Summary
holding that a six-year statute of limitations governs alleged breach of an H-2A contract between employer and employee
Summary of this case from Sanchez v. Bland Farms, LLCOpinion
605CV062.
January 12, 2006
ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
In this labor law case, 15 plaintiffs, including Clemente Morales-Arcadio, along with 19 "opt-in" plaintiffs, bring claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and under state law for breach of their employment contracts. Doc. # 1; doc. # 28 (amended complaint). Defendants have filed a partial motion to dismiss, arguing that some of the plaintiffs' claims are barred by statutes of limitations. Doc. # 12.
II. BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs in this case are all Mexican nationals who were recruited by defendants for seasonal agricultural work on defendants' muscadine farm in Screven County, Georgia. Doc. # 28 at 2. Each year since 2000, defendant Shannon Produce Farms, Inc. ("Shannon Farms") has recruited guest workers from Mexico under the United States Department of Labor's H-2A program. Id. ¶¶ 32-33, 43. That program authorizes employers to seek guest workers when there are not sufficient U.S. workers to fill the employer's needs. Id. ¶¶ 32-35.
The H-2A program establishes minimum wages for such H-2A workers, and it also requires that employers pay certain transportation, food, and housing costs. Regulations prescribe that employers seeking such guest workers file "job orders" that describe the terms of the offered employment relationship; when accepted, that job order serves as a written contract between employer and employee. Id. ¶¶ 32-42; see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(14).
Each year from 2000 to 2005, defendant Shannon Farms recruited between 62 (for 2000) and 90 (for 2004 and 2005) H-2A workers. Doc. # 28 ¶¶ 44-54. Plaintiffs were among those H-2A guest workers hired by Shannon Farms from mid-July through late October or early November of each year between 2000 and 2005. Id. ¶¶ 48-54.
However, the plaintiff workers allege a number of violations of the H-2A program by Shannon Farms. Those allegations include two distinct sets of claims relevant here: (1) that the defendants violated the FLSA by "willfully" failing to pay them the federally-mandated minimum wage for all of their hours worked in 2002 through 2005; and (2) that the defendants breached their employment contracts by, inter alia, failing to pay the agreed-upon wages, failing to pay them for all hours worked, and failing to reimburse the workers for agreed-upon expenses for the years 2000 through 2005. Doc. # 28 ¶¶ 114-138, 139-211.
The 14 original plaintiffs filed this action on 7/11/05. Doc. # 1. One plaintiff and 19 "opt-in" plaintiffs later joined in the filing of an amended complaint. Doc. # 28. The defendants now move under F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss some of the plaintiffs' claims on the basis of both federal and state law statutes of limitations. Doc. # 12. III. ANALYSIS
The defendants' motion to dismiss was filed before the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint. Doc. ## 12, 28. However, the amended complaint only (1) added plaintiffs and (2) added claims for the year 2005. See doc. # 28. Thus, the amendments to the complaint do not affect the defendants' argument that some claims from 2000 to 2002 are barred by the limitations statutes. Doc. # 12.
A. Motion to Dismiss
On a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), "[t]he plaintiff's factual allegations are accepted as true. Dismissal is not appropriate unless it is plain that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would support the claims in the complaint." Next Century Comm. Corp. v. Ellis, 318 F.3d 1023, 1025 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). "In essence, the movant says, `Even if everything you allege is true, the law affords you no relief.'" U.S. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 755 F.Supp. 1040, 1046 (S.D.Ga. 1990). However, "conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual deductions, or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal." Next Century, 318 F.3d at 1025.
B. 3-Year FLSA Statute of Limitations
The defendants note that the plaintiffs' claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) are subject to a 3-year statute of limitations. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Claims for "willful" violations of the FLSA are subject to the 3-year statute of limitations, while "non-willful" violations are subject to a 2-year statute. Id. Since the plaintiffs have stated a claim for a willful violation of the FLSA, the Court will not consider the 2-year limitations period for purposes of this motion to dismiss. See Fowler v. Land Mgmt. Groupe, Inc., 978 F.2d 158, 162-63 (4th Cir. 1992) (the determination of "willfulness" under 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) is question of fact for jury); see also Schneider v. City of Springfield, 102 F.Supp.2d 827, 836 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
Defendants are correct in asserting that the plaintiffs' FLSA claims arising before 7/11/02 would be barred under 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Doc. # 12 at 2. As it turns out, though, the plaintiffs have not actually raised any FLSA claims arising prior to that date. Doc. # 28 ¶¶ 117-120, 128-131 (all FLSA claims arise from work done in 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005); id. ¶ 48 (contract called for work to begin on 7/10/02).
