Opinion
No. CV 02 0485200S
June 12, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This habeas corpus petition had its origin in two drug-related murders which occurred in October of 1990. The petitioner was convicted of two counts of felony murder and sentenced on November 4, 1994 to a total effective term of 70 years. The victims of these crimes were Ricardo Turner and Lamont Fields. His convictions were affirmed by our Supreme Court in State v. Morant, 242 Conn. 666 (1997).
Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for a new trial. Separate counts of that petition were heard by two different judges and were denied. Appeals from those denials were unsuccessful.
In this four-count habeas corpus petition, the petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the criminal trial, actual innocence, a violation of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Brady v. Maryland and a due process violation because the state employed allegedly perjured testimony to convict him.
A fifth count was abandoned at oral argument.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged test to be applied in evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition to being deficient, that is, not within the range of competence of lawyers with the ordinary skill and training in criminal law, the deficient performance must have prejudiced the defense.
Connecticut courts have addressed this test and elaborated upon a petitioner's burden in asserting such claims:
"The right of a defendant to effective assistance is not, however, the right to perfect representation." State v. Barber, 173 Conn. 153, 159-60, 376 A.2d 1108(1977); Chance v. Bronson, 19 Conn.App. 674, 678, 564 A.2d 303 (1989). He must also show "that this lack of competency contributed so significantly to his conviction as to have deprived him of a fair trial." Herbert v. Manson, 199 Conn. 143, 144-45, 506 A.2d 98 (1986). The reviewing court must employ a strong presumption of the reasonableness of that counsel's assistance. Levine v. Manson, supra, 640; Chance v. Bronson, supra, 678. The assistance must be viewed in light of the circumstances that existed at the time, and not with either the benefit or the distortions of hindsight. Levine v. Manson, supra. Even if that assistance is found to have been lacking in competency, the petitioner bears the further burden of showing that there is a reasonable probability that, were it not for the deficiency of counsel, the result of the trial would have been different. Aillon v. Meachum, 211 Conn. 352, 357, 559 A.2d 206 (1989). Williams v. Bronson, 21 Conn.App. 260, 263 (1990). Further, strategic or tactical choices of counsel are not subject to challenge. ( Strickland, supra).
The petitioner also claims that he is "actually innocent." In Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn. 397, 422 (1994), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that "a substantial claim of actual innocence is cognizable by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, even in the absence of proof by the petitioner of an antecedent constitutional violation that affected the result of his criminal trial." Although Summerville did not decide the standard of proof for such a claim, the decision was quite emphatic that the standard was much higher than the standard for a habeas claim based on ineffective assistance of counsel and much higher than the standard for a petition for a new trial. Summerville v. Warden, supra at 431, 433. In Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, 242 Conn. 745 (1997), the court determined the standard of proof for such a claim. "We conclude that the proper standard for evaluating a freestanding claim of actual innocence is two-fold. First, the petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that, taking into account all of the evidence — both the evidence adduced at the original trial and the evidence adduced at the habeas corpus trial — he is actually innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted. Second, the petitioner must also establish that, after considering all of that evidence and the inferences drawn there from as the habeas court did, no reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner guilty of the crime." Id. at 747.
The "clear and convincing" standard of proof is substantially greater than the usual civil standard of a preponderance of the evidence, but less than the highest legal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Miller at 794. It is sustained if the evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist. Id. at 794. Its emphasis on the high probability and the substantial greatness of the probability of the truth of the facts asserted indicates that it is a very demanding standard and should be understood as such. Id. at 795. It "should operate as a weighty caution upon the minds of all judges, and it forbids relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory." Id. at 795. It is the functional equivalent of an extraordinary high and truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence. Id. at 795.
The second component under the Miller test requires the habeas court to determine what a second fact finder, normally a jury, is likely to do if presented with the same evidence, original and new, that was presented to the habeas court. The standard here is also quite high. It erects a demanding but not insurmountable barrier that the petitioner must overcome in order to establish his claim of actual innocence. Id. at 802. The court must determine whether no reasonable fact finder, considering all of the evidence in the same way that the habeas court considered it, and drawing the same inferences that the habeas court drew, would find the petitioner guilty of the crime of which he stands convicted. Miller v. Commissioner, supra, at 800.
