Opinion
No. 05-09-01286-CR
Opinion Filed July 1, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F99-70158-PI.
Before Justices BRIDGES, FITZGERALD, and FILLMORE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
John Martin Morales appeals from the adjudication of guilt for aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years. In a single issue, Morales contends the order of deferred adjudication and the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt should be modified. We modify and affirm the judgment adjudicating guilt. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled. Morales waived a jury and pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years of age. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i) (Vernon Supp. 2009). The trial court deferred adjudicating guilt, placed Morales on ten years' community supervision, and assessed a $1000 fine. The State later moved to adjudicate guilt, alleging Morales violated four conditions of his community supervision. Morales pleaded true to the allegations in a hearing on the motion. The trial court found the allegations true, adjudicated Morales guilty, and assessed punishment at six years' imprisonment. Morales contends the order of deferred adjudication should be modified to delete a $1000 fine that was not orally pronounced. Morales also contends the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt should be modified to recite the correct statute for the offense for which Morales was convicted. The State agrees that the judgment adjudicating guilt should be modified as proposed by Morales. As to the order of deferred adjudication, we dismiss Morales's complaint. The trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt set aside or supplanted the underlying deferred adjudication order. See Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); McCoy v. State, 81 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet. ref'd). Once the trial court adjudicated Morales's guilt, the deferred adjudication order was no longer in effect. See Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 502; McCoy, 81 S.W.3d at 919. Therefore, there is no longer an order in effect requiring modification. As to the judgment adjudicating guilt, we sustain Morales's issue. Morales was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years of age, which falls under section 22.021 of the penal code. The written judgment adjudicating guilt recites the statute for the offense as "22.01 Penal Code," which is the statute for assault. Thus, the written judgment is incorrect. We modify the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt to show the statute for the offense is "22.021 Penal Code." See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). We note that Morales's conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child subjects him to statutory sex offender registration requirements. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.001(5)(A), 62.051 (Vernon Supp. 2009). The trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt, however, recites that the sex offender registration requirements do not apply to appellant. Thus, the judgment is incorrect. We modify the judgment adjudicating guilt to show the sex offender registration requirements do apply to Morales, and that the age of the victim at the time of the offense was twelve years of age. As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt.