The doctrine of fixtures, by which the nature and legal incidents of the property must be determined, rests upon a course of judicial decisions made at different times, under a variety of circumstances, and running into numerous distinctions arising out of the peculiar relation of the parties and the peculiar circumstances of each particular case; so that it has been found extremely difficult to reduce this branch of the law to any uniform system. Tolles v. Winton, 63 Conn. 440, 443, 444, 28 A. 542; Morey v. Hoyt, 62 Conn. 542, 546, 26 A. 127. There are certain general principles, however, which have been well established. In the case of Capen v. Peckham, 35 Conn. 88, 94, this court held: "That it is essential to constitute a fixture that an article should not only be annexed to the freehold, but that it should clearly appear from an inspection of the property itself, taking into consideration the character of the annexation, the nature and the adoption of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which that part of the building was appropriated at the time the annexation was made, and the relation of the party making it to the property in question, that a permanent accession to the freehold was intended to be made by the annexation of the article."
D brought an action to be relieved of the forfeiture. In discussing the effect of the surrender of the head lease to A on the terms in the sublease which permitted the subtenant in violation of the covenants of the head lease to use the premises for other than a shoe-shining and hat-cleaning establishment, the court said: "But complainants claim under a sublessee, and it is true that a lessee cannot surrender his term to the prejudice of his assignee or subtenant ( Brock v. Desmond, 154 Ala. 634 [129 Am. St. Rep. 71, 45 So. 665]), and that third persons who have acquired interests in the premises may have relief against a forfeiture when their right would be defeated thereby ( Morey v. Hoyt, 62 Conn. 542 [19 L.R.A. 611, 26 A. 127]). This, however, assumes that the sublease does not offend against the rights of the original lessor, for a sublessee is charged with notice and bound by all the conditions of the original lease. . . . The act of the original lessee in surrendering his lease was not the surrender of any right, but an assent to the right of his landlord under the terms of the original lease.
"`[I]f the court which rendered judgment had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction, and rendered a judgment within its jurisdictional limits, that judgment is valid and cannot be collaterally attacked.'" 129 Main Street Partnership v. Tunsky, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. 52059 (March 18, 1992) (Pickett, J., 6 Conn. L. Rptr. 677, 7 CSCR 445) (citing Morey v. Hoyt, 62 Conn. 663-55, 26 A. 127 (1893)). "It is axiomatic that the Superior Court has jurisdiction over actions to foreclose mortgages on real property situated in Connecticut."Citibank v. Bolona, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 10 59 40 (September 20, 1990) (Cioffi, J., 2 Conn. L. Rptr. 538). In the present case, it is undisputed that Gary Costa ("the decedent") died on May 5, 1993.
"`[I]f the court which rendered judgment had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction, and rendered a judgment within its jurisdictional limits, that judgment is valid and cannot be collaterally attacked.'" 129 Main Street Partnership v. Tunsky, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. 52059 (March 18, 1992, Pickett, J., 7 CSCR 445) (citing Morey v. Hoyt, 62 Conn. 663-55, 26 A. 127 (1893). "It is axiomatic that the Superior Court has jurisdiction over actions to foreclose mortgages on real property situated in Connecticut."Citibank v. Bolona, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 10 59 40 (September 20, 1990, Cioffi, J.). CT Page 4225-U
Under these circumstances, there being no intention to take this property by purchase or condemnation when the improvements were erected, and the facts simply showing a case of neglect to remove the improvements within the time limited in the contract of lease, the improvements now belong to the owner. Buildings not removed during the term, or time limited by lease, become the absolute property of the lessor, 2 Minor's Inst., 613; 25 C.J. 706; 11 R.C.L. 1072; Freeman v. Dawson, 110 U.S. 264; Kinkead v. United States, 150 U.S. 483; United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 65; Clifford v. United States, 34 Ct. Cls. 232; 32 Op. Atty. Gen. 114; 26 C.J. 705; Wood on Landlord and Tenant, 529; Morey v. Hoyt, 62 Conn. 542; Ray v. Young, 160 Iowa 613; Tunis Lumber Co. v. Dennis Lumber Co., 97 Va. 682; Highes v. Kershaw, (Colo.), 51 L.R.A. (N.S.), 723. The right of possession of the plaintiff in error was complete except as to such possession of the United States as was necessary to enable it to remove the warehouses.
Young v. Consolidated Implement Co., 23 Utah 586, 65 P. 720, 722; Morey v. Hoyt, 62 Conn. 542, 26 A. 127, 130, 19 L.R.A. 611; Fitzgerald v. Anderson, 81 Wis. 341, 51 N.W. 554;
Merritt v. Judd, 14 Cal. 59; Whipley v. Dewey, 8 Cal. 36, 39; Randolph Marketing Co. v. Stevenson, 65 Cal.App. 1, 222 P. 849. This rule would apply to an attaching creditor (Morey v. Hoyt, 62 Conn. 542, 26 A. 127, 19 L.R.A. 611), and consequently to a trustee in bankruptcy who stands in the shoes of an attaching creditor (section 47a, subd. 2, Bankruptcy Act, as amended by Act of June 25, 1910, c. 412, § 8, 36 Stat. 840, 11 USCA § 75(a)(2). If then we assume that the pump and motor are fixtures, it is clear that they now belong to the landlord and not to the successor of the tenant — the trustee in bankruptcy. However, the question of whether or not personal property attached to the land has become a fixture by reason of the method by which it is affixed is a question of intent; that is to say, the permanency of the affixing described in section 660, Cal. Civil Code, supra, is a question of the intention of the parties, the landlord and tenant in the case at bar.
R.C.L. 1070. The lease treated the improvements that might be put upon the ground as personal property, giving the lessee the right to remove them. They were purchased by Glenn Hafey as personal property, and we think they were subject to sale on execution as personal property. 2 Taylor, Landl. Ten. (9th Ed.) § 549; 2 Tiffany, Landl. Ten. §§ 241, 247; Freeman v. Dawson, 110 U.S. 264, 4 S. Ct. 94, 28 L. Ed. 141; Broaddus v. Smith, 121 Ala. 335, 26 So. 34, 77 Am. St. Rep. 61; Morey v. Hoyt, 62 Conn. 542, 26 A. 127, 19 L.R.A. 611; Hershberger v. Johnson, 37 Or. 109, 60 P. 838; 11 Am. Eng. Encyc. Law (2d Ed.) 622; 13 Am. Eng. Encyc. Law (2d Ed.) 657; 26 C.J. 731. It is not clear from the record just when the partnership of Glenn Hafey was entered into. Mr. Glenn testified that the agreement between them in the formation of the partnership was oral, and that it was made in 1921.
Unless the invalidity of a judgment appears on the face of the record, the judgment is not vulnerable to collateral attack. Lampson Lumber Co. v. Hoer, 139 Conn. 294, 297, 93 A.2d 143; Morey v. Hoyt, 62 Conn. 542, 554, 26 A. 127. There is nothing in the record to support the plaintiffs' claim. See Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. v. Williamson, 153 Conn. 345, 349, 216 A.2d 635; Jenkins v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 152 Conn. 249, 260, 205 A.2d 780.
This procedure was in violation of 52-356 of the General Statutes. The execution sale was therefore void and illegal, and title to the car did not pass to the purchaser. Morey v. Hoyt, 65 Conn. 516, 524, 33 A. 496. The conclusion of the trial court that Staub did not prove title to the car at the time of the sale cannot stand.