In Williams v. Commissioner, 41 Conn.App. 515, 527 (1996), the Appellate Court also held that a substantial claim of actual innocence, as recognized by Summerville, must be based on newly discovered evidence.
A Brady violation ( 373 U.S. 83, 1963), arises when the state fails in its duty to disclose exculpatory information to the defense. Thus, the petitioner must prove that the prosecution suppressed material evidence favorable to the defendant. State v. Shannon, 212 Conn. 387, 398 (1989).
The due process violation allegedly occurred when the state used testimony that was "false and/or perjured." Here, the petitioner's burden is to demonstrate the intentional making of a false statement, known not to be true.
FACTS
In order to evaluate the petitioner's claims, the factual background of the underlying case must be examined. This was set forth by the Supreme Court in its decision affirming the petitioner's conviction as follows:
In 1990, the defendant and Scott Lewis were partners engaged in the sale of drugs from a Clay Street house and on Exchange Street, both in New Haven. As part of this drug operation, Ricardo Turner stored drugs and cash in his second floor apartment at 634 Howard Avenue, New Haven. During the night of October 10 and the early morning hours of October 11, 1990, the defendant and. Lewis were at the Clay Street house and discussed the possibility that Turner might take the money and leave [the area]. Ovil Ruiz and several other individuals who sold drugs for the defendant and Lewis were also present at the Clay Street house during this discussion.
Two handguns, a .357 caliber and a .38 caliber, were stored in the house. In the early morning hours of October 11, 1990, either the defendant or Lewis told Ruiz to get the guns, and Ruiz gave the guns to Lewis. The defendant, Lewis and Ruiz then proceeded to travel in Lewis' automobile to Turner's apartment on Howard Avenue. On the way, the defendant stated, "whatever happens, you know, keep it between us." At the apartment, the defendant and Lewis exited the automobile and Ruiz got into the driver's seat. Ruiz then waited in the car while the defendant and Lewis went inside. When the two of them entered the apartment house, the defendant was carrying the .38 caliber handgun and Lewis was carrying the .357 caliber handgun.
The defendant and Lewis forced their way into Turner's apartment. They were in the apartment for thirty minutes when, shortly after 4 a.m., they fatally shot Turner and his roommate, Lamont Fields. Turner was shot in the head, the back and the side. The bullet that went into his side traveled through his body and into his left arm. Fields was shot twice in the back. One bullet passed through the floor and punctured a waterbed in the apartment below. All of the bullet fragments later recovered by police had been fired from a .357 caliber handgun.
The defendant and Lewis then ran out of the apartment, down the stairs, and into the waiting car. The defendant took from the apartment a bag that contained money, and Lewis took another bag that contained several ounces of cocaine. As they drove away from the scene, Lewis asked the defendant whether the defendant thought he, Lewis, had killed Turner and Fields. The defendant responded, "whatever happened, happened."
In January 1991, the defendant gave a statement to police in which he admitted that he was with Lewis during the early morning hours of October 11, 1990. He stated that Lewis was taking him home when Lewis stopped on Howard Avenue near the victim's apartment. The defendant stated that Lewis said "he had to take care of some business" and would be right back, and that Lewis then entered the apartment building while the defendant waited in the car. The defendant further stated that Lewis was perspiring when he came running from the apartment building to the car five or ten minutes later.
The defendant also told police that Lewis sold narcotics and that, when he and Lewis stopped on Howard Avenue, he thought Lewis was going to take care of some drug-related business. The defendant stated that the next day he learned that there had been a murder on Howard Avenue, and that a few days later, Lewis told the defendant that Lewis "did what [he] had to do" because one of the victims had owed Lewis "a couple dollars." The defendant further stated that at some later time he observed Lewis throw the gun that Lewis had used to commit the murders into the Mill River under the Chapel Street Bridge in New Haven. ( State v. Morant, supra, at 668-70).
The petitioner's statement to the police became a focal point in the trial and in the subsequent proceedings seeking a new trial as well as in the instant case.
