SMITH, J. Like Moran v. Nafi Corporation, 370 Mich. 536, decided simultaneously, this case requires a determination of the question of whether the workmen's compensation act bars a wife from asserting against her husband's employer in a separate suit a claim for loss of consortium by reason of alleged negligence of the employer. Plaintiff filed her declaration in 1961 against Leonard Refineries and others, alleging that on the 15th day of February, 1958, her husband, Robert Balcer, was employed by defendant and appellant, Leonard Refineries, and while so employed and working in the course of his employment was severely injured in an explosion and fire occurring on the premises of Leonard Refineries. It was alleged that Leonard Refineries was negligent in failing to construct, install, maintain and supervise, and operate, the tanks, pipes, valves, and gauges used in conjunction with the manufacture and storage of butane gasoline.
Id. at 475. Moreover, although we regard the plain language of MCL 418.131 as decisive, we believe that our decision is reinforced by an understanding of the history of the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA. Helpful in this regard are this Court's companion decisions in Moran v. Nafi Corp, 370 Mich. 536; 122 N.W.2d 800 (1963), and Balcer v. Leonard Refineries, Inc, 370 Mich. 531; 122 N.W.2d 805 (1963). In both Moran and Balcer, we addressed whether a claim for loss of consortium against an employer based on an injury suffered by a spouse as an employee was barred by the then much less well-defined exclusive remedy provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which did not then, as it does now, expressly extend to persons other than an employee.
The wrongful death act supplies a cause of action for damages in cases of wrongful death. In Moran v. Nafi Corporation (1963), 370 Mich. 536, 545, 546, this Court construed the provisions of the workmen's compensation act to provide an exclusive remedy: "Permitting the maintenance of actions for damages in instances where the injured employee is entitled to, and has received, compensation under the statute would clearly be at variance with the express language as enacted by the legislature.
Reliance contends that the term "derivative injury" used in the workers' compensation cases carries the same meaning as "consequential injury" in its insurance policy. The only case that Reliance cites in support of this contention, Moran v. Nafi Corp., 370 Mich. 536, 122 N.W.2d 800 (1963), is inapposite. In Moran, the Michigan Supreme Court was deciding for the first time whether a wife's loss of consortium action against her husband's employer was barred by the exclusivity provisions of Michigan's workers' compensation act.
Plaintiffs next argue that the deceased's survivors retain an independent action against defendant for loss of society and companionship. However, because this alleged loss derives from the chief claim itself, it is also barred by the Worker's Disability Compensation Act. Moran v Nafi Corp, 370 Mich. 536; 122 N.W.2d 800 (1963); Bourassa v ATO Corp, 113 Mich. App. 517; 317 N.W.2d 669 (1982), lv den 414 Mich. 966 (1982); Cole v Dow Chemical Co, 112 Mich. App. 198; 315 N.W.2d 565 (1982). Plaintiffs next argue that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying their motion to file a second amended complaint. GCR 1963, 118.1. Although such motions are within the trial judge's discretion, they are to be freely granted whenever justice requires.
A wife is not permitted to maintain a separate action against her husband's employer for personal injuries sustained by her husband during his employment. Moran v Nafi Corp, 370 Mich. 536, 543; 122 N.W.2d 800 (1963). Because her husband's sole remedy was workers' compensation benefits, Mrs. Cole failed to state a cause of action which could survive defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Cases from other jurisdictions uniformly sustain the employer's right to invoke the immunity of the Act in actions by the wife or widow for loss of services and consortium on the ground that the right of the husband to benefits under the Act is exclusive not only as to him but where the Act so provides as to dependents as well. Ziegler v. United States Gypsum Co., 251 Iowa 714, 102 N.W.2d 152; McCain v. Travelers Ins. Co., La. App., 153 So.2d 124; Roseberry v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 70 N.M. 19, 369 P.2d 403; Moran v. Nafi Corp., 370 Mich. 536, 122 N.W.2d 800; Balcer v. Leonard Refineries, Inc., 370 Mich. 531, 122 N.W.2d 805. And see 101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation sec. 980, p. 452; Anno. 104 A.L.R. 346.
"In the case of the plaintiff wife, Dorothy A. Simerka, our Supreme Court has held that a wife's cause of action is barred by the workmen's compensation act, and the sole remedy of these plaintiffs is under the workmen's compensation act." Balcer v. Leonard Refineries, Inc., (1963), 370 Mich. 531 and Moran v. Nafi Corporation (1963), 370 Mich. 536, to which reference in above regard was probably made, were suits brought for loss of consortium by the wives respectively of employees injured "out of and in the course of" their employment. The employer in each instance was the defendant.
Ernest Brooks is barred from bringing a common-law action against his wife's coemployees. See Moran v. Nafi Corporation, 370 Mich. 536. The judgment should be affirmed.
When Wall was decided in 1922, part 1, § 4 of the act (CL 1915, § 5426 [CL 1929, § 8410, Stat Ann § 17.144]) was relied upon and emphasized by the Court as now indicated (p 437): Followed expressly in Varga v. Detroit Edison Co., 240 Mich. 593, 594, and Moran v. Nafi Corporation, 370 Mich. 536, 539, 545. "Any employer who has elected, with the approval of the industrial accident board, hereinafter created, to pay compensation as hereinafted provided, shall not be subject to the provisions of section 1; nor shall such employer be subject to any other liability whatsoever, save as herein provided for the death of or personal injury to any employee, for which death or injury compensation is recoverable under this act, except as to employees who have elected in the manner hereinafter provided not to become subject to the provisions of this act."