Opinion
Civil Action 20-3701
10-11-2022
LUIS MORALEAS, Petitioner, v. ERIC TICE, et al., Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
DAVID R. STRAWBRIDGE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court for a Report and Recommendation is the pro se petition of Luis Moraleas (“Moraleas” or “Petitioner”) for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Moraleas is currently incarcerated at SCI Somerset, serving a term of incarceration of 1224 years that was imposed on April 18, 2017 following his guilty plea and conviction in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas to charges of robbery and possession of an instrument of crime. He seeks federal habeas relief based on his assertion that trial counsel was ineffective when he allegedly told Moraleas that he faced a “third strike” sentence if convicted following trial when, he contends, he was facing only a sentence of 10-20 years. For the reasons set out below, we conclude that Petitioner has not established that he is entitled to habeas relief. Accordingly, we recommend that the petition be denied.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In preparing this Report, we have considered the Petition (Doc. 1); the Memorandum of Law in Support of 2254 Habeas Corpus Petition, with appended exhibits (Doc. 9); the response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 13); the state court opinion resolving the PCRA petition (filed July 8, 2019, and found in the state court record provided by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas); the PCRA appellate decision, Commonwealth v. Moraleas, No. 1488 EDA 2019, 2020 WL 1815790, 236 A.3d 1087 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 2020); the other components of the original Common Pleas record; and the Notes of Testimony provided by the District Attorney's Office at our request (Doc. 22).
The Superior Court's opinion on review of Petitioner's petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 9541-46 (“PCRA”), provides a succinct introduction to his state court judgment and the issues implicated by his petition:
Appellant committed an armed robbery of a Rent-A-Center store on May 23, 2015, and was charged with, inter alia, robbery, possession of firearm prohibited, firearms not to be carried without a license, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, carrying firearms in public in Philadelphia, possession of an instrument of crime, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person. On April 18, 2017, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea, under which he agreed to plead guilty to robbery and possessing an instrument of crime and receive standard-range sentences of ten to twenty years and two to four years, respectively, and the Commonwealth agreed to nolle pros the remaining counts. The trial court accepted the plea and imposed the agreed-upon sentence.
Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition raising the claim that plea counsel supplied Appellant with erroneous information about the maximum sentence he faced, and thereby induced him to enter an involuntary plea. Amended PCRA Petition, 2/5/18, at ¶ 8. After several continuances, a hearing was held at which plea counsel and Appellant testified. On April 16, 2019, the PCRA court denied Appellant's petition.Commonwealth v. Moraleas, 236 A.3d 1087, 2020 WL 1815790, *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 2020). Moraleas pressed his claim on appeal to the Superior Court, asserting that evidence had been presented to the PCRA Court that plea counsel's “communication of an erroneous and illegal maximum sentence” created an unlawfully-induced guilty plea; that Moraleas had been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel based on plea counsel's alleged assessment and communication of an incorrect and illegal sentence; and that the evidence presented to the PCRA Court established that his guilty plea was induced by plea counsel's ineffectiveness. See id. (citing Appellant's Br. at 7). The Superior Court ultimately recognized that it was “bound by” the factual findings of the PCRA Court that were supported by the record and that, therefore, Moraleas could not establish the predicate facts for his claim of ineffectiveness - namely, that counsel gave him inaccurate information about his potential exposure.
Surveillance footage captured clear images of a person who appeared to be Petitioner walking out of the store just after the robbery. See N.T., PCRA Hr'g, 4/16/19 at 18.
On or about July 27, 2020, Moraleas submitted the form petition for habeas corpus relief that is presently before the Court. (Doc. 1.) He asserts a single ground for relief: that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, where his lawyer “lied and told [him] that [he] was facing a third strike,” or “25 to 40years,” “when in actuality [Petitioner] was facing a 10 to 20 year sentence.” (Pet. at 8.) As set out further in a supporting memorandum he submitted on February 8, 2021, he seeks permission to withdraw his guilty plea. (Mem. at 5.) The Philadelphia District Attorney's Office filed an answer and memorandum of law in response to the petition on April 13, 2021. Petitioner did not avail himself of the opportunity to file a reply to Respondents' response.
Elsewhere, Moraleas describes the mandatory sentence as 25 to 50 years.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Before addressing the merits of Petitioner's claim, we describe the habeas petitioner's obligation to present to the state court any federal claims upon which he seeks federal review. We also address the standards for federal court review of claims already adjudicated in state court.
A. Standards for state-adjudicated claims
Where a claim presented in the habeas petition was properly presented and adjudicated on the merits in the state courts in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), the application for habeas relief may be granted by a federal court only if the state adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
“[C]learly established law” means “governing legal principle or principles set forth by the United States Supreme Court,” and is limited to law that existed at the time the state court rendered its decision. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). A state court decision is “contrary to” established federal law if it contradicts Supreme Court precedent “or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from that reached by the Supreme Court.'” Eley v. Erickson, 712 F.3d 837, 846 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Alternatively, a writ may issue under the “unreasonable application clause” if “the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle” from the Supreme Court “but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002).
When we examine whether the state court acted “reasonably” under § 2254(d)(1), we are “limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). If the state court's decision required making a factual determination, the state court's factual finding enjoys a presumption of correctness pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The petitioner bears the burden to rebut this presumption by presenting the Court with “clear and convincing evidence” to the contrary. Id.
B. Ineffectiveness of counsel under Strickland
To prove a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate: (1) his trial counsel's representation was deficient in that it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;” and (2) because trial counsel's representation was deficient, counsel's performance “prejudiced the defense” and “deprive[d] defendant of a fair trials.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
A court will find deficient performance if counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel' guaranteed” to the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687. This standard is not exhaustive but accounts for the variety of circumstances faced by counsel “and the range of legitimate decisions regarding how to best represent a criminal defendant.” Id. at 68889. Further, because a defendant can “second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence,” a court presumes counsel's conduct to be of sound strategy and requires the petitioner claiming ineffective assistance to identify specific errors by counsel. Id. See also, Stevens v. Del. Corr. Ctr., 295 F.3d 361, 370 (3d Cir. 2002).
The prejudice to the client is proven if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. In the context of ineffectiveness relative to a guilty plea, the petitioner must show that there was a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty if not for the actions or omissions of counsel and that he would instead have gone to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
III. DISCUSSION
Moraleas seeks federal habeas relief on the ground this his guilty plea resulted from ineffective assistance in that counsel erroneously advised him that he faced a mandatory “third strike” sentence of 25 to 50 years if convicted following a trial. He contends that he was induced to accept an offer that carried with it a 12-24 year sentence but that, in actuality, he was only going to be subject to a 10-20 year sentence upon conviction. (Pet. at 8; Mem. at 2.) We ultimately agree with the Superior Court that the PCRA Court's factual findings preclude the availability of relief on this ineffectiveness claim. We first review the circumstances of the guilty plea that gave rise to the state court's factual finding concerning the information known to Moraleas at the time he entered the plea. We then address his particular allegations ascribing deficient performance to plea counsel.
A. The circumstances of the guilty plea
Moraleas contends that he was “led” to enter his plea - which resulted in his receipt of a sentence of 12 to 24 years - due to “misinformation” from counsel that he faced 25 to 50 years in prison if he did not take the deal offered to him. (Mem. at 2-3.) These contentions arise from one of two mistakes that were apparently contained within an initial offer that the Commonwealth extended Moraleas during an early phase of his case, referred to as “the SMART Room.” The record before us does not include a copy of the written offer, although it was marked as an exhibit and described in the subsequent PCRA hearing. It was also described, however, in a letter that counsel sent to Moraleas on October 16, 2015, which reflected:
“SMART Rooms” were part of an initiative of the Court of Common Pleas to streamline operations and allow for earlier dispositions of cases. The acronym refers to Strategic, Management, Advance Review and Design, Readiness, and Trial.
The Offer extended by the Commonwealth is that you would plead “guilty” to the charges of Robbery and Violation of the Firearms Act - Person Prohibit [sic], which are graded as Felony 1st degree and
Felony of the 2nd degree, respectively. In addition, you would be subject to a period [of] incarceration in a State facility for a period of twelve (12) - twenty-four (24) monthsand be ordered to pay restitution (maybe $500.00 - $600.00). You should notice that the “Offer” sheet indicates that if you go to Trial and are found “guilty” the Commonwealth will address that this is a third (3rd) strike felony and request a mandatory sentence equal to twenty-five (25) years.(Doc. 9 at ECF p. 6.) There is no question, then, that counsel repeated to Moraleas early on that he was potentially exposed to a mandatory 25-year minimum sentence.
As discussed below, this was the other error in the offer letter: it conveyed an offer of a number of months of imprisonment that was meant to be years of imprisonment.
A year and a half later, on April 18, 2017, Moraleas appeared before Judge Minehart to enter a guilty plea to robbery and PIC - slightly different charges than those described in the SMART Room offer. Judge Minehart noted that those counts were a felony of the first degree and a misdemeanor of the first degree, and he stated that “those two charges would carry 25 years [and] a $35,000 fine[.]” (N.T. 4/18/17 at 5.) Judge Minehart memorialized, however, that the other charges were being withdrawn, that “the recommended sentence is 12-24 years,” and that Moraleas would get credit for time served. (Id.) Following a colloquy, the court accepted the plea. The defense waived the right to a presentence investigation, and the court imposed the sentence of 1020 years for robbery and a consecutive sentence of 2-4 years on the PIC count for an aggregate sentence of 12-24 years. (Id. at 10.)
The PCRA petition that Moraleas filed on November 13, 2017 prompted the first examination of the plea, as Moraleas did not file a direct appeal, request reconsideration of his sentence, or otherwise seek to withdraw his plea after he entered it in April of that year. At the hearing that the PCRA Court ultimately convened in April 2019, the parties stipulated that if Moraleas had been convicted of the crimes charged and if his criminal history were analyzed correctly, he would have been subject to a “second strike” mandatory penalty under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9714, which would have meant that the robbery conviction would have carried a mandatory sentence of 10-20 years. The parties also stipulated, however, that the Commonwealth's offer sheet incorrectly indicated that if he were convicted of a violent crime arising from these charges it would be Moraleas's third strike. See N.T., PCRA Hr'g, 4/16/19 at 8, 13. For his part, plea counsel, James T. Marsh, Esquire, testified at the PCRA hearing that he had known that the conviction would not have been a third strike and that he told Moraleas that the written offer's reference to a third strike was a mistake. (Id. at 8-9.) He testified that he recalled advising the District Attorney's Office “that there was a mistake regarding [the] prior record,” and suggested that he had a specific memory of this because he “tried to accept the 12 to 24” offer that appeared on the SMART Room sheet and wanted to have his client brought in for that plea to lock in “the unbelievable offer” of 12 to 24 months (id. at 8-9):
Pennsylvania's “three strikes” law allows for “heightened punishment for repeat offenders” who commit crimes of violence and where their crimes are separated by an intervening opportunity to reform.” See Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 879 A.2d 185, 186 (Pa. 2005). In this case, Moraleas had committed five robberies in a two-month span in 2003 and was convicted of them in 2005. The 2015 robbery at issue here was the first violent crime Moraleas committed after he served his prior sentences and had the opportunity to reform. Accordingly, when the issue was examined, it was clear that Moraleas was not subject to the third strike provision of 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9714. See Moraleas, 2020 WL 1815790, *2 n.1.
Q. And what happened with that?
A. That's when they believed there's a third strike. Then we had the discussions about the second strike. And I still thought it should have been a better offer. Then they said, well, we'll agree that it's not a third strike, but you can plea him open. And I declined that offer because I knew it'd be rather - I think it would have been a rather significant sentence there also.
Q. So, ultimately, what happened with regards to preparation - or plea discussions in this case?
A. I believe it came down to that we were rejecting the offer, naturally. I filed a notice of alibi with - to relatives. ... I talked to him on the day of trial and said: Well, there is an offer now. There's a definite offer of 10 to 20 on the robbery, and then it was 2 to 4 consecutively on the possession of an instrument of a crime, so an F1 and an M2.(Id. at 9-10.) Attorney Marsh testified that the DA's Office later revised the offer to change the period of 12-24 months to 12-24 years. (Id. at 13.) This document was also presented at the PCRA hearing with the word “months” crossed out and “years” added.
Presumably the offer for an open plea, leaving the sentence entirely to the discretion of the court.
Attorney Marsh further explained at the PCRA hearing that if the case had gone to trial in 2017 and Moraleas was convicted, he believed that Judge Minehart would have imposed “a rather significant sentence,” as he “would have been considering that it would be a fifth conviction for robbery.” (Id. at 10.) He testified that he did communicate all of that information to Morales -including his assessment of the weakness of his defense - although he had no contemporaneous notes or other documentation of communications with Moraleas about how his prior record would impact his sentencing in this case. (Id. at 11.) Marsh testified that he communicated to Moraleas that he believed the court would sentence him to 20 to 40 years if he went to trial, which was “why I thought the 12 to 24 was pretty good.” (Id. at 18.)