DISCUSSION I
To evaluate the allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, one is confronted with the defense suggested by the petitioner and apparently supported by several witnesses. In the face of his statement placing himself at the crime scene, the petitioner offered an alibi defense, placing him in South Carolina at the time of the crime.
Counsel first attempted to suppress this statement on the grounds of coercion, saying that he was intoxicated at the time and was easily persuaded to tell the investigating detective "what he wanted to hear." He was unsuccessful after a full hearing and no claim has been advanced that the suppression hearing was conducted poorly by defense counsel.
Thus, counsel was now presented with a difficult defense — that he was not there and his admissions that he was there were the products of police coercion.
The petitioner's claim here is that he wanted to testify in support of his coercion claim but counsel delayed a decision on this point, and argued against such action until it was too late. Defense counsel testified that he and the petitioner discussed this question at length and it was the petitioner's decision not to testify.
Having heard the petitioner testify in this case and witnessing his censure of the assistant state's attorney representing the respondent at one point, it is highly unlikely that he would sit quietly while his turn to testify came and went. His courtroom behavior in this case lends support to defense counsel's concern over his testifying at trial.
The court concludes that a tactical decision was made with the petitioner's participation that he not testify.
Further, while the petitioner posits the view that the only possible way for the petitioner to prevail was for him to testify, he ignores the fact that his claim of intoxication and coercion was unsupported. And, he never followed through on his alleged attempts to recant his statement.
Cross examination of the petitioner could have been a total disaster. In the petition for a new trial before Judge Blue, the petitioner testified and his testimony was found not to be credible. In this proceeding, the petitioner testified at length about the circumstances surrounding his giving the statement. He indicated that he told the police what they wanted to hear so he could leave. But it is what he told them that is remarkable. According to the petitioner, he was unaware of what his accomplice Lewis was preparing to do when they drove to Howard Avenue, Lewis went in alone, killed the two victims, and they drove way. The petitioner claims no knowledge of Lewis' plan and no part in the deaths. But now, he says, this never happened and he exposed his old friend to a double murder charge so he could leave the police station after carefully absolving himself of any participation.
It just so happened that a tenant in the Howard Avenue building indicated that on the date in question she heard gunshots and then two persons running down the stairs and exiting the building.
In two prior trials, the petitioner's explanation and excuse for giving the statement failed to meet the test required for him to get a new trial. Two judges rejected the proposition that his statement was coerced and that if his version of events were heard by a jury, the verdict would have been not guilty. Judge Blue found the petitioner was not credible.
This court concurs in their conclusions and agrees that the petitioner was not a credible witness.
II
The petitioner also argues trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to call as an additional alibi witness, a woman who had been living with the petitioner in 1990 and had borne him two children. At the time of the criminal trial, their relationship had ended.
Trial counsel had issued a subpoena for her and she appeared at the courthouse with her own attorney. Trial counsel spoke with the attorney and decided against calling her as a witness. Counsel testified in this case that she was at the state's attorney's office when he talked to her lawyer. He could not recall the specifics of his conversation with her lawyer, but decided not to call her.
This appears to have been another tactical decision by counsel, based on his conversation and observation. The court notes that when a subpoenaed witness appears with counsel, the moving party probably does not have a friendly willing witness.
When this witness testified in the instant case, she was somewhat hesitant, stating she learned of the charges against Morant in 1991 or 1992. She could not vouch for the statement she gave in 1994 to an investigator for the petitioner. This statement is not a model of clarity, and her testimony before this court, elicited with some difficulty, would have the petitioner in Carolina on October 8th or 9th and arriving in New Haven October 17th or 18th. The court would not describe her as a strong witness.
In view of the decision reached, after the conversation with the witness's lawyer, her status as a former girlfriend, and her demeanor in this case, counsel cannot be faulted for his decision. It should be noted that her testimony would have been cumulative, other alibi witnesses were available, and she could well have diminished the alibi defense. Her testimony would not have affected the result.
III
The petitioner also complains that defense counsel was ineffective because he neglected to ask the petitioner's mother about a phone bill, after the jury returned to the courtroom following oral argument over the bill, thus, not having her attribute a phone call from the petitioner.
