Morecock v. Hood

18 Citing cases

  1. IN RE KATRINA CANAL BREACHES CONSOLIDATED LIT

    466 F. Supp. 2d 729 (E.D. La. 2006)   Cited 5 times

    3 Term R. 87; Broom, Max. 588. Morecock v. Hood, 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730, 731; Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland, 223 Ala. 385, 136 So. 800, 801.

  2. Royal Mfg. Co. v. Spradlin

    6 F. Supp. 98 (M.D.N.C. 1934)   Cited 3 times

    While Braswell v. Bank, supra, was decided after the enactment of the statute, the facts in the case occurred before the statute was enacted.         This statute was construed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Morecock v. Hood, 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730, 731, in which Judge Adams says: 'The proviso applies to the receipt by any bank of a check, etc., with request that remittance, not manual delivery, be made therefor. One of the conditions imposing liability is a failure to remit, or 'the non-payment of a check sent in payment therefor.'

  3. Nomura (America) Corp. v. United States, (1969)

    299 F. Supp. 535 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1969)   Cited 12 times

    Noscitur a sociis (associated words) signifies that one may ascertain the meaning of an ambiguous term by determining the meaning of the other terms with which it is associated. See Morecock v. Hood, 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730, 731 (1932). The merchandise in the X-Acto Crescent Products case consisted of empty wooden boxes arranged to hold small tools.

  4. In re Ragan

    64 B.R. 384 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986)   Cited 3 times

    The meaning of a doubtful word may frequently be ascertained by looking at adjoining words in the same document. Morecock v. Hood, 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730 (1932). N.C.GEN.STAT. § 1C-1601(a)(8) provides an exception to the "compensation" exemption for "funeral, legal, medical, dental, hospital, and health care charges related to the accident or injury giving rise to the compensation" (emphasis added).

  5. Gardner v. Reidsville

    269 N.C. 581 (N.C. 1967)   Cited 21 times

    The maxim is, noscitur a sociis: the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words with which it is associated." Morecock v. Hood, 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730. The framers of the Constitution have enumerated a great many specific subjects, then grouped the words "regulating labor, trade, mining, or manufacturing."

  6. In re Dillingham

    257 N.C. 684 (N.C. 1962)   Cited 16 times

    This is especially applicable to penal or criminal statutes. Chambers v. Board of Adjustment, 250 N.C. 194, 108 S.E.2d 211; Turner v. Board of Education, 260 N.C. 456, 109 S.E.2d 211; Morecock v. Hood, 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730; S. v. Craig, 176 N.C. 740, 97 S.E. 400; 82 C.J.S., Statutes, section 332 b. Applying these rules of statutory construction, it seems evident that of the eleven acts enumerated in G.S. 93A-6(a) authorizing revocation or suspension of a license, acts one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, nine and ten relate solely to the conduct of real estate brokers and salesmen as they are defined in G.S. 93A-2.

  7. Williams v. Hood, Comr. of Banks

    178 S.E. 669 (N.C. 1935)   Cited 1 times

    This Court, however, does not concur in this view upon the evidence appearing in the record. The defendant relied upon the case of Morecock v. Hood, 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730. This case deals with an interpretation of the proviso in section 218 (c) (14). The reasoning and scope of the Morecock case, supra, is not decisive of the question presented by the present appeal. The Morecock case did not involve a collection at all, but undertook to deal with a series of transactions by means of which a depositor was undertaking to withdraw his own money from a bank.

  8. BOARD OF EDUCATION v. HOOD, COMR

    168 S.E. 522 (N.C. 1933)   Cited 2 times

    The cashier's check described in the evidence did not constitute a statutory preference as defined by C. S., 218(c). In re Bank, ante, 143. See, also, Morecock v. Hood, Comr., 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730. Nor do the facts constitute a preference upon the trust fund theory as interpreted in Parker v. Trust Co., 202 N.C. 230, 162 S.E. 564; Williams v. Hood, Comr., ante, 140. See, also, Flack v. Hood, Comr., ante, 337. Reversed.

  9. BANK v. HOOD, COMR

    168 S.E. 224 (N.C. 1933)

    PER CURIAM. Reversed on authority of Morecock v. Hood, Comr., 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730. Reversed.

  10. Flack v. Hood

    168 S.E. 520 (N.C. 1933)   Cited 15 times
    In Flack v. Hood, Comr., 204 N.C. 337, 168 S.E. 520, it is said: "In the liquidation of insolvent banks, the general depositors are entitled to no preference, and must share pro rata with the general creditors.

    Corp. Com. v. Trust Co., supra; Hudspeth v. Union Trust Savings Bank, 196 Iowa 706, 195 N.W. 378, 31 A.L.R., 466, and note; 7 C. J., 631. There are also certain statutory preferences (C. S., 218(c); Morecock v. Hood, Comr., 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730), as well as equitable ones ( Parker v. Trust Co., supra), allowable in the liquidation of insolvent banks, but the present record deals only with the equitable right of priority. In re Bank, ante, 143, 167 S.E. 561.