Though the work did begin on 7/10/02 — three years and one day before the plaintiffs filed their claim — there is no statute of limitations problem. The limitations period under 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) does not begin to run until the defendant takes the allegedly unlawful actions and the plaintiff learns of them. See, e.g., O'Connell v. Champion Int'l Corp., 812 F.2d 393, 394 (8th Cir. 1987); see also Cook v. U.S., 855 F.2d 848, 851 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[A] claim . . . under the FLSA accrues at the end of each pay period when it is not paid") (cite omitted). Since the plaintiffs here only began work at Shannon Farms on 7/10/02, they could not have learned of the defendants' failure to pay them until later. Therefore, the plaintiffs' FLSA claims filed on 7/11/05 were filed within 3 years of the date they accrued, and the defendants' motion to dismiss the FLSA claims must be denied. Doc. # 12.
Additionally, plaintiffs rightly note that their claims asserted in Count III arise under breach of contract law rather than under the FLSA. Doc. # 21 at 9-10; see doc. # 28 ¶¶ 139-155. Thus, the statute of limitations for state law breach of contract applies to that count, rather than the 3-year period from 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Avery v. City of Talladega, 24 F.3d 1337, 1348 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that FLSA did not preempt state law claim for wages under a contract).
C. State Breach of Contract Claims
The defendants also move to dismiss the plaintiffs' state law breach of contract claims arising prior to 7/11/03, arguing that a 2-year state statute of limitations bars those claims. Doc. # 12 at 2-4. Plaintiffs respond that their breach of contract claims are governed instead by the 6-year statute of limitations specified in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24. Doc. # 21 at 5.
The parties do not dispute that Georgia law applies to these state claims.
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 provides: "All actions upon simple contracts in writing shall be brought within six years after the same become due and payable. However, this Code section shall not apply to actions for the breach of contracts for the sale of goods . . . or to negotiable instruments. . . ."
Federal regulations make clear that H-2A workers hold contract claims for underpayment. 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(14); see also Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC, 305 F.3d 1228, 1246 n. 27 (11th Cir. 2002); De Luna-Guerrero v. N.C. Growers' Ass'n, Inc., 338 F.Supp.2d 649, 652 (E.D.N.C. 2004). Thus, by the plain terms of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24, the plaintiffs' breach of employment contract claims are governed by this six-year statute of limitations.
Defendants argue, nonetheless, that "the two-year statute in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22, and not the six-year statute for breach of a written contract, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24, applie[s] to an action for back wages, even when the wage claim is based on contract." Doc. # 12 at 3 (emphasis added). The Court cannot accept the defendants' argument, however, for the defendants have misconstrued the two cases on which they rely.
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 provides in pertinent part: "[A]ll actions for the recovery of wages . . . accruing under laws respecting the payment of wages and overtime shall be brought within two years after the right of action has accrued." Id. (emphasis and footnote added).
The defendants first cite City of Atlanta v. Adams, 256 Ga. 620 (1987). In that case, the Georgia Supreme Court held that O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22's two-year limitations period applied to the plaintiff employees' suit for back wages. Id. at 621. Though the court noted that there was a contract between the employees and employer, it held that the six-year statute of limitations could not apply because the contract would have been invalid "except that it was authorized by law." Id. at 621. Thus, since the action there was actually based on a local ordinance rather than a contract, the two-year period from O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 applied. Id.
The defendants similarly misconstrue Milhollin v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 272 Ga.App. 267 (2005). As in Adams, that court applied the two-year limitations period from O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 to bar plaintiff's claim for unpaid wages. Id. at 270-71. Since that plaintiff's claim was based solely on the state Labor Law statute, that court held that his claim arose "under law" and thus was subject to the two-year statute of limitations. Id. Indeed, that court noted that had the plaintiff's claim been based on a contract, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24's six-year period would have applied. Id. at 271.
Here, as noted above, regulations governing the H-2A program expressly state that the job order creates a contract between the employer and the employee. See supra at 1, 3 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(14)). Therefore, the six-year statute of limitations specified in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 applies.
All of the instant plaintiffs' state law breach of contract claims were filed on 7/11/05 — easily within six years of the dates on which they accrued. See doc. # 28 ¶¶ 141-211. It follows that the plaintiffs' state law breach of contract claims were timely filed under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the partial motion to dismiss filed by defendants Shannon Produce Farms, Inc., James G. Shannon Sr., and James G. Shannon Jr. is DENIED. Doc. # 12.