Assuming this was an omission by counsel, the impact of this episode must be considered slight at best. The call was made some thirteen hours after the killings in New Haven, thus it was not positive proof, even if elicited and believed, that the petitioner was not in New Haven at the time of the murders.
Mrs. Morant testified about two phone calls from South Carolina (the items on the bill) but only the second one was attributed to the petitioner. She would have been the sole source of evidence that the petitioner called from South Carolina since he did not testify.
It must be noted that these phone calls were purportedly made to help a relative make bond after his arrest perhaps not the sort of family image one would like to project to a jury and further weakening its positive value.
IV
The court next addresses the claim that trial counsel failed to effectively cross examine Detectives Vaughn Maher and Vincent Raucci. According to the petitioner, counsel should have exploited an alleged difference between their testimony and Raucci's police report. That difference was that, contrary to Maher's testimony, the petitioner directed them to a place at Criscuolo Park where Lewis discarded a bag he assumed contained the murder weapon. The petitioner argues that Raucci's report does not contain this episode but has Maher Raucci taking the petitioner directly home from 634 Howard Avenue when he became ill.
However, a careful reading of Raucci's report (Ex. 18) does not support that version of the events. For, after Morant told the officers of the occasion when Lewis threw the bag in the water, the report goes on to say:
"Morant agreed to take New Haven Police Officers to the location wherein Scott Lewis threw something in the water. Prior to going to Criscuolo Field, to the bridge location, Stefon Morant ____ us to 634 Howard Avenue, New Haven, Connecticut, where we parked the vehicle out front. Stefon Morant steered (sic) at the front door to 634 Howard Avenue, and then observed that he was about to vomit and he was attempting to hold it back. To having Mr. Morant vomit in the detective's vehicle, we immediately drove off. Morant decided at this point that he just wanted to go home and sleep."
Not printed in Exhibit.
This appears to be intended as "stared," suggesting the sight of the door produced Morant's distress.
Not printed, so interpreted by court.
The portion of the report that reads "Prior to going to Criscuolo Field, to the bridge location . . ." suggests that the detectives and Morant did go to the bridge location. Significantly, after the passage quoted above, the next subject addressed in Raucci's report is the police attempt to retrieve the bag described by Morant.
Nor does the statement say that when Morant decided he wanted to go home and sleep that the trip to Criscuolo Field was called off. It should be noted that the location in question is not a major detourer en route to returning petitioner to the gas station or his home, depending on which destination Morant decided upon.
Part of the alleged deficiency in trial counsel's performance is that he failed to "meaningfully challenge Maher and/or Raucci on their testimony that Petitioner was not under the influence when he provided his tape-recorded statement."
Though the petitioner suggests nothing said by Raucci should be believed, Raucci's testimony was that the petitioner called him in response to Raucci having left his business card at the Morant home. After that conversation, Raucci picked up Morant in front of his house where he was waiting for the police. When Morant was returned, he asked to be dropped off at the gas station.
While the petitioner's version of these acts varies, it appears to be uncontroverted that he called Raucci and arranged to be picked up. At no point was evidence introduced that he was intoxicated when he received Raucci's card, when he called Raucci, or when he left the house to meet him nor that he was restrained in any way.
But putting aside all the differences in versions, the court looks to the taped statement (Exhibit H) to evaluate the numerous claims of the petitioner that the statement was coerced, that he was drunk, and that it only repeats what Raucci told him. To this end, the tape has been played and re-played with and without the transcript.
Having heard the petitioner testify, the court first focused on the claim that his speech was slurred. The court finds nothing to support this theory.
Turning to the "I repeated what he told me to say" claim, this too is rebutted by the petitioner's responses, many of which go on at length and contain details and asides that the police couldn't possibly have supplied. In particular, answers on pages 3, 5, 8, 12 (Mark "doing" his jacket), and the running commentary about the bag tossed in the water, pages 8-12, all in Exhibit E, belie the notion that this statement was the product of police "feeds."
The court also notes some significant responses which appear clearly to have originated with the petitioner. For example on pages 3 and 4, Exhibit E, this appears in an 11-line answer:
. . . then we got some some address on Howard Avenue, he said "Yo, wait here I'll be back' . . . (Emphasis added).
CT Page 10227
Thus, on page 4, he is asked:
And he said we had to take care of some business? (repeating the "we").
The supposedly intoxicated petitioner responds:
He said he had to take care of some business. (Emphasis added).
Then, on pages 6 and 7, the petitioner goes to great lengths to describe where Lewis parked the car on the night in question, apparently demonstrating to the detectives his position and the location of the car.
On page 8, the petitioner attempts to provide the exact words used by Lewis in discussing the crime, with another reference to the Clay Street location. This response is 7 lines long.
On page 9, the detectives refer to the episode previously discussed when Lewis disposed of the bag which Morant felt contained the murder weapon. The petitioner names the persons present, including "Mack, Black, and Slick," and then refers to the James Auto Body location as the place near where the bag was thrown. The petitioner has offered no explanation for how the police would have possessed this information so that they could have "fed" it to him.
Like the prior courts which heard this claim, the court finds nothing to support the allegations which would negate this statement or render it inadmissible.
V
The criticism of trial counsel for not "investigating" witness Millie Martinez must be addressed as counsel has raised it, but the court seriously questions the wisdom of using her. In the habeas trial, the court heard of an attempt to bribe her by the police. Unfortunately, the amount of the bribe money varied in her versions of the transaction, so she presents a problem ab initio. But, were her police statement (disavowed before this court) to come in, it would serve to re-enforce the testimony of Ovil Ruiz who puts the petitioner at the scene of the murders and in a getaway car.
What this witness would contribute to the defense is unclear, but the court finds her testimony totally unreliable.
VI
The petitioner is also critical of counsel for failing to call as a witness one Jeffrey Rochler, the employer of Scott Lewis. Had Rochler testified at trial as he did before this court, he would have added nothing to the defense! While he did say Lewis was at work, he was not present at the job site and could not place him there at the time of the killings.
Calling him would also raise the question of why the name of this purportedly respectable business man pops up in the statement of Ovil Ruiz. And, he would not be offering exculpatory evidence as to Morant, but only as to Lewis — which would serve the purpose of showing Morant to be a liar, since his statement does not have Lewis at work.
The court also notes that in his testimony before this court, Rochler related his disagreement with the police at the time of the arrests of Lewis and Morant and claimed to have set up a meeting to air his views. However, this was not the subject of any follow up effort.
CONCLUSION AS TO CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
It is the conclusion of the court that the petitioner has not sustained his burden of proof on this ground.
Many of the questions raised pertain to tactical decisions and fail to consider the impossible situation counsel was placed in by the petitioner's statement to the police.
But of significance in view of counsel's argument that the five "errors" collectively establish the claim is the fact that none of the alleged errors, taken above are of any probative value. Adding up the inconsequential data does not give rise to a single strong case of ineffectiveness.
VII
Count two alleges a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct 1194 (1963) in that the state failed to learn of and to disclose certain information possessed by Detectives Michael Sweeney and Joseph Pettola pertaining to Detective Raucci's tactics in interviewing Ovil Ruiz.
Taking first Detective Pettola, he testified in this habeas trial and his brief testimony included the statement that Detective Raucci conducted the interview in a professional manner.
The petitioner refers to Pettola's statement to the F.B.I. (Exhibit 36) as supporting his claim of withheld information. While Pettola did concede that the tape recorder was stopped during the Ruiz interview, he explained why and the reasons seem somewhat innocuous. He did not remember any threats by Raucci or any "coaching" to influence the responses.
Turning to the information purportedly "possessed" by Detective Sweeney, the petitioner appears to ignore his cross examination before Judge Blue. Though he stated his concern that Raucci was "feeding" lines to Ruiz and telling him too many details about the killings, he agreed that there was much in Ruiz's statement he did not hear Raucci suggest. For example, he did not remember Raucci mention the petitioner or his co-defendant. And, he did admit that it was standard police techniques to give an interviewee some information in anticipation of getting more in return. This cross examination was referred to by the Appellate Court in the petitioner's appeal from Judge Blue's decision denying him a new trial. Morant v. State, 68 Conn.App. 137, 155 (2002).
To further weaken the petitioner's contention that Ruiz's statement to Detective Raucci was coerced and of Raucci's creation, one need only look at his subsequent statement — given in the presence of his attorney. This too weighed heavily in Judge Blue's decision and was referred to in the appeal. Id. at 158.
It must also be noted that despite the criticism of Detective Raucci and the concerns he had over the Ruiz interview in 1991, Detective Sweeney took no action to address his numerous misgivings until just before the 1999 trial before Judge Blue when he contacted counsel for the petitioner. While expressing disappointment at departmental indifference to his alleged concerns, he never approached the State's Attorney at New Haven to alert him to what he described at length in October 1999. And, significantly, it was Detective Sweeney who took Mr. Ruiz's acknowledgment when the statement was ready to be signed. (Exhibit 36, Page 37). Thus, he notarized a statement he later claimed was inaccurate and coerced.
The court concludes that there was no suppression of material to establish a Brady violation. The material referred to, even if accepted as true, is such that it can hardly be described as favorable to the petitioner. This is a requirement for a Brady violation. State v. Shannon, 212 Conn. 357, 398 (1989).
This claim was raised by the petitioner in his earlier bids for a new trial. It was found wanting at both the trial and appellate levels. Like those courts, this court does not find it likely to have produced a different result on a retrial. Secbeck v. State, 246 Conn. 514, 536 (1998).
The claim of a Brady violation is rejected.
VIII
The claim of actual innocence fails in two particulars. First, evidence supporting such a claim must be newly discovered. Williams v. Commissioner, Conn.App. 515, 529 (1996).
There was no evidence presented to this court and made part of the record for this case that was not presented in the previous trials.
The petitioner's other argument centers on the various Ruiz statements and his recantation in a letter. None of this is newly discovered, but counsel injects the novel proposition that the court should have granted Ruiz immunity. Then, by ignoring the inconsistencies in his statements to the FBI, but crediting those portions that clear Morant and Lewis, crediting the letter of recantation and ignoring the fourth statement to the New Haven State's Attorney, (which re-affirms his trial testimony), the petitioner asks this court to conclude that no reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner guilty. Clarke v. Commissioner, 249 Conn. 350, 355 (1999). This assumes that an immunized Ruiz would clear Morant and Lewis.
The court must reject this theory as sheer speculation and one in which no reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner not guilty.
IX
The petitioner's final claim is that he was denied due process and a fair trial because Detective Raucci's testimony was "false and/or perjured."
The court has addressed aspects of this claim in Section VII dealing with the alleged Brady violation. In assessing this claim, the transcript of Raucci's deposition testimony (Exhibit I) has been examined.
The petitioner recites his claim in this language:
Sweeney's testimony establishes that Raucci, an agent of the State, knowingly mislead the jury on a material fact, namely, the scope of his discussions with Ovil Ruiz on January 14, 1991 and the date he first received/discussed substantive information about the killings. Raucci's perjured testimony, as discussed above, enabled the State to make the highly successful argument that the police department's lack of substantive information about the killings, as of January 16, 1991, was proof that Petitioner's statement was the product of Petitioner's personal knowledge and was not the product of information provided by the police.
This flimsy premise ignores the fact that Ruiz testified before the jury. It also ignores Sweeney's admission that it is common police practice to give bits of information to a suspect so as to coax him into giving more. Further, the petitioner's statement has been found to be voluntary by every court in which it has been the subject of attack.
Furthermore, the mere assertion that Raucci's testimony was false and/or perjured hardly renders it so. The court finds nothing in the Raucci deposition to support this accusation. He admitted he could not recall several episodes and was unable to answer several questions. This is hardly remarkable eight years after the acts occurred.
Minor inconsistencies over such a period of time are hardly indicative of a conspiracy.
The suggestion encompassed in the claim recited above does not stand up to logical scrutiny.
What is being advanced here is the notion that there would not have been a conviction had the jury been told that the police already had information about the killings when the petitioner was interviewed. This is yet another attempt to convince a court that the petitioner's statement should be treated as a product of police tricking and coercion.
This claim is rejected.
CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing, the petition is denied.