Moraleas testified at the PCRA hearing that the letter he received from Attorney Marsh referring to the third strike led him to believe he faced “life imprisonment,” and that Attorney Marsh never told him that he was not “looking at a life sentence.” (Id. at 21-22.) He testified that Attorney Marsh told him that Judge Minehart would sentence him to 50 years in prison if he went to trial and was convicted. (Id. at 22.) He testified that he did not want to plead guilty but that he did so because he was deceived that his conviction would have been a third strike and a possible life sentence. (Id. at 22-23.)
At the conclusion of the PCRA hearing, Judge Minehart announced his factual finding that Attorney Marsh “conveyed to the Defendant that it was not a third strike and that the smart room offer was the best that he could recommend[,] because if it went to trial, and it was an open plea, with someone on a video, the sentence might have been - it wouldn't have been 50 years, but it would have been [sic] a good chance it would have been heavier than 12 to 24.” (Id. at 30.) This finding was confirmed in the court's subsequent written opinion, in which Judge Minehart explained that he “found Mr. Marsh credible and appellant not so with regard to whether appellant was aware that if he were convicted in the instant matter, he would not be subject to a Third Strike sentence.” Moraleas, slip op. at 7 (Phila. Comm. Pl. Ct. July 8, 2019). The state court thus found as a matter of fact that, regardless of the reference in the guilty plea offer sheet from 2015, Moraleas entered his plea in 2017 knowing that he would receive a negotiated sentence of 12-24 years and that if he proceeded to trial, while he did not face a “third strike” mandatory minimum sentence, he ran the real risk of an aggregate sentence greater than even the “second strike” mandatory minimum sentence of 10-20 years that would have applied to the robbery count.
We note that at the guilty plea hearing, the court made reference to Moraleas facing “25 years and a $35,000 fine” on these two charges if he had proceeded to trial. This does not appear correct. Yet it is not the court's description at the proceeding regarding his exposure at trial but rather counsel's advice leading up to the plea hearing that Petitioner attributes as the impetus for his decision to plead guilty when he appeared before Judge Minehart on April 18, 2017.
B. Deficient performance?
With respect to the first prong of the Strickland standard, Moraleas has not shown that Attorney Marsh made such “serious” errors that he was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed to him under the Sixth Amendment. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The state court found as a matter of fact that lawyer and client discussed the sentencing guidelines, the maximum sentences permitted under the statute, and how the offered negotiated sentence recommended by counsel was sound advice given the circumstances. While Moraleas properly notes that he would be exposed to nothing more than a 10-20 year sentence on the burglary charge, it was also the case that he faced several other charges, including for possession of a prohibited firearm, firearms not to be carried without a license, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, carrying firearms in public in Philadelphia, possession of an instrument of crime, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person. The Superior Court reasonably determined, based on the PCRA Court's credibility assessment and factual findings, that Moraleas “did have accurate information from plea counsel at the time he pled guilty.” Moraleas, 2020 WL 1815790, at *3 (emphasis added). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (permitting habeas relief if state court adjudication was based upon an “unreasonable determination of the facts”). Inasmuch as Moraleas cannot demonstrate that trial counsel's representation was deficient, his claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
IV. CONCLUSION
Moraleas has not met his burden to show that the adjudication by the state court of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim resulted in a decision that was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, nor based on an unreasonable determination of fact. Rather, the adjudication of his claim was not unreasonable in light of Strickland and given the finding by the state court that, notwithstanding what counsel represented to him from the initial “Smart Room” offer sheet, Moraleas understood at the time he was pleading guilty that he would not have been subjected to a mandatory, 25-year minimum “third-strike” sentence had he proceeded to trial. Petitioner's attempts to undermine the correctness of the state court's factual finding fail where he has not presented “clear and convincing evidence” to undermine the correctness of the facts found by the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The text of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) thus clearly forecloses relief.
Under Local Appellate Rule 22.2 of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, when a final order denying a habeas petition is issued, the district judge is required to determine whether a Certificate of Appealability (COA) should be issued. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), a habeas court may not issue a COA unless “the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). A COA is not issued unless we believe that reasonable jurists would debate whether the petition stated a valid claim for the denial of a constitutional right. See id. For the reasons set forth below, we do not believe reasonable jurists would find the Court erred in denying the petition. Accordingly, we do not believe a COA should issue. Our Recommendation follows.
RECOMMENDATION
AND NOW, this 11th day of October 2022, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be DENIED. It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability should NOT ISSUE, as we do not believe that Petitioner has demonstrated that reasonable jurists would debate the correctness of the denial of his claim.
Petitioner may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. See Local Civ. Rule 72.1. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.