Here, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for leave to discontinue the action insofar as asserted against the defendant, as there was no showing of substantial prejudice to the defendant or other improper results arising from the proposed discontinuance of the action insofar as asserted against the defendant (see U.S. Bank N.A. v. Narain, 223 A.D.3d 856, 204 N.Y.S.3d 194; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Starr–Klein, 221 A.D.3d 677, 678, 200 N.Y.S.3d 35). Indeed, since the defendant transferred his entire interest in the subject property, and the plaintiff waived any claim for a deficiency judgment against him, the defendant no longer had any interest in the property and lacked standing to defend the action (see U.S. Bank N.A. v. Nur, 208 A.D.3d 708, 171 N.Y.S.3d 920; Moret, LLC v. New-Bank, 194 A.D.3d 809, 810, 143 N.Y.S.3d 902; U.S. Bank N.A. v. Davids, 188 A.D.3d 943, 944, 132 N.Y.S.3d 315). The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit.

Here, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to discontinue the action insofar as asserted against the defendant, as there was no showing of substantial prejudice to the defendant or other improper results arising from the proposed discontinuance of the action insofar as asserted against the defendant (see U.S. Bank N.A. v Narain, 223 A.D.3d 856; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Starr-Klein, 221 A.D.3d 677, 678). Indeed, since the defendant transferred his entire interest in the subject property, and the plaintiff waived any claim for a deficiency judgment against him, the defendant no longer had any interest in the property and lacked standing to defend the action (see U.S. Bank N.A. v Nur, 208 A.D.3d 708; Moret, LLC v NewBank, 194 A.D.3d 809, 810; U.S. Bank N.A. v Davids, 188 A.D.3d 943, 944).

ORDERED that on the Court's own motion, the notice of appeal from so much of the first order as denied the application of the defendant Jefferson & Sons, LLC, and nonparty Eleven Forty, Inc., pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Jefferson & Sons, LLC, as abandoned, and the notice of appeal from so much of the second order as, in effect, denied the same relief to the defendant Jefferson & Sons, LLC, and nonparty Eleven Forty, Inc., are deemed to be applications for leave to appeal from those portions of the orders, and leave to appeal from those portions of the orders is granted (see CPLR 5701[c]); and it is further, ORDERED that the orders are affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs. The defendant Jefferson & Sons, LLC (hereinafter the defendant), lacked standing to defend the action (see U.S. Bank N.A. v Nur, ___ A.D.3d ___ [Appellate Division Docket No. 2019-07389; decided herewith]; Moret, LLC v NewBank, 194 A.D.3d 809). In any event, although the defendant and nonparty Eleven Forty, Inc., opposed the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a default judgment and for an order of reference by requesting that, pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), the complaint be dismissed insofar as asserted against the defendant as abandoned, as the Supreme Court determined, the right to seek dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) was waived (see Bank of Am., N.A. v Lichter, 192 A.D.3d 957; U.S. Rof III Legal Tit. Trust 2015-1 v John, 189 A.D.3d 1645; Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v Chishty, 179 A.D.3d 1147; US Bank N.A. v Gustavia Home, LLC, 156 A.D.3d 843).

The defendant appeals. Since the defendant transferred the property to Eleven Forty, Inc., after this action was commenced, the Supreme Court properly determined that the defendant no longer had any interest in the property and, therefore, lacked standing to defend the action (see Moret, LLC v NewBank, 194 A.D.3d 809; Valiotis v Bekas, 191 A.D.3d 1037; U.S. Bank N.A. v Davids, 188 A.D.3d 943; Totaram v Gibson, 179 A.D.3d 451; Bancplus Mtge. Corp. v Galloway, 203 A.D.2d 222). In light of our determination, we need not consider the defendant's remaining contentions.

ORDERED that the orders are affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs. The defendant Jefferson & Sons, LLC (hereinafter the defendant), lacked standing to defend the action (see [ U.S. Bank N.A. v. Nur, ––– A.D.3d ––––, 171 N.Y.S.3d 920, Appellate Division Docket No. 2019–07389 ; decided herewith]; Moret, LLC v. NewBank, 194 AD3d 809, 143 N.Y.S.3d 902, 903). In any event, although the defendant and nonparty Eleven Forty, Inc., opposed the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a default judgment and for an order of reference by requesting that, pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), the complaint be dismissed insofar as asserted against the defendant as abandoned, as the Supreme Court determined, the right to seek dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) was waived (seeBank of Am., N.A. v. Lichter, 192 A.D.3d 957, 140 N.Y.S.3d 775 ; U.S. Rof III Legal Tit. Trust 2015–1 v. John, 189 A.D.3d 1645, 140 N.Y.S.3d 59 ; Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v. Chishty, 179 A.D.3d 1147, 114 N.Y.S.3d 701 ; US Bank N.A. v. Gustavia Home, LLC, 156 A.D.3d 843, 67 N.Y.S.3d 242 ).

The defendant appeals. While the defendant's conveyance of his interest in the subject property to a third party during the pendency of this foreclosure action effectively divested the defendant of standing to challenge the plaintiff's requests for relief (seeMoret, LLC v. NewBank, 194 A.D.3d 809, 810, 143 N.Y.S.3d 902 ; U.S. Bank N.A. v. Davids, 188 A.D.3d 943, 944, 132 N.Y.S.3d 315 ), contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, so long as the defendant remained a named party in the action, he retained the right to contest the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over him pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) (seeDeutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Patrick, 173 A.D.3d 973, 974, 105 N.Y.S.3d 85 ). However, contrary to the defendant's contention, he waived his defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.