3 Term R. 87; Broom, Max. 588. Morecock v. Hood, 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730, 731; Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland, 223 Ala. 385, 136 So. 800, 801.
While Braswell v. Bank, supra, was decided after the enactment of the statute, the facts in the case occurred before the statute was enacted. This statute was construed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Morecock v. Hood, 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730, 731, in which Judge Adams says: 'The proviso applies to the receipt by any bank of a check, etc., with request that remittance, not manual delivery, be made therefor. One of the conditions imposing liability is a failure to remit, or 'the non-payment of a check sent in payment therefor.'
Noscitur a sociis (associated words) signifies that one may ascertain the meaning of an ambiguous term by determining the meaning of the other terms with which it is associated. See Morecock v. Hood, 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730, 731 (1932). The merchandise in the X-Acto Crescent Products case consisted of empty wooden boxes arranged to hold small tools.
The meaning of a doubtful word may frequently be ascertained by looking at adjoining words in the same document. Morecock v. Hood, 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730 (1932). N.C.GEN.STAT. § 1C-1601(a)(8) provides an exception to the "compensation" exemption for "funeral, legal, medical, dental, hospital, and health care charges related to the accident or injury giving rise to the compensation" (emphasis added).
The maxim is, noscitur a sociis: the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words with which it is associated." Morecock v. Hood, 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730. The framers of the Constitution have enumerated a great many specific subjects, then grouped the words "regulating labor, trade, mining, or manufacturing."
This is especially applicable to penal or criminal statutes. Chambers v. Board of Adjustment, 250 N.C. 194, 108 S.E.2d 211; Turner v. Board of Education, 260 N.C. 456, 109 S.E.2d 211; Morecock v. Hood, 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730; S. v. Craig, 176 N.C. 740, 97 S.E. 400; 82 C.J.S., Statutes, section 332 b. Applying these rules of statutory construction, it seems evident that of the eleven acts enumerated in G.S. 93A-6(a) authorizing revocation or suspension of a license, acts one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, nine and ten relate solely to the conduct of real estate brokers and salesmen as they are defined in G.S. 93A-2.
This Court, however, does not concur in this view upon the evidence appearing in the record. The defendant relied upon the case of Morecock v. Hood, 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730. This case deals with an interpretation of the proviso in section 218 (c) (14). The reasoning and scope of the Morecock case, supra, is not decisive of the question presented by the present appeal. The Morecock case did not involve a collection at all, but undertook to deal with a series of transactions by means of which a depositor was undertaking to withdraw his own money from a bank.
The cashier's check described in the evidence did not constitute a statutory preference as defined by C. S., 218(c). In re Bank, ante, 143. See, also, Morecock v. Hood, Comr., 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730. Nor do the facts constitute a preference upon the trust fund theory as interpreted in Parker v. Trust Co., 202 N.C. 230, 162 S.E. 564; Williams v. Hood, Comr., ante, 140. See, also, Flack v. Hood, Comr., ante, 337. Reversed.
PER CURIAM. Reversed on authority of Morecock v. Hood, Comr., 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730. Reversed.
Corp. Com. v. Trust Co., supra; Hudspeth v. Union Trust Savings Bank, 196 Iowa 706, 195 N.W. 378, 31 A.L.R., 466, and note; 7 C. J., 631. There are also certain statutory preferences (C. S., 218(c); Morecock v. Hood, Comr., 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730), as well as equitable ones ( Parker v. Trust Co., supra), allowable in the liquidation of insolvent banks, but the present record deals only with the equitable right of priority. In re Bank, ante, 143, 167 S.E. 561.