) 1983. Morgan v. Cohen, 665 F. Supp. 1164, 1175 (E.D.Pa. 1987) (relying on Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 107 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987)). We also note that in Smith v. Vowell, 379 F. Supp. 139 (W.D.Tex. 1974), aff'd, 504 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1974) (table), the court, in an action brought by Medicaid recipients under Section(s) 1983, held Texas's Medicaid plan to be "out of conformity" with the transportation regulation and ordered the State to submit a conforming plan.

  5. Leonard v. MacKereth

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-7418 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2014)   Cited 5 times
    Explaining how the legislative history underlying the amended definition of "medical assistance" supports this interpretation

    Plaintiffs argue that the Court can issue injunctive relief at this stage in the litigation without running afoul of Rule 65(d). (Pls.' Resp in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 19.) Plaintiffs cite the case of Morgan v. Cohen in support of the notion that the Court should issue an injunction to ensure that Plaintiffs in this case receive ICF/ORC benefits. 665 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1987). In Morgan, the court granted injunctive relief to a class of plaintiffs "eligible to attend psychiatric partial hospitalization services subsidized by the medical assistance (Medicaid) program under Title XIX of the Social Security Act[.]" Morgan, 665 F. Supp. at 1165.

  6. Methodist Hosp. v. Ind. Family

    860 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Ind. 1994)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that absence of "objective benchmark by which the term 'geographic area' can be defined" precluded enforceability of statute and regulation under § 1983

    "Under the regulation, the [medical care advisory committee] should have the opportunity to consider and discuss the available alternative policies, not merely the chance to make minor suggestions concerning a single policy already adopted by the state." Burgess v. Affleck, 683 F.2d 596, 599 (1st Cir. 1982) (citations omitted); see also Morgan v. Cohen, 665 F. Supp. 1164, 1179 (E.D.Pa. 1987). The declaration of James Verdier states in paragraph 3 that the reimbursement reform proposals eventually codified in the new rules were presented to the Medicaid Advisory Committee on at least three separate occasions: March 11, 1993; June 18, 1993; and August 17, 1993.

  7. Siracusa v. State, Department of Health & Human Services

    AP-14-16 (Me. Super. Nov. 19, 2014)

    In Morgan v. Cohen, to which Mr. Siracusa also directs the Court, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania determined that 42 C.F.R. § 431.53 does create an enforceable right to transportation for Medicaid covered services. 665 F.Supp. 1164, 1167 (E.D.Pa. 1987). In both Harris and Morgan, the plaintiffs sought to protect and enforce their alleged right to transportation to and from Medicaid covered services.

  8. Stracusa. v. State of Me. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.

    SUPERIOR COURT LOCATION: AUGUSTA Docket No. AP-14-16 (Me. Super. Nov. 19, 2014)

    In Morgan v. Cohen, to which Mr. Siracusa also directs the Court, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania determined that 42 C.F.R. §431.53 does create an enforceable right to transportation for Medicaid covered services. 665 F.Supp. 1164, 1167 (E.D.Pa. 1987). In both Harris and Morgan, the plaintiffs sought to protect and enforce their alleged right to transportation to and from Medicaid covered services, Harris, 127 F.3d at 1012 ("... we cone hide that plaintiffs do not have a federal right. enforceable under -"42 U.S.C] § 1983, to transportation to and from Medicaid providers); Morgan, 665 F.Supp. at 1165 (plaintiffs are eligible to attend psychiatric services "subsidized by the medical assistance (Medicaid) program...").

  9. Avila v. Smith

    File No. 2:05-CV-309 (D. Vt. May. 26, 2006)   Cited 2 times

    Such links to Congressional intent may be sufficient to support the validity of a regulation; however, we think they are too tenuous to support a conclusion that Congress has unambiguously conferred upon Medicaid recipients a federal right to transportation enforceable under § 1983.Id. (emphasis in original); cf. South Camden Citizens In Action v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 274 F.3d 771, 786-88 (3d Cir. 2001) (adopting Harris analysis and concluding that EPA disparate impact regulations cannot create federal rights); but see Morgan v. Cohen, 665 F. Supp. 1164, 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (finding Medicaid transportation regulation enforceable under § 1983). This Court finds the Harris approach persuasive.

  10. Harris v. James

    883 F. Supp. 1511 (M.D. Ala. 1995)   Cited 8 times
    In Harris v. James, 883 F. Supp. 1511, 1519 (M.D. Ala. 1995), the court, after reciting the above reasoning of the Court, stated that the points on which the Court relied "bring new considerations to the analysis of the appropriateness" of invoking section 1983 to remedy violations of a federal statute.

    Plaintiffs direct this court's attention to several cases that have held that non-emergency transportation is required under the statute and regulations at issue in this case. See, e.g., Morgan v. Cohen, 665 F. Supp. 1164, 1175 (E.D.Pa. 1987); Fant v. Stumbo, 552 F. Supp. 617, 618-19 (W.D.Ky. 1982); Smith v. Vowell, 379 F. Supp. 139. The most important of these cases is Smith v. Vowell, which involved an action brought by a Texas welfare recipient on behalf of himself and others similarly situated seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The recipient claimed that Texas had failed to comply with the Social Security Act and its regulations by failing to provide medically necessary transportation for Medicaid recipients. Although the recipients brought suit under Section 1983, Texas did not challenge jurisdiction. The specific regulation at issue in the Vowell case was set forth in 45 C.F.R. § 249.10 